




Myndigheten för
totalförsvarsanalys

Development of the preparedness sectors

Interim report 4 of the government assignment to evaluate the implementation of the new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness



Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis

Development of the preparedness sectors – Main report
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Summary

The new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness entered into force on 1 October 2022. The government has tasked the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis (MTFA) with following up and evaluating agencies' implementation of the new structure over a period of three years. In this interim report, we evaluate the implementation of the preparedness sectors, which are one of the key components of the new structure.

Our evaluation shows that in 2023 and 2024, the preparedness sectors have largely been engaged in capability-building activities. Inter alia, they have established meeting arrangements, developed procedures for the sector's work and produced joint documents. The agencies in the sectors argue that they now need to move away from capability-building intra-sectoral activities and towards capability-building activities. Furthermore, there needs to be an increase in collaboration with county administrative boards responsible for civil areas, as well as other sectors. We assess that this is starting to happen, too. As regards collaboration with the business sector, this has progressed in a number of sectors, but not in all.

All in all, we assess that collaboration is working well in most of the sectors. However, we have identified a number of factors that have adversely affected the establishment of the sectors. High staff turnover has been a problem for most of the sector-responsible agencies, which has affected the pace of development for the sectors. Additionally, the agencies in the sectors find the overall volume of reporting and information gathering to be labour-intensive and time-consuming. Furthermore, the sectors have had to spend a lot of time interpreting and defining the meaning of sectoral responsibility. The sector-responsible agencies have interpreted the operational role of the sectors in different ways, for instance.

1. Introduction

The new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness entered into force on 1 October 2022.¹ The government has tasked the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis (MTFA) with following up and evaluating agencies' implementation of the new structure over a period of three years. The assignment is formulated as follows:

The government has allocated the following assignment to MTFA:

The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis shall follow up and evaluate agencies' implementation of the new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness and the agencies' prerequisites for this. In its work, the agency shall operate on the basis of the goals adopted by the Riksdag for total defence, military defence and civil defence. Follow-up and evaluation shall focus on the agencies' coordination and establishment of work under the new civil defence structure, and also on how the structure contributes to efficient use of resources in order to achieve the set goals.²

In the first interim report of the government assignment, MTFA mapped the regulatory financial criteria for the agencies' work with the new structure. The second interim report was a follow-up and evaluation of the agencies' work on establishing civil areas. The third interim report was a follow-up and evaluation of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's system support role in the structure.

In this report, we follow up and evaluate the implementation of the preparedness sectors, which are one of the key components of the new structure. Each preparedness sector includes a number of preparedness agencies, one of which is designated as the sector-responsible agency. The tasks of sector-responsible agencies are primarily regulated in the Ordinance

¹ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524); Ordinance on county administrative boards responsible for civil areas (2022:525); Ordinance amending the Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002). See also Ministry of Justice, Ärendeförteckning I, ärende 18, regeringssammanträde 2022-05-19; dir. 2018:79, *Ansvar, ledning och samordning inom civilt försvar*; government press conference, 18 May 2022.

² Ministry of Defence, *Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2023 avseende Myndigheten för totalförsvarsanalys*, Fö2022/01177, Fö2022/01610 (in part), 21 December 2022. The final report on the assignment is to be submitted by 30 November 2025.

on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524) (hereinafter referred to as the Preparedness Ordinance).

1.1 Our interpretation of the assignment

In this section, we set out key starting points for our work on following up and evaluating the implementation of preparedness sectors. Our evaluation covers the period from 1 October 2022 to the spring of 2025.

1.1.1 Coordination and establishment of work by agencies under the new structure

According to the government assignment, we are to focus on coordination and establishment of work by agencies under the new civil defence structure. As collaboration is primarily the method used by agencies to achieve coordination, their collaboration is also key to understanding the structure of the new organisation.

1.1.2 Efficient use of resources

The government assignment also requires us to focus on how the structure contributes to efficient use of resources in order to attain the set goals. As the structural reform is in an implementation phase, it is too early to assess whether the preparedness sectors are contributing to efficient use of resources.

1.1.3 Programme-theoretical approach

We apply a programme-theoretical approach in order to follow up and evaluate the new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness. In simplified terms, this means that we evaluate our results against the purposes of the reform. We have opted to refer to these purposes as ‘intentions’.

1.2 Purpose, intentions and research questions

1.2.1 Purpose

The purpose of this interim report is to follow up and evaluate the agencies’ work on implementing the preparedness sectors.

1.2.2 Identified intentions

The Preparedness Ordinance does not explicitly state the purposes of the preparedness sectors. Nor did the government provide any explanatory memorandum when the ordinance was adopted. Therefore, we have based our work on the tasks relating to the preparedness sectors in the

Preparedness Ordinance. Working on the basis of these, we have also analysed the Committee on Defence's report Ds 2017:66 *Motståndskraft* [Resilience], SOU 2021:25 *Struktur för ökad motståndskraft* [Structure for increased resilience], and its directives. Our combined interpretation is that the preparedness sectors are intended to contribute to

1. good coordination of capability planning between the agencies included in a preparedness sector
2. capability for effective operational management in peacetime crisis situations and heightened preparedness
3. good coordination with preparedness agencies in other sectors, as well as with the Swedish Armed Forces and county administrative boards responsible for civil areas
4. good collaboration with the business sector
5. strong capability to maintain vital societal functions.

1.2.3 Research questions

Our overarching research question is whether the introduction of preparedness sectors to date is helping to achieve the intentions that we have identified.

We have also worked on the following subsidiary questions:

- a) How have agencies within the preparedness sectors interpreted their joint assignments?
- b) How has the establishment of the preparedness sectors been implemented?
- c) What results have been generated by the work in the preparedness sectors?

1.3 Method and implementation

We have studied all preparedness sectors as part of ten sub-projects; and these have then formed the basis for our overall analysis. Our studies for seven of the sectors are based mainly on semi-structured qualitative interviews conducted with relevant actors, as well as on document studies. Most of the interviews were conducted in the autumn of 2024 and in early 2025. In total, we interviewed representatives of 37 central government agencies, 22 industry organisations, two companies and one municipal association. We interviewed around 90 people in total. See the appendix for a full list of interviews and references.

We have based our work for the Energy Supply, Food Supply and Drinking Water, and Transport sectors on a study carried out by the Committee on Defence on these sectors. The Committee on Defence's report was published in November 2024 and is based on interviews that were conducted in the spring of 2024³. We have subsequently supplemented the material from the Committee on Defence's report with some of our own interviews and document studies.

We have also conducted a survey of sector-responsible agencies regarding matters such as financial and human resources, as well as the documents produced by the sectors.

Quality assurance of the report has been conducted via MTFAs internal procedures and with the support of the agency's Scientific Advisory Board. All ten sector-responsible agencies, the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency have been offered the opportunity to fact-check chapters 1 to 7 of the appendix. Furthermore, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise has fact-checked the section on cooperation with the business sector in section 7.4 of the appendix.

1.4 The report is divided into two documents

This main document addresses the research questions for the evaluation. The empirical basis for our conclusions is presented in an appendix. The appendix includes in-depth descriptions of work within the preparedness sectors and their collaboration with external actors. It also describes the resource-related conditions for the preparedness sectors. An international comparison with sectors in other countries is also provided. When referring to the appendix, *appendix* and the number of the section are indicated. When making references within the main report, we refer only to the section number.

1.5 Terminology

The report uses the following terms:

Vital societal function refers to a societal function that is necessary for society's basic needs, values or security. These functions are maintained and ensured by societally vital activities.⁴

³ Committee on Defence, *Uppföljning av det civila försvaret – erfarenheter från tre beredskapssektorer*, 2024.

⁴ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Lista med viktiga samhällsfunktioner*, 2023.

A *societally vital activity* is an activity, service or infrastructure that maintains or ensures societal functions that are necessary for society's basic needs, values or security.⁵

Capability planning refers to planning aimed at creating capability in the short to medium term (1–10 years).⁶

Preparatory planning refers to generic or scenario-specific planning in order to deal with potential events that may have a significant impact on society.⁷

Preparedness sector refers to the ten preparedness sectors and their associated agencies as listed in the Preparedness Ordinance. We often refer to these using the term *sector*.

Collaboration is defined here as achieving direction and coordination through information sharing and agreements in contexts where no party has a mandate to make decisions about anyone else.⁸

1.6 Are the preparedness sectors separate entities?

Sector-responsible agencies have a number of tasks that are set out in the Preparedness Ordinance. Under the same ordinance, other preparedness agencies in the sector must participate in the work and report to the sector-responsible agency. However, there are no regulated tasks for the preparedness sector as a collective.

The starting point for our evaluation is when the agencies in a preparedness sector work jointly, and when a sector-responsible agency acts on the basis of its sectoral responsibility.

Agencies in most of the preparedness sectors have jointly adopted foundational documents in which they have interpreted aspects such as the sector's responsibilities, purpose and goals. The sectors also have common preparatory procedures. They make regular joint decisions on different types of documents and material. The agencies also conduct joint activities within the framework for the sector.

⁵ Section 6 of the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524).

⁶ MSBFS 2025:4 MSB föreskrifter och allmänna råd om statliga myndigheters uppgifter inför och vid höjd beredskap.

⁷ MSBFS 2025:4 MSB föreskrifter och allmänna råd om statliga myndigheters uppgifter inför och vid höjd beredskap.

⁸ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Gemensamma grunder – Termsamling*, 2025.

Therefore, we argue that the sectors are entities to some extent, even though they are not entities in the legal sense. In our report, therefore, we use phrases such as *sector X has decided on document Y*.

The agencies within the sectors have jointly interpreted the meaning of the Preparedness Ordinance and identified the work that they are to carry out together. We refer to this as having *interpreted their assignment*, even though they have not formally been allocated an explicit joint assignment by the government.

2. The structural reform in brief

The new structure for civil defence and society's emergency preparedness is part of the ambition to strengthen Sweden's total defence. In May 2022, the government adopted new ordinances and amendments to ordinances and presented them as a structural reform of the organisation of the state. The purpose of the structure is to create clearer lines of responsibility and leadership and to strengthen coordination in the field of civil defence.⁹

In concrete terms, this structural reform comprises

- the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524) (hereinafter referred to as the Preparedness Ordinance)
- the Ordinance on county administrative boards responsible for civil areas (2022:525)
- amendments to the Ordinance on total defence and heightened preparedness (2015:1053) and the Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), as well as a number of adjustments to the instructions of several other agencies.

In the first interim report of this government assignment, we worked on the basis of the above-mentioned ordinances and assessed that the new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness includes four main elements:

- an increase in the responsibilities and tasks of central government agencies in the field of civil defence and societal crisis preparedness
- designation of certain central government agencies as preparedness agencies, categorisation of the majority of these preparedness agencies into ten different preparedness sectors, and designation of ten sector-responsible agencies
- geographical division of county administrative boards into six civil areas with six designated county administrative boards responsible for civil areas

⁹ Ministry of Justice, Ärendeförteckning I, ärende 18, regeringssammanträde 2022-05-19; Dir. 2018:79, *Ansvar, ledning och samordning inom civilt försvar*; government press conference, 18 May 2022.

- The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) in the role of a coordinating and supporting function within the structure.¹⁰

2.1 The new structure is based on a responsibility staircase

As the first two points above suggest, the new structure can be said to be based on a responsibility staircase for central government agencies:

- **All central government agencies** have a basic preparedness responsibility. This is regulated in Sections 7 to 17 of the Preparedness Ordinance.
- **Preparedness agencies** bear responsibility within one or more vital societal functions and conduct activities of particular importance for societal crisis preparedness and total defence. The responsibilities of the preparedness agencies are set out in Sections 7 to 17 and 19 to 22 of the Preparedness Ordinance.
- Within their individual preparedness sectors, **sector-responsible agencies** must lead efforts to coordinate measures prior to and during peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness. The responsibilities of the sector-responsible agencies are set out in Sections 7 to 17, 19 to 22 and 24 to 25 of the Preparedness Ordinance.

¹⁰ Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis, *Uppföljning och utvärdering av ny struktur för civilt försvar och samhällets krisberedskap*, Interim report 1, 2023.

3. On preparedness sectors

This chapter describes how the preparedness sectors are organised and what tasks they perform. In-depth descriptions of the sectors are provided in chapter 3 of the appendix.

3.1 How is a preparedness sector defined?

There is no regulatory definition of what constitutes a preparedness sector. Section 23 of the Preparedness Ordinance states only the following

Certain preparedness agencies shall be included in preparedness sectors. In each preparedness sector, one of the preparedness agencies shall be the sector-responsible agency. Other preparedness agencies in the sector shall participate in the work.

An appendix to the Preparedness Ordinance provides a list of the sectors included, which agencies are responsible for each sector, and which other agencies are included in the sectors.

3.2 Division into preparedness sectors

SOU 2021:25 *Struktur för ökad motståndskraft* [Structure for increased resilience] specified three criteria to be fulfilled by a preparedness sector:

- A preparedness sector shall be delimited and specific, and include vital societal functions with strong interdependencies.
- A preparedness sector shall be important for total defence and for peacetime emergency preparedness.
- A preparedness sector shall include societally vital activities where there is a strong need for coordination in planning and for preparedness measures.¹¹

On this basis, the intention of the inquiry was for a sector to comprise the central government agencies that are directly or indirectly responsible for the vital societal functions in question.

At present, the ten preparedness sectors include 61 preparedness agencies. These are listed in Table 1. It should be noted that the sector-responsible agencies also maintain the role of preparedness agency in their respective sectors.

¹¹ SOU 2021:25 *Struktur för ökad motståndskraft*, p. 213.

Besides the preparedness agencies included in the ten preparedness sectors, there are also three preparedness agencies (the Swedish Migration Agency, the Psychological Defence Agency and the Swedish National Agency for Education) that are not included in any sector.

Table 1. Preparedness sectors and agencies included¹².

Sector	Sector-responsible agency	Other agencies included in the sector
Economic Security	Swedish Social Insurance Agency	Swedish Public Employment Service* ¹³ Swedish Pensions Agency Swedish National Debt Office Swedish Tax Agency National Government Service Centre* Swedish Payments Agency*
Electronic Communications and Postal Services	Swedish Post and Telecom Authority	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency Svenska kraftnät Swedish Transport Administration
Energy Supply	Swedish Energy Agency	Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate* Swedish Radiation Safety Authority Svenska kraftnät
Financial Services	Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority	Sveriges Riksbank ¹⁴ Swedish National Debt Office
Provision of Core Data	Swedish Tax Agency	Swedish Companies Registration Office* Lantmäteriet* (the Swedish mapping, cadastral and land registration agency) Agency for Digital Government*
Health, Care and Welfare	National Board of Health and Welfare	Swedish eHealth Agency Public Health Agency of Sweden Swedish Medical Products Agency

¹² Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524, Annex 2.

¹³ An asterisk (*) denotes an agency that did not have monitoring responsibilities previously, before the introduction of the reform.

¹⁴ The Riksbank, which is an agency under the Riksdag, is not formally part of the Financial Services sector but participates voluntarily in its work.

Food Supply and Drinking Water	Swedish Food Agency	Swedish Board of Agriculture County administrative boards ¹⁵ Swedish Environmental Protection Agency* Swedish Veterinary Agency
Security, Law and Order	Swedish Police Authority	Swedish National Courts Administration* Prison and Probation Service* Swedish Coast Guard Swedish Migration Agency ¹⁶ Swedish Security Service Swedish Customs Swedish Prosecution Authority*
Rescue Services and Civil Protection	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency	Swedish Coast Guard County administrative boards ¹⁷ Swedish Police Authority Swedish Maritime Administration Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute* Swedish Radiation Safety Authority
Transport	Swedish Transport Administration	Swedish Civil Aviation Administration Swedish Maritime Administration Swedish Transport Agency

3.3 Tasks of the sector-responsible agencies

The Preparedness Ordinance thus sets out the tasks for which preparedness agencies and sector-responsible agencies are to stand responsible prior to and during peacetime crisis situations and heightened preparedness. However, the ordinance does not specify in greater detail which tasks the agencies included in a preparedness sector should jointly perform as a sector.

The tasks of the sector-responsible agencies are regulated in Sections 24–25 of the Preparedness Ordinance and Section 8 of the Ordinance on total

¹⁵ All 21 county administrative boards are part of the Food Supply and Drinking Water sector. However, they are represented in the sector by one or two county administrative boards.

¹⁶ Co-opted participant in the sector.

¹⁷ All 21 county administrative boards are part of the Rescue Services and Civil Protection sector. However, the collective of county administrative boards has mainly been represented by a representative from the County Administrative Board of Gävleborg, and sometimes by a representative from the Örebro County Administrative Board.

defence and heightened preparedness (2015:1053). Sector-responsible agencies must

- within their individual preparedness sectors, lead efforts to coordinate measures prior to and during peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness
- drive work within the preparedness sector
- support the preparedness agencies
- ensure that tasks and roles are clarified within the preparedness sector
- ensure that the measures undertaken by the preparedness agencies within the preparedness sector are coordinated with the measures undertaken by other preparedness agencies, including county administrative boards and county administrative boards responsible for civil areas, as well as the Swedish Armed Forces
- ensure that there is collaboration with the business sector to the extent necessary.

In the event of a peacetime crisis situation or heightened preparedness, sector-responsible agencies must also

- keep the government informed of developments, the situation, anticipated developments and available resources within its area of responsibility, and also of measures undertaken and planned
- provide supporting material to the government on the prioritisation and allocation of resources in the preparedness sector, if necessary
- provide the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency with the information needed to allow the agency to fulfil its tasks.

This information must also include the situation in the preparedness sector's area of responsibility.¹⁸

Prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness, sector-responsible agencies must also

- provide supporting material to the county administrative boards responsible for civil areas to enable them to fulfil their tasks¹⁹
- provide the Swedish Armed Forces with the supporting material needed to allow the agency to fulfil its obligation to provide information to the government.²⁰

¹⁸ Section 25 of the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524).

¹⁹ Section 22 of the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524).

²⁰ Section 8 of the Ordinance on total defence and heightened preparedness (2015:1053).

This information must also include the situation in the preparedness sector's area of responsibility.²¹

3.3.1 The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency has specified certain tasks for sector-responsible agencies in a regulation

On 20 April 2025, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency adopted regulations on the tasks of central government agencies prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness. These state that in addition to the tasks applicable to preparedness agencies, sector-responsible agencies must²²

- implement and document capability planning for the preparedness sector with a view to achieving coordination in the agencies' planning
- carry out preparatory planning and compile plans covering the tasks involved in being a sector-responsible agency.

3.4 Preparedness agencies carry out most preparedness work individually

We have evaluated the agencies' work on implementing the preparedness sectors. However, it should be emphasised that the agencies primarily carry out the tasks incumbent upon them prior to peacetime crisis situations and heightened preparedness in their capacity as individual preparedness agencies.

Non-sector-responsible preparedness agencies have a number of specific tasks related to their sectoral work. They must

- participate in the work of the sector to which they belong²³
- submit a risk and vulnerability assessment to the sector-responsible agency²⁴
- prior to and during peacetime crisis situations and heightened preparedness, provide the sector-responsible agency with the information needed for the sector-responsible agency to fulfil its tasks²⁵.

²¹ Section 25 of the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524).

²² MSBFS 2025:4 MSB:s föreskrifter och allmänna råd om statliga myndigheters uppgifter inför och vid höjd beredskap.

²³ Section 23 of the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524).

²⁴ Section 19 of the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524).

²⁵ Section 22 of the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524).

4. Structure of the preparedness sectors

This chapter sets out how the agencies included in the sectors have interpreted the sectoral assignment and how the preparedness sectors have been established. We also describe factors that have facilitated the work of the sectors, as well as general challenges for the sectors.

4.1 Interpretation of the assignment

The work of the preparedness sectors on interpreting the assignment is presented in greater detail in chapter 4 of the appendix.

The Preparedness Ordinance does not specify which tasks the agencies included in a preparedness sector should jointly perform as a sector. As there are no explanatory memoranda setting out the government's aims and considerations, this has created significant scope for interpretation, with the preparedness sectors themselves largely being able to define their assignments. A number of agencies argue that this has meant that the preparedness sectors have had to spend a great deal of time interpreting and defining the meaning of sectoral responsibility. This interpretation work has also taken place within the framework of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's meeting structure for sector-responsible agencies and county administrative boards responsible for civil areas.

The interpretations concern aspects such as the purpose and goals of the sectors, as well interpretation of the wording of the Preparedness Ordinance. This also concerns whether actors other than the designated agencies can be regarded as forming part of the sector; and if so, which actors these are. The sectors have arrived at differing interpretations of their assignments in these and other respects. This also concerns the operational role to be played by the sector.

Most²⁶ of the sectors have codified these interpretations in overarching documents referred to as foundational documents, orientation documents or agreements. Such documents define a sector's area of responsibility, purpose and goals, for example, as well as regulating the division of roles and labour

²⁶ Foundational documents or equivalent have been adopted in seven of the sectors. A foundational document is being prepared in the Economic Security sector. The Provision of Core Data sector is considering whether to produce a foundational document. At the present time, the Financial Services sector is not planning to develop a foundational document.

between the sector's agencies. The documents take the form of agreements between the agencies at Director-General or management level.

Work on interpreting the joint assignment is continuing even in several of the sectors that have foundational documents.

4.1.1 Vital societal functions constitute areas of responsibility for the sectors

SOU 2021:25 *Struktur för ökad motståndskraft* [Structure for increased resilience] used vital societal functions as a basis for defining the areas of responsibility for the preparedness sectors. However, the Preparedness Ordinance does not specify which vital societal functions are included in a sector; instead, it indicates only the names of the preparedness sectors and which agencies are included in them.

Our evaluation shows that the preparedness sectors mainly focused on the vital societal functions when defining their areas of responsibility. The sectors themselves – in cooperation with the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency – have defined what these functions are. These are listed in the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's list of vital societal functions. The ten preparedness sectors cover a total of 40 vital societal functions. These are presented in chapter 4 of the appendix.

4.1.2 Sectoral responsibilities at regional level

Only the Transport preparedness sector has opted to apply sectoral responsibility at a regional level. The Swedish Transport Administration has adapted its regional organisation to correspond to the division into civil areas. This work is primarily aimed at local and regional actors within the transport system. This also includes collaboration with the county administrative boards responsible for civil areas, which means that the Transport sector has its own interface between sectoral responsibility and geographical area responsibility. Other agencies in the preparedness sector have limited resources for participation in work at regional level.

4.2 How the sectors were established

Our evaluation shows that overall, the preparedness sectors have been established in similar ways. The agencies in the sectors initially focused on capability-building activities that aimed to develop forms for internal collaboration between the sectors. Collaboration was then developed with other sectors and civil areas, for instance.

Work within the preparedness sectors is described in greater detail in chapter 6 of the appendix; while the sectors' collaboration with external actors is described in chapter 7 of the appendix.

4.2.1 Staffing

Initially, the sector-responsible agencies have staffed their own sectoral offices. This has taken varying amounts of time. High staff turnover has impacted work in most sectors, and continues to do so. This is applicable to both sector-responsible agencies and other preparedness agencies.

4.2.2 Establish meeting arrangements, working groups and networks

All sectors have established meeting arrangements at three hierarchical levels, corresponding to those applicable to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's meeting structure. Tasks, mandates and meeting frequency vary between sectors.

All sectors have established some form of working group. The number of working groups per sector varies between 1 and 9. Much of the work in the sectors is carried out within these working groups. Seven of the sectors have also established networks. The purpose of the networks is to share intelligence and carry out joint development work in a specific area, such as law or protective security.

4.2.3 Establish procedures for the sector's work

The sectors have developed procedures for aspects such as meeting structures and the preparation of joint matters. This also includes procedures for more operational collaboration such as situation reporting and collaboration between the agencies' duty officers and communications officers. Work on developing procedures is ongoing in most sectors.

4.2.4 Supporting new preparedness agencies

Sector-responsible agencies have supported new preparedness agencies²⁷ that were not previously designated as agencies with monitoring responsibilities. This included the field of communications security, for example. Other preparedness agencies have also provided support.

²⁷ This refers to preparedness agencies that were not agencies with monitoring responsibilities prior to the structural reform.

4.2.5 Identify and plan joint measures

During the initial period, the sectors spent time on reaching agreement what they should do jointly as a sector, and what each agency should do individually. This has been translated into short-term and long-term action plans. However, most sectors are continuing to work on interpreting what should be done jointly.

4.2.6 Develop joint documents

The sectors have spent a great deal of time producing joint documents. The most important of these is the foundational document, which is described in greater detail in chapter 4 and section 6.3 of the appendix. Other common documents are:

- Ten-year plan
- Annual work plan
- Training and exercise strategy

4.2.7 Build a collaborative structure with the business sector

Structures for collaboration with industry organisations or directly with key companies have been established in most of the sectors where a large proportion of societally vital activities are carried out by the business sector. Some form of structure was generally in place already, but in several cases this situation was altered with the introduction of the preparedness sectors.

Some sectors – such as Electronic Communications and Postal Services and Transport – have worked actively on collaboration with the business sector from the outset. For other sectors, collaboration with the business sector has begun to develop more actively as collaboration between the sector's agencies has progressed.

4.2.8 Establish collaboration arrangements with external actors

In addition to collaboration with the business sector, the sectors have also begun to establish collaboration arrangements with other preparedness sectors, with county administrative boards responsible for civil areas, and with the Swedish Armed Forces. This is described further in section 6.1.3.

Our view is that the sectors' external collaboration has mainly developed in the latter part of 2024, and in 2025.

4.3 Activities carried out by the preparedness sectors

Our information shows that most of the sectors have mainly focused on capability-building activities and, to a lesser extent, worked on measures to strengthen capability among the sector's vital societal functions. However, it should be noted that individual preparedness agencies may work extensively on capability-building activities. However, the work done within the framework of the sectors has focused mainly on creating the conditions for continued work.

The sector-responsible agencies state that the sectors are working on emergency preparedness and civil defence in an integrated fashion. However, it is evident that the preparedness sectors place strong emphasis on civil defence work. We identified few examples of activities specifically relating to emergency preparedness.

Preparing joint supporting material has taken up a lot of time for the agencies in the preparedness sectors. This involves reporting to the government, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency and the Swedish Armed Forces. This is described in more detail in section 6.7.3 in the appendix.

Furthermore, in a number of cases, the preparedness sectors have started working on joint training and exercise activities.

Working on NATO-related issues is not a regulated task for sector-responsible agencies. Our evaluation shows that the sector-responsible agencies are nevertheless engaged in NATO coordination within their sectors.

4.4 Overall impression of the work of the sectors

Our impression is that the establishment of the preparedness sectors has been a team effort in which the sector-responsible agencies have operated as a driving force. The agencies argue that the sectoral work is generally working well in most of the preparedness sectors. Our impression is that there is generally a good climate of cooperation within the sectors, with a willingness to collaborate and reach agreement. However, as pointed out by a number of respondents, the latter does not prevent the agencies in a sector from having different views on individual issues. We also assess that a good climate of cooperation does not always guarantee that the sectoral work will deliver the desired effects.

Our evaluation shows that in 2023 and 2024, the preparedness sectors have largely been working on capability-building measures. The agencies in the sectors argue that the sectors now need to move away from capability-building intra-sectoral activities and towards capability-building activities. Furthermore, there needs to be an increase in collaboration with county administrative boards responsible for civil areas, as well as other sectors.

In 2025, we are seeing several signs to indicate that most of the sectors have started working more on capability-building measures. Furthermore, collaboration with civil areas and other preparedness sectors has begun to increase.

4.5 Factors facilitating the work of the sectors

We have identified a number of factors that have facilitated the work of the sectors.

4.5.1 Proactive sector-responsible agency

One of the most important factors for good progress in sectoral work is to have a sector-responsible agency that is proactive and takes initiatives. Sectoral responsibility largely involves acting as a process leader.

One example is the Swedish Police Authority in the Security, Law and Order sector. The Swedish Police Authority is one of the agencies that received the least funding in respect of civil defence. The sector has not been preceded by a corresponding configuration relating to preparedness issues. It is a sector with no fewer than eight agencies, three of which are new to the preparedness agency role. These agencies also conduct a fairly diversified range of activities. However, the Swedish Police Authority has consistently received positive assessments from the preparedness agencies that we interviewed. We assess that the sector has good momentum in its activities, due in part to a proactive sector-responsible agency.

4.5.2 Plenty of resources for sector-responsible agencies

Adequate funding is important for sector-responsible agencies. The clearest example is the Swedish Food Agency, which has been awarded substantial resources in its role as preparedness agency. Although these resources do not relate specifically to its sectoral responsibility, the resources mean that the agency has plenty of preparedness expertise and good conditions for conducting development work and implementing plans developed within the framework of the preparedness sector. The agency is also less vulnerable to staff turnover.

4.5.3 A clear and defined area of responsibility

Matters are facilitated if the sector has a clear and defined area of responsibility. In the Electronic Communications and Postal Services sector, this is evident with regard to the Electronic Communications Networks and Services and Other Radio Use function²⁸. All agencies within the sector operate within this function. There are a limited number of actors within the function who account for large parts of the market. It is also relatively clear what measures need to be undertaken in order to reduce vulnerabilities among these actors.

4.5.4 Established collaboration arrangements with the business sector

It takes time to establish effective collaboration with the business sector. Therefore, matters are facilitated if there is a proven collaborative structure in place. Examples of such collaborative structures are the National Telecommunications Cooperation Group (NTSG) and the Financial Sector Public-Private Cooperation (FSPOS).

4.6 Challenges for the work of the sectors

4.6.1 High staff turnover

One challenge that has affected establishment in most of the preparedness sectors is high staff turnover. There is currently strong demand for preparedness expertise and high staff turnover in the preparedness system. Working in preparedness sectors often requires officials to have both good general preparedness expertise and a good knowledge of their own agency's activities, as well as understanding the links with other agencies in the sector. It takes time to develop such expertise. However, it should also be noted that preparedness agencies in at least one sector are calling for more general project management skills at the sector-responsible agency.

In most sectors, the agencies interviewed testify that high staff turnover has presented an obstacle to the development of the sector. In several sectors, this has also meant that work has had to be restarted on one or more occasions. In several sectors, the development of sectoral work has not followed a gradual, harmonious progression; instead, the development curve has been more irregular. Staff turnover continues to present a challenge for the sectors.

²⁸ However, the sector has faced greater challenges in addressing the Post function and the Digital Platforms, Services and Information Systems function.

4.6.2 Difficulties in sharing classified information

Another, more general challenge relates to difficulties in sharing classified information between agencies. We encountered similar challenges in our evaluation of the establishment of civil areas²⁹. In some sectors (particularly those with new preparedness agencies), there are agencies that have no established communications security organisations. This challenge has not only affected the establishment phase, but is also impacting ongoing work.

4.6.3 Different resource-related conditions between agencies

Another frequent challenge is that not all agencies in a sector are able to devote the same level of resources to work in the preparedness sector. Agencies have received highly variable levels of resources for their civil defence work.

4.6.4 Reporting and information gathering divert resources from other work in the sectors

Our material shows that many agencies feel that the work within the preparedness sectors is hampered by the extensive reporting and information gathering linked to capability planning. This mainly concerns material to be submitted to the government and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. The documents to be submitted to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency are often based on government assignments, although some products are also initiated by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, such as what is known as system documentation.

Several agencies question the value of some of the extensive reporting and information gathering, which they feel diverts resources from capability-building work. It is becoming increasingly common for sectors to submit joint documentation, which requires joint preparation between the agencies. The preparation processes reduce the time available to individual agencies to produce the documentation itself, which is often detrimental to the quality of the documentation.

4.6.5 Challenges in representing other agencies

Some preparedness agencies have referred to challenges in the relationship between the sector-responsible agency and the other agencies in the sector. One question that arose related to whether the sector-responsible agency is able to speak on behalf of the entire sector in the context of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency meeting structure, for example. Some

²⁹ MTFA, *Uppbyggnaden av civilområden*, 2024.

preparedness agencies, and sector-responsible agencies as well, have argued that the sector-responsible agency is unable to speak on behalf of other agencies. The sector-responsible agencies interviewed generally maintain that they do not do so. If an issue concerning a particular preparedness agency within the sector is to be discussed at a meeting, that agency is invited to participate. Our overall impression is that sector-responsible agencies regularly prepare joint positions with the sector's agencies prior to meetings.

4.6.6 A few of sectors have faced major challenges in their establishment

In a few sectors, we get the impression that there are major obstacles to establishment of the sector.

In the Provision of Core Data sector, our interviews indicate that collaboration decreased in 2024 as a result of staff turnover at the Swedish Tax Agency, the sector-responsible agency. The agency has indicated that it allocated 2.2 full-time equivalents to sectoral responsibility in 2024. The sector has a number of working groups, but several of these lacked clear terms of reference in 2024, which impacted their work. We also note that the sector does not have an adopted foundational document.

In the Economic Security sector, a number of agencies indicate that the sector has not really clarified what it should be working on, and there has been no clear plan going forward. There is still no adopted foundational document for the sector as yet, despite several efforts to produce one. There has also been substantial staff turnover among several agencies, which has affected continuity of work. One challenge described is that many of the administrators at the sector's agencies are primarily preparedness generalists and do not have sufficiently in-depth knowledge of their agencies' core activities.

5. Results in the preparedness sectors

This chapter presents the results achieved to date in the preparedness sectors.

5.1 Concrete results

In our interviews, the agencies often found it difficult to identify concrete results from their sectoral work. However, we have identified a number of results of a more concrete nature:

- joint documents for the sectors, such as foundational documents, annual work plans, ten-year plans and various other plans and procedures.
- joint budget requests
- joint supporting material for the Total Defence Bill 2025–2030
- other jointly prepared documents, consultation responses, etc.
- joint exercises and training activities
- coordinated situation reporting
- new collaborative structures for the business sector and other actors.

5.2 Enhanced capabilities for new preparedness agencies

In sectors with several new³⁰ preparedness agencies, a great deal of effort has gone into enhancing their preparedness capabilities. This has included establishing

- crisis and wartime organisations coordinated with the sector
- Duty officer functions
- organisations for protective security and communications security.

We assess that overall, it has been quicker for new preparedness agencies to start on their preparedness work with the help of the support they have received from sector-responsible agencies and other preparedness agencies in the sector, rather than if that support had not been available.

³⁰ Agencies that were not agencies with monitoring responsibilities before the structural reform was implemented.

5.3 The sectors constitute a new structure for collaboration

A number of agencies interviewed stated that the purpose of the sectors, and their principal outcome, is that they provide a collaborative structure in which the agencies are able to hold discussions and decide on cases in which it is most appropriate for the agencies in the sector to address tasks jointly, and cases in which it is best for the agencies to maintain sole responsibility for the initiatives.

What is perceived as innovative about the sectors is the fact that there are now requirements to operate within a structure in which these discussions do actually take place. As one agency interviewed put it, ‘a framework has been placed on top of what was already there’.

The Swedish Post and Telecom Authority states in its annual report:

This work results in greater clarity and predictability in the joint work of the agencies in the preparedness sector, strengthened collaboration and enhanced opportunities for strategic discussions at various management levels.³¹

Several sectors already had collaboration arrangements that have now been assigned a new framework. Often, a new agency has been added by establishing the preparedness sectors. However, three sectors are new configurations: Provision of Core Data, Health, Care and Welfare, and Security, Law and Order.³² In sectors that constitute newer configurations, the value of the sector’s collaboration arrangements may be greater than in sectors with a long history of collaboration. However, the perceived benefits of the sector’s collaboration arrangements are also influenced by additional factors, such as the degree of mutual dependencies within the sector.

5.4 Agencies have become better acquainted with one another

Our evaluation shows that the introduction of the preparedness sectors has helped the agencies in question to become better acquainted with one another, and now have more of a mutual understanding of each other’s operational conditions.

³¹ Swedish Post and Telecom Authority, *Annual Report 2025*, 2025.

³² Other forms of inter-agency collaboration involving most of the relevant agencies have existed for a long time in both Security, Law and Order and Health, Care and Welfare, but not at a general level in respect of preparedness.

This increased awareness – at both a personal and an organisational level – is highlighted by many agencies as an important outcome of the sectoral work. The agencies feel that the conditions for future crisis management are improved by the fact that there are now established contact pathways between the agencies.

5.5 The sectors have strengthened the legitimacy of preparedness issues

A number of agencies in our evaluation have stressed that the fact that the agency is now part of a preparedness sector has provided greater legitimacy – both internally within the agency and in relation to the surrounding environment and other agencies – for working on preparedness issues and collaborate on them. This is particularly true of new preparedness agencies, where there is no tradition of working on preparedness issues. By way of example of this increased internal legitimacy, one agency interviewed mentioned that the preparedness assignment is now reflected in the agency's annual operational plan in a way that it never was before. Another agency argued that the safeguarding of resources in the internal process is now facilitated by the ability to refer to requests for action put forward by the sector-responsible agency.

We assess that the deterioration in the security policy situation in recent years and increased resources for civil defence work are other factors contributing to increased legitimacy for preparedness issues.

6. How are the preparedness sectors responding to the intentions of the reform?

This chapter presents our assessment of the extent to which the work carried out within the framework of the preparedness sectors is helping to achieve the intentions we have identified for the introduction of the sectors. We also assess whether the implementation of the preparedness sectors is on track in relation to these intentions.

6.1 Have the intentions been achieved?

The work of the sectors is assessed in relation to the intentions we have identified for the introduction of preparedness sectors. We have interpreted this as meaning that the sectors are intended to contribute to:

1. good coordination of capability planning between the agencies included in a preparedness sector
2. capability for effective operational management in peacetime crisis situations and heightened preparedness
3. good coordination with preparedness agencies in other sectors, as well as with the Swedish Armed Forces and county administrative boards responsible for civil areas
4. good collaboration with the business sector
5. strong capability to maintain vital societal functions.

6.1.1 Intention: Good coordination of capability planning between the agencies included in a preparedness sector

One intention of the introduction of the preparedness sectors was to achieve good coordination of capability planning between the agencies included in a preparedness sector. Capability planning refers to planning aimed at creating capability in the short to medium term (1–10 years).³³

Our evaluation shows that most sectors have focused on capability-building activities in 2023 and 2024. The sectors have established foundational documents, meeting structures and various procedures for sectoral work. We

³³ MSBFS 2025:4 MSB:s föreskrifter och allmänna råd om statliga myndigheters uppgifter inför och vid höjd beredskap.

can also see that work on joint or coordinated capability planning has begun in a number of sectors.

For instance, four sectors have working groups for general capability planning. Moreover, several sectors have working groups for specific areas such as maritime security, supply analysis and geographical nodes. Agencies in certain sectors have also carried out government assignments relating to capability planning within the framework of the work of the preparedness sector. This is true, for example, of the work of the Food Supply and Drinking Water sector on development of joint investment programmes.

In some areas, the sectors have also coordinated their capability planning through aspects such as coordinated supporting material for the total defence decision 2025–2030 and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's system documentation.

Against the above background, we note that the preparedness sectors have facilitated the agencies' coordination of capability planning in a number of cases. We assess that the introduction of the preparedness sectors has, to a degree, contributed to the coordination of the agencies. As the sectors have initiated various working groups and projects in respect of capability planning, we are expecting to see more results in a year or so.

6.1.2 Intention: Capability for effective operational management in peacetime crisis situations and heightened preparedness

One intention of the introduction of the preparedness sectors was to create capability for effective operational management in peacetime crisis situations and heightened preparedness. In this context, operational management refers to all tasks assigned to sector-responsible agencies during a peacetime crisis situation and heightened preparedness. This includes coordinating agencies, providing reports and producing supporting material for prioritisation. One way of creating such capability is through preparatory planning; that is, generic or scenario-specific planning that will make it possible to deal with potential events that may have significant consequences for society.³⁴ Other important tools for creating capability include training and exercises, as well as various types of investments in infrastructure and technical systems for management and collaboration, for example.

³⁴ MSBFS 2025:4 MSB:s föreskrifter och allmänna råd om statliga myndigheters uppgifter inför och vid höjd beredskap.

Our assessment is that to date, the sectors have focused on capability-building activities in the first instance, then on capability planning, and only then on preparatory planning.

Situation reporting is a key element in operational management. Our evaluation shows that the sectors have spent a great deal of time both developing reporting formats and carrying out reporting. In section 6.5 of the appendix, we set out the challenges we have identified in the sectors' situation reporting efforts. Our conclusion is that there are substantial development needs in relation to situation reporting, both within the sectors and for the preparedness system as a whole. It is important in this regard to recognise the fact that there is major variation in the complexity and scope of different sectors' efforts to create situation reports. It is sufficient in some sectors to gather information from just a handful of central government agencies, while other sectors potentially need to collect and process information relating to thousands of actors³⁵. This is true of the Transport and Food Supply and Drinking Water sectors, for example.

One potential component of the operational management assignment is that a sector-responsible agency could host an orientation and coordination function for the sector. Three sectors are planning to be able to establish an orientation and coordination function in the event of an incident. One example is Electronic Communications and Postal Services, where the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority uses the National Telecommunications Cooperation Group (NTSG) function as its orientation and coordination function. However, the National Telecommunications Cooperation Group has existed for over two decades, so this planning has not been influenced by sectoral responsibility.³⁶

To date, few sector-responsible agencies have worked actively on the task of ensuring that they are able to provide the government with supporting material concerning the prioritisation and allocation of resources in the preparedness sector in the event of a peacetime crisis or heightened preparedness. In this respect, there are also questions about the type of resources that should be prioritised. Furthermore, cross-sectoral methods and criteria for prioritisation are lacking. However, the sector-responsible agencies have initiated a joint activity to start addressing this task.

³⁵ This is not to say that the sector-responsible agency will have direct contact with all these actors.

³⁶ Furthermore, the National Telecommunications Cooperation Group covers just one of the sector's three vital societal functions.

Several of the sectors conduct training and exercise activities for the sector's operational management of incidents, including different types of position-specific training and functional exercises. Several sectors have also begun planning or organising more complex exercises. Seven of the sectors have networks of communication officers working with aspects such as crisis communication. Several sectors also have working groups and networks for duty officers.

To date, few sector-responsible agencies, together with other agencies in the sector, appear to have clarified and documented what is involved in leading efforts within the sector to coordinate measures in peacetime crisis situations and heightened preparedness.

Our assessment shows that the preparedness sectors have different interpretations of the sectors' operational management role. In the Security, Law and Order sector, the management role has been placed at an overall strategic level. In the Electronic Communications and Postal Services sector, the sector-responsible agency Swedish Post and Telecom Authority has a fairly specific coordinating role through the National Telecommunications Cooperation Group.

The Rescue Services and Civil Protection sector and its sector-responsible agency, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, have conducted an analysis of the operational assignment. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency assesses that the current wording of the ordinance – which states that sector-responsible agencies shall lead the coordination of measures – risks creating inefficiency due to unclear boundaries between sectoral responsibility on the one hand and geographical area responsibility and the responsibilities of the state preparedness agencies on the other. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency argues that the Preparedness Ordinance may need to be revised in this respect.³⁷

We concur with the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's assessment in respect of the Rescue Services and Civil Protection sector. However, we argue that there are other sectors comprising actors operating mainly at a national level, and where interfaces responsible for geographical areas are not as significant. This illustrates the difficulty of applying a uniform regulation for sectors that differ substantially.

³⁷ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Årsredovisning 2024*, 2025, p. 28.

The Financial Services sector also faces structural challenges in achieving effective operational management capabilities. The Riksbank and the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, the sector-responsible agency, already have partially overlapping assignments in respect of operational management. An inquiry from the Ministry of Finance now proposes that a crisis management function for the entire financial sector should be established at the Riksbank – and not at the sector-responsible agency, the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority. This would mean that responsibility for leading the work of coordinating measures in peacetime crisis situations and heightened preparedness within its own preparedness sector would be transferred in practice from the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority to the Riksbank. Given this proposal, the Riksbank has indicated that assigning the Riksbank the role of sector-responsible agency, through regulation in the Riksbank Act, would be a potential solution to the overlapping responsibility between the agencies.³⁸

We note a degree of inconsistency in the signals emitted by the government in terms of the operational management role of the sectors. In the national security strategy, the government indicates that it intends to go on developing the system involving preparedness sectors so that it can increasingly be used operationally in crises and to address hybrid threats.³⁹ At the same time, the Total Defence Bill 2025–2030 states that command of civil defence at times of heightened preparedness and, ultimately, in wartime should be exercised by actors responsible for geographical areas⁴⁰. The latter point has been the subject of extensive discussion among the preparedness sectors, and there are differing views on how this wording in the Total Defence Bill should be interpreted.

The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, in cooperation with the sector-responsible agencies, is in the process of initiating efforts to review the exercise of sectoral responsibility, including its operational management elements.⁴¹

In summary, we assess that to date, the establishment of the preparedness sectors has made a limited contribution to effective operational management capability in peacetime crisis situations and heightened preparedness. The

³⁸ Sveriges Riksbank, *Redogörelse om Riksbankens verksamhet inom krisberedskap och civilt försvar*, 2024, p. 23.

³⁹ Skr. 2023/24:163 *Nationell säkerhetsstrategi*, p. 26.

⁴⁰ Prop. 2024/25:34 *Totalförsvaret 2025–2030*, p. 111.

⁴¹ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Vägledande principer för fortsatt utveckling av förmåga till ledning och samverkan inom civilt försvar – Fortsatt arbete* (Ärendnr 2025–07752), 2025.

lack of clarity cited by a number of sector-responsible agencies in respect of the assignment presents the sectors with a challenge. This constitutes an obstacle to further development.

6.1.3 Intention: Good coordination with preparedness agencies in other sectors, as well as with the Swedish Armed Forces and county administrative boards responsible for civil areas

One intention with the introduction of the preparedness sectors was to achieve good coordination with preparedness agencies in other sectors, as well as with the Swedish Armed Forces and county administrative boards responsible for civil areas. Our evaluation shows that in 2023 and 2024, most preparedness sectors focused mainly on developing their inter-agency collaboration within the sector. As a result, collaboration with external agencies has generally been given lower priority. More detailed descriptions of the preparedness sectors' external collaborations can be found in chapter 7 of the appendix.

Coordination with preparedness agencies in other sectors

Sector-responsible agencies shall endeavour to ensure that the measures undertaken by the preparedness agencies within the preparedness sector are coordinated with the measures undertaken by other preparedness agencies.⁴²

We have noted an increase in activity in 2025 in respect of collaboration between preparedness sectors. Activities to date have often focused on identifying issues for continued collaboration – bilaterally between agencies, or multilaterally between entire sectors. Contacts have become more frequent and more systematic. However, we are of the opinion that it is too early to determine whether collaboration has led to an increase in coordination between agencies in different sectors. Furthermore, many individual preparedness agencies have a long history of bilateral cooperation with one another, even before the preparedness sectors were established.

Our evaluation also shows that in some cases, establishment of preparedness sectors has helped to reduce collaboration between agencies. Infection control is one such area. Previously, the Public Health Agency of Sweden, the Swedish Board of Agriculture and the Swedish Veterinary Agency were included in the Dangerous Substances Cooperation Area (SOFÄ) and held regular meetings as part of this. Nowadays, infection control is divided into the Health, Care and Welfare sector and the Food Supply and Drinking

⁴² Section 24 of the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524).

Water for Animals sector. According to our interviews, this division has resulted in a reduction in collaboration between the agencies in respect of infection control for humans and animals. Our interviews also indicate that cross-sectoral collaboration on hazardous substances in general has also decreased since the Hazardous Substances Cooperation Area was discontinued. The same is true of collaboration between the emergency services, which played a key role in the Protection, Rescue, Care Cooperation Area.

Although there are some areas in which collaboration has decreased, the overall assessment is that the preparedness sectors have helped to increase collaboration between agencies. In the long term, this collaboration may lead to greater coordination.

Coordination with county administrative boards responsible for civil areas

Sector-responsible agencies shall endeavour to ensure that the measures undertaken by the preparedness agencies within the preparedness sector are coordinated with the measures undertaken by county administrative boards responsible for civil areas.⁴³

The county administrative boards responsible for civil areas have working groups for each preparedness sector, within which collaboration with sector-responsible agencies takes place. County administrative boards responsible for civil areas and sector-responsible agencies also meet frequently as part of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's series of meetings.

Moreover, around half of the sectors have begun developing their collaboration with the sector-responsible agencies. This has mainly taken place in the latter half of 2024, and in 2025.

There are a number of examples of development of collaboration between preparedness sectors and county administrative boards responsible for civil areas in 2025, and they can be expected to continue developing going forward. However, a number of sector-responsible agencies state that there is a lack of clarity with regard to what the sector's link to the regional level involves, and what it should be. This can present an obstacle to achieving good coordination.

⁴³ Section 24 of the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524).

Coordination with the Swedish Armed Forces

Sector-responsible agencies shall endeavour to ensure that the measures undertaken by the preparedness agencies within the preparedness sector are coordinated with the measures undertaken by the Swedish Armed Forces.⁴⁴

collaboration between the preparedness sectors and the Swedish Armed Forces has been limited to date, driven mainly by the needs of the Swedish Armed Forces. Overall, the Swedish Armed Forces have mainly collaborated bilaterally with individual preparedness agencies. To an extent, collaboration takes place via the Swedish Armed Forces' operational command, within which sector-responsible agencies are involved in basic operational planning. Furthermore, some sector-responsible agencies collaborate with the military regions. The Swedish Armed Forces also participate in the work of a few sectors. The Swedish Armed Forces Defence Staff are mainly involved in collaboration on capability development and policy.

The Swedish Armed Forces have indicated that collaboration with the preparedness sectors with a view to longer-term capability establishment should be developed, as current collaboration is primarily aimed at identifying measures that need to be undertaken in the immediate future.⁴⁵ We note that the Swedish Armed Forces Defence Staff collaborates with the preparedness sectors on the basis of its line organisation, and that it has no designated administrators for individual preparedness sectors who maintain ongoing contact with the sectors. This constitutes a potential organisational challenge if the Swedish Armed Forces and the preparedness sectors wish to develop their collaboration towards longer-term capability establishment.

Overall view of collaboration with external agencies

MTFA assesses that the preparedness sectors have to an extent helped to improve coordination with preparedness agencies in other sectors, county administrative boards responsible for civil areas and the Swedish Armed Forces. As collaboration between sectors and with county administrative boards responsible for civil areas has increased in 2025, we believe that there is potential for greater coordination between these actors.

⁴⁴ Section 24 of the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524).

⁴⁵ Swedish Armed Forces, *Försvarmaktens redovisning av uppgift 9 i regleringsbrevet för budgetåret 2024 – Samverkan utifrån ny struktur för samhällets krisberedskap och civilt försvar*, 2024.

6.1.4 Intention: Good collaboration with the business sector

One intention behind the introduction of the preparedness sectors was to achieve good collaboration with the business sector. According to the Preparedness Ordinance, the sector-responsible agencies must ensure that there is collaboration with the business sector to the extent necessary.⁴⁶

Collaboration between the preparedness sectors and the business sector varies depending on the role of the business sector in the vital societal functions associated with the sector:

- four sectors have little or no sector-wide collaboration with the business sector. These are the Economic Security, Provision of Core Data, Health, Care and Welfare⁴⁷ and Rescue Services and Civil Protection⁴⁸ sectors. There are currently no plans in these sectors to develop collaboration with the business sector.
- The Security, Law and Order sector currently has limited collaboration with the business sector, but efforts to develop this are ongoing.
- Other sectors have more extensive collaboration with the business sector: Electronic Communications and Postal Services, Energy Supply, Financial Services, Food Supply and Drinking Water, and Transport.

Collaboration with the business sector has been ongoing for several decades for the agencies in the Financial Services, Electronic Communications and Postal Services and – to some extent – Energy Supply⁴⁹ sectors, and this has continued to develop since the preparedness sector was established. The collaboration arrangements in the case of the agencies in the Food Supply and Drinking Water and Transport sectors have been in place for a number of years, but have developed significantly in recent years.

Our assessment is that elements of the development that has taken place as part of the collaboration of these sectors with the business sector are not dependent on the establishment of the preparedness sectors, but may equally be due to the deterioration in the security policy situation, the increase in

⁴⁶ Section 24 of the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524).

⁴⁷ The sector previously included a number of industry organisations in its preparedness forum, but this initiative has now been discontinued. The National Board of Health and Welfare is the sector-responsible agency and describes how the sector's collaboration focuses on the regions, but states that it may be necessary in the long term to develop collaboration with the business sector.

⁴⁸ The Rescue Services and Civil Protection sector has co-opted SOS Alarm Sverige AB, but otherwise has no developed collaboration with the business sector.

⁴⁹ Refers primarily to Svenska kraftnät's collaboration in respect of electricity supply.

resources for civil defence and, for some agencies, extended statutory support for collaboration with the business sector.

However, we assess that sectoral responsibility is a primary reason as to why the Swedish Energy Agency is in the process of building a cross-sectoral structure for private-public cooperation (POS) which did not exist previously. The Swedish Transport Administration has also further developed its structure for private-public cooperation since becoming a sector-responsible agency. In the case of the Financial Services sector, the FSPOS structure was previously the responsibility of the Riksbank, but the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority took over responsibility for it when it became a sector-responsible agency. The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority is in the process of developing its private-public cooperation as a result of its sectoral responsibility.

It should be noted that both agencies and representatives of the business sector in all the sectors that involve collaboration with the business sector argue that their collaboration needs to be developed further. In a number of cases, representatives of the business sector state that the preparedness sectors do not make full use of the expertise available in the business sector, and that the business sector is invited to participate at a late stage of the planning process or merely for the purposes of disseminating information. Furthermore, several representatives of the business sector stress that confidentiality is a limiting factor for their participation in sectoral work, in terms of both planning and sharing of situation reports.

In the Security, Law and Order sector, the emphasis to date has been mainly on collaboration between the eight agencies involved, but work is in progress on developing collaboration primarily with the security industry.

A collaborative structure for municipalities, regions and the business sector was initially established in the Health, Care and Welfare sector, but this was discontinued as it was not deemed appropriate. Representatives of the business sector perceive a major need to develop the sector's collaboration with the business sector.

In the other sectors where no collaboration with the business sector is planned, the sector-responsible agencies likewise do not feel there is currently any need for such developed collaboration. Our assessment on the matter is no different.

Our overall assessment is that introducing preparedness sectors has helped to accelerate and develop collaboration with the business sector in a number of cases, but that other factors have also contributed to this development.

6.1.5 Intention: Strong capability to maintain vital societal functions

Our interpretation of one intention with the introduction of the preparedness sectors was to contribute to a strong capability to maintain vital societal functions. The Preparedness Ordinance does not indicate which vital societal functions are included in the sectors' areas of responsibility. Instead, the sectors – in collaboration with the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency – have identified the vital societal functions for which they are responsible.

As the sectors have largely devoted their first few years to capability-building activities, there is variation in the extent to which they have been able to get to grips with work on vital societal functions. Some sectors have not started working on all of their vital societal functions.

Overall, we consider it difficult to assess the extent to which sectoral responsibility has helped to strengthen the capability to maintain vital societal functions. Capability-building initiatives are often implemented by individual preparedness agencies, and are generally dependent on financial and regulatory criteria.

For instance, the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority was actively working with the Electronic Communications Networks and Services and Other Radio Use function even before the sector reform. This work has intensified throughout the years in which the agency has held sectoral responsibility, but perhaps mainly as a result of a significant increase in financial resources allocated to the agency's preparedness appropriations. In its capability assessment, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency assesses that there has been clear development of the sector's capability. However, we assess that this development is dependent to a lesser extent on the emergence of the preparedness sector.

The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency has conducted an assessment of capability development by sector. This is presented in Table 2. In some respects, there is a correlation between the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's assessment of capability development by sector and what we have seen of the work in the sectors. In other respects, these two perspectives do not correlate as closely. Our conclusion is that capability development in a

sector at this stage is not necessarily linked to how the work in the preparedness sector is functioning.

We assess that the preparedness sectors have helped to strengthen capability among vital societal functions to date, but only to a limited extent. However, we perceive plenty of potential for the sectors to help strengthen this capability in the long term.

Table 2 The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency’s assessment of capability development by sector.⁵⁰

	None	Limited	Clear	Extensive
Economic Security		X		
Electronic Communications and Postal Services			X	
Energy Supply			X	
Financial Services		X		
Provision of Core Data			X	
Health, Care and Welfare			X	
Food Supply and Drinking Water			X	
Security, Law and Order			X	
Rescue Services and Civil Protection		X		
Transport		X		

6.2 Our conclusion: the intentions have been achieved to a limited extent to date

Our assessment is that the intentions behind the introduction of the preparedness sectors have been achieved to a limited extent to date.

However, we believe that the effects of the work in the preparedness sectors are primarily long-term in nature, and that it is likely to take a few more years before clearer effects will start to become more apparent. However, we are already able to identify certain structural obstacles that could prevent all

⁵⁰ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Det civila försvaret – På frammarsch! Kompletterande öppen rapport till 2025 års redovisning av regeringsuppdrag*, 2025, p. 8.

sectors achieving all intentions, including work on the operational management tasks for the Rescue Services and Civil Protection sector. The same is true of the Financial Services sector, in the event that the Ministry of Finance's inquiry into new crisis management tasks for the Riksbank is implemented.

7. Observations

7.1 The sectors are very different

The extent of the differences between the sectors is a key insight revealed by this evaluation. On the one hand, there is the Provision of Core Data sector, where four central government agencies are mainly responsible for the sector's area of responsibility. On the other, there are sectors such as Transport and Food Supply, where the area of responsibility includes tens of thousands of companies across a wide range of activities. The conditions for operational management also differ from sector to sector (see section 6.1.2). All in all, we assess that these differences make it difficult to formulate a regulation that is adapted in all respects to all ten sectors – as well as the new sectors that are expected to emerge.

7.2 On work in the preparedness sectors

7.2.1 These sectors may face more profound role allocation issues

Several of the agencies interviewed stated that they have now reached agreement on the more fundamental division of labour and roles within their sectors. However, a number of agencies stress the fact that going forward, their sector needs to perform a more in-depth analysis of what should be done jointly within the sector and what should be done by the agencies individually. This indicates that in the future, the sectors may need to address certain more profound role allocation issues that have not been fully addressed as yet.

Our evaluation suggests that these forthcoming discussions may be challenging for the sectors, as opinions appear to vary among the agencies with regard to what the ultimate goal should be in terms of sectoral integration and how far-reaching coordination should actually be.

Broadly speaking, there appears to be a dividing line between

- agencies that believe that further sectoral work should primarily involve agencies coordinating their measures, but then undertaking parallel rather than integrated planning and implementation of measures
- agencies that believe that further sectoral work should also be capable of developing towards more in-depth collaboration, with the agencies

working jointly on certain tasks, prioritising resources jointly, and so forth.

7.2.2 Staff turnover presents a major challenge

Our evaluation shows that high staff turnover has presented a major challenge in the establishment of preparedness sectors. Staff turnover for most of the sector-responsible agencies has meant that sectoral work has ground to a halt and, in several cases, has begun to go backwards and needed to be restarted.

There has been strong demand for personnel with preparedness expertise for a number of years now, as highlighted by the Swedish Defence Research Agency in its 2021 report *Växtvärk* [Growing pains].⁵¹ Financial resources for civil defence have been increased by a factor of twenty over a five-year period. This has led to a significant shortage of staff with preparedness expertise, particularly in specialised areas such as protective security and communications security. Salaries have increased, and staff have become more mobile. This is true not only of central agencies, but also of county administrative boards, regions and municipalities.

Some agencies, such as the Swedish Food Agency, have received substantial increases in resources in both of their roles: as preparedness agency, and as sector-responsible agency. They have been able to conduct their activities without staff turnover presenting a major obstacle. They have also recruited staff from other actors.

Other agencies have received a much more modest allocation of new resources for civil defence work and so thus have few preparedness specialists. This leaves operations vulnerable when the organisation loses key expertise. Working in preparedness sectors often requires employees to have good preparedness skills, a good knowledge of their own agency's activities and an understanding of links with other agencies in the sector. It takes time to establish this expertise.

One reflection is that further increases in resources to agencies that have already been allocated substantial resources may indeed lead to a degree of increase in the capability of the agency in question, but that this risks leading to greater staff turnover among other actors at system level.

⁵¹ Swedish Defence Research Agency, *Växtvärk – Utmaningar med att personalförsörja det civila försvaret i fredstid*, 2021.

We assess that it is likely that a higher marginal benefit can be achieved from the allocated funds by distributing smaller sums to agencies that have relatively limited resources at present. This would place them in a better position to establish stability in their preparedness activities, making them less vulnerable to staff turnover.

Another reflection is that funding linked to temporary government assignments can be problematic if it occurs on a large scale and over a long period, as in the case of the National Board of Health and Welfare. The Swedish Agency for Public Management has highlighted this problem recently.⁵² We assess that long-term funding solutions are important if the agencies are to be able to retain staff and conduct efficient activities over time.

7.2.3 Challenges with reporting and information gathering linked to capability planning

A number of statutory reporting requirements are applicable to sector-responsible agencies and preparedness agencies. Additionally, there are requirements for reports within the framework of government assignments and other requests. Section 6.7.3 in the appendix expands upon the preparation of joint material by sectors.

Our evaluation shows that many agencies find the overall volume of reporting and information gathering to be very labour-intensive and time-consuming. Reporting diverts resources away from the implementation of actual capability planning and capability enhancement measures. At the same time, many of the agencies interviewed argue that there is a lack of more long-term steering measures and targets for the work done by the preparedness sectors.

We have also identified a number of more procedural and quality-oriented challenges in respect of information gathering:

- Government assignments and requests from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (which in turn are often based on government assignments) frequently have a one-sided focus on the activities of central government agencies. As a result, the responses do not always provide a comprehensive view of the circumstances within vital societal functions.

⁵² Swedish Agency for Public Management, *Myndighetsanalys av Socialstyrelsen – Slutrapport*, 2025.

- Material for the government and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency is being processed via the preparedness sectors to an ever-increasing extent. This often leaves little time for the preparedness agencies to work on the material itself, as the sector's joint preparation process is very time-consuming. This may have an adverse impact on the quality of the material. It may also lead to accumulation of an unnecessarily large volume of security-sensitive information within the sector-responsible agencies. A number of agencies indicate that in some cases, the quality of the material would be better if it were collected only from the preparedness agencies individually.

7.2.4 Common criteria and tools for identifying societally vital activities are lacking

Several preparedness sectors are struggling with how to go about identifying and prioritising societally vital activities. In the field of electricity supply, criteria for prioritising societally vital electricity consumers are available within the framework of Styrel⁵³. Similar systems for prioritising societally vital activities are now being considered in respect of several other activities. This may include water, fuel or security services, for example. However, there are no cross-sectoral criteria or prioritisation principles that can be applied across all sectors.

We assess that the work of the agencies would be facilitated if a common methodology and general processes, criteria and system support were available for prioritising societally vital activities. This is applicable to both sector-responsible agencies and actors responsible for geographical areas.

7.3 On governance of the sectors

7.3.1 Unclear regulation of the role of sectors

The Preparedness Ordinance sets out the tasks for which preparedness agencies and sector-responsible agencies are to stand responsible prior to and during peacetime crisis situations and heightened preparedness. However, the ordinance does not specify the purpose of the preparedness sectors or which tasks the agencies included in a preparedness sector should jointly perform as a sector. Nor does the Preparedness Ordinance regulate the sectors in which various vital societal functions are based.

⁵³ Ordinance on planning for the prioritisation of societally vital electricity consumers (2011:931).

The preparedness sectors have spent a great deal of time interpreting the agencies' joint assignment, partly due to the absence of such wordings in the ordinance and the lack of explanatory memoranda. Our evaluation also shows that the sectors have interpreted the assignment differently in a number of instances.

7.3.2 The purpose of the sectors could be clarified

One way of making it easier for the sectors to interpret their assignments going forward, particularly for new preparedness sectors, would be for the government to clarify the purpose of the sectors in its governance. A statement of purpose could clarify the link to vital societal functions, as well as the relationship between central government agencies and other actors in the sectors' areas of responsibility. Examples of how the sectors have formulated their own statements of purpose can be found in section 4.3 in the appendix.

7.3.3 The operational management role of the sectors should be reviewed

In section 6.1.2, we described how different preparedness sectors view their operational management roles in peacetime crisis situations and heightened preparedness. Our evaluation shows that the preparedness sectors have differing views on whether the sectors should be involved in such operational management, and if so how. The agencies' differing interpretations of the role of the preparedness sectors in operational management can largely be explained by the fact that conditions vary significantly between different sectors. Some sectors refer to activities carried out mainly at national level, and by a limited number of actors. Other sectors' areas of responsibilities cover a large number of actors at different levels of society. There is also sector-specific regulation, such as the Electronic Communications Ordinance (2022:511), which regulates the operational management role to be held by an agency (in this case, the role of the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority).

We assess that it may be difficult to have completely consistent regulation of the operational management assignment for all sector-responsible agencies.

The government has announced that it intends to appoint a special investigator to consider the need to modernise and expand the regulatory or decision-making powers of sector-responsible agencies in the event of war

and the threat of war.⁵⁴ We assess that it may also be relevant to review the operational management role of the sector-responsible agencies and the preparedness sectors in connection with such a review.

7.3.4 No requirements for collaboration with representatives of municipalities and regions

Municipalities and regions make up the bulk of the public sector and are responsible for activities that underpin many of the vital societal functions included in preparedness sectors.

The Preparedness Ordinance does not explicitly require sector-responsible agencies to take action to ensure there is collaboration with representatives of municipalities and regions, unlike the requirement applicable in respect of the business sector. Our assessment is that the preparedness sectors have generally had limited collaboration with representatives of municipalities and regions to date.

The previous collaboration areas included co-opted representatives of municipalities and regions. These included both preparedness generalists and representatives from activities such as environmental and health protection, ambulance services or public transport. Their task was to bring a municipal and regional perspective to the work. As things stand at present, only the Rescue Services and Civil Protection sector has co-opted representatives of municipalities into the sector's meeting forum.

The preparedness sectors play a key role in the planning of preparedness measures, and also in the preparation of material for total defence bills and other processes. We assess that there is value in ensuring that actors other than central government agencies can be involved in the preparedness sectors' processes, where appropriate. Thus, the government could consider regulating the responsibility of sector-responsible agencies to take action to ensure there is collaboration with representatives of municipalities and regions to the extent necessary.

⁵⁴ <https://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2025/01/regeringen-har-gett-53-beredskapsmyndigheter-i-uppdrag-att-starka-sin-beredskap/> Accessed on 9 June 2025.

7.4 The NIS2 and CER Directives have links to the sectors

The NIS2⁵⁵ and CER⁵⁶ Directives on cybersecurity and the resilience of critical entities respectively are in the process of being implemented in Sweden. They are both based on sectoral classifications, which means that there are links to the preparedness sectors. Several of the sector-responsible agencies are currently also supervisory agencies under the current NIS Act⁵⁷. The NIS2 and CER Directives mean that more sectors are being introduced and more activities are being included. The NIS2 and CER Directives have been developed in parallel, with a view to aligning the directives and thus facilitating matters for the business sector and others.

While the NIS1 Directive relied on actors identifying themselves and registering with the supervisory agencies, the NIS2 and CER Directives require supervisory agencies to identify the critical operators. For a critical operator, registration means that new demands are imposed in respect of risk assessment, resilience measures and incident reporting, for instance. Being a supervisory agency on the basis of the NIS2 and CER Directives thus means that the agency gains knowledge of who the critical operators are in the sector's area of responsibility, their work on risk management, and the incidents that occur. Therefore, there is intelligence here that ought to be highly valuable in respect of sectoral responsibility.

In our interviews, we were made aware that incident reports that are currently submitted to agencies on the basis of other legislation are often not taken into account in sectoral work.

The inquiry SOU 2024:64 *Motståndskraft i samhällsviktiga tjänster* [Resilience of societally vital services] has proposed a number of supervisory agencies for sectors in the CER Directive (see Table 3). These mainly correspond to the sector-responsible agencies – but not in all instances. One example is the CER sector Health, for which the Health and Social Care Inspectorate (IVO) is the supervisory agency. The Health and Social Care Inspectorate is not part of the Health, Care and Welfare preparedness sector. As a result, there is no natural bridge for the transfer of knowledge from the supervisory work under the CER Directive to the preparedness sector.

⁵⁵ EU Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union.

⁵⁶ EU Directive on the resilience of critical entities.

⁵⁷ Information Security for Essential Services and Digital Services Act (2018:1174).

Table 3. Proposed supervisory agencies for the CER Directive.⁵⁸

CER sector	Proposed supervisory agency	Sector-responsible agency, preparedness sector
Banking	Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority	Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority
Financial market infrastructure	Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority	Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority
Digital infrastructure	Swedish Post and Telecom Authority	Swedish Post and Telecom Authority
Space	Swedish Post and Telecom Authority	Not included in any sector
Energy	Swedish Energy Agency	Swedish Energy Agency
Health	Health and Social Care Inspectorate	National Board of Health and Welfare
Pharmaceutical supply	Swedish Medical Products Agency	National Board of Health and Welfare
Drinking water	Swedish Food Agency	Swedish Food Agency
Wastewater	Swedish Food Agency	Swedish Food Agency
Production, processing and distribution of food	Swedish Food Agency	Swedish Food Agency
Transport	Swedish Transport Agency	Swedish Transport Administration
Digital services	Swedish Post and Telecom Authority	Swedish Post and Telecom Authority
Public sector	The county administrative boards of Stockholm, Skåne, Västra Götaland and Norrbotten	Not included in any sector

In its consultation response to the report, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency has pointed out that the inquiry has not clearly taken into account the natural link between the directive and the existing Swedish preparedness structure. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency argues that the proposals set out risk creating two partly overlapping but parallel systems that will result in ambiguity, inefficiency and duplication of work for the actors involved – particularly the business sector.⁵⁹

We share the view of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency; that there are potential synergies between the work of the preparedness sectors and the new EU directives. A lack of coordination could potentially risk an increase in administrative costs, which could impact preparedness efforts.

⁵⁸ SOU 2024:64 *Motståndskraft i samhällsviktiga tjänster*.

⁵⁹ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Remissvar – Betänkandet SOU 2024:64 Motståndskraft i samhällsviktiga tjänster* (MSB 2024-13423), 2025.

In this context, there is also reason to consider links to supervisory areas under the Protective Security Act. By way of example, the Swedish Food Agency is the sector-responsible agency for the Food Supply and Drinking Water sector. In its role as preparedness agency, the agency is also responsible for national coordination of crisis and preparedness planning in respect of drinking water supply. The agency is also the supervisory agency for drinking water under the NIS Act and is proposed to assume this role under the NIS2 and CER Directives. With regard to the Protective Security Act, four county administrative boards are instead responsible for the supervision of drinking water supplies. Supervision under the different legislative frameworks largely concerns the same operators.

7.5 On vital societal functions

A more detailed description of vital societal functions can be found in section 4.2 of the appendix.

7.5.1 The link between the sectors and vital societal functions could be clarified

The preparedness sectors have consistently interpreted their areas of responsibility as comprising the vital societal functions. However, the Preparedness Ordinance provides no indication that this should be the case. Nor is there any regulation of what the vital societal functions are; the sectors, together with the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, have had to interpret this for themselves.

Our evaluation shows that the sectors have interpreted the vital societal functions in different ways. Some sectors have worked on the basis of functions that capture the majority of the sector's activities. Other sectors have based their work on functions that represent a kind of lowest common denominator in the sector, while omitting some of the agencies' other activities. Some sectors have a fairly detailed list of functions, while others have fewer, more general functions.

The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's list of vital societal functions has served as a tool for creating an overall view of which functions belong to which sector. However, it is not fully applied by all sectors. Nor is there any clear link between the content of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's list and how the government allocates resources for work on the vital societal functions.

Under the current system, there is uncertainty in some instances about which sector and which agencies are responsible for addressing vital societal

functions at national level. One such function is Digital Platforms, Services and Information Systems which, according to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's list, is included in the Electronic Communications and Postal Services sector. However, the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority argues that the fact the agency has been tasked with working with this function is not entirely clear. Furthermore, this is a major undertaking and the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority has not been allocated resources for working with this function.

Given the central role that the vital societal functions play in preparedness work in Sweden, the government could consider clarifying in its governance what the vital societal functions are and the sectors in which they are based. Additionally, the government could specify in the instructions for each preparedness agency the vital societal functions with which the agency is to work.

We are not of the opinion that it would be an option to authorise the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency to dictate to other agencies and preparedness sectors with regard to where various vital societal functions should be based. A decision to assign responsibility to an agency for a vital societal function may have major financial consequences for the agency in question, which is why the government should exercise this governance.

7.5.2 Vital societal functions outside the preparedness sectors risk being marginalised

The preparedness sectors play a key role in the Swedish preparedness system. Many documents to support decision-making are prepared by the sectors. This was the case for the Total Defence Bill 2025–2030, for instance. Central government funds are also largely allocated on the basis of the sectoral classification. We assess that there is a risk that agencies and vital societal functions that are not included in the preparedness sectors will become marginalised in preparedness work.

As indicated in the MTFFA report *MSB:s systemstödande roll i strukturen* [The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's system-supporting role in the structure], there is currently no systematic preparedness planning in a number of vital societal functions, as these functions are not based within a preparedness sector.

A few examples are provided below, based on vital societal functions included in the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's list⁶⁰ but not included in any preparedness sector:

- **Research, and Education for adult learners:** Sweden has 31 state universities and higher education institutions, which collectively employ 61,000 full-time equivalents. None of these are preparedness agencies, and there is no nationally organised preparedness planning for them.⁶¹
- **Judicial activities and activities relating to administration of justice:** There are 22 administrative courts. None of these are preparedness agencies. The Swedish National Courts Administration is a preparedness agency, but it has no mandate to influence the preparedness work of the administrative courts. The administrative courts do not form part of the Legal Chain vital societal function, and therefore do not fall within the area of responsibility of the Security, Law and Order sector.
- **Education and supervision for children and school students:** Schools and preschools are one of the largest societal activities, covering around 2.5 million people. The Swedish National Agency for Education is the preparedness agency, but has limited resources for the assignment. For 2025 and beyond, the agency's appropriations will be increased by SEK 3 million for its work as a preparedness agency. No resources have been specifically allocated in the central government budget for preparedness work in schools and preschools.

Other examples of vital societal functions beyond the preparedness sectors include Management of the deceased and burials, Cultural heritage, Migration and population movements, Personnel supply during periods of heightened preparedness, News and public information, and Psychological defence.

A few examples of activities that do not constitute vital societal functions according to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency list are presented below:

⁶⁰ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Lista med viktiga samhällsfunktioner. Utgångspunkt för att stärka samhällets beredskap*, 2023.

⁶¹ However, higher education institutions do collaborate within the framework of Campus Total Defence on education and research to strengthen Sweden's total defence.

- **Environmental protection** from a preparedness perspective would involve planning for large-scale environmental consequences resulting from peacetime crisis situations and war. The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency is the preparedness agency, but focuses primarily on the vital societal functions of Sewerage and Waste⁶², which belong to the Food Supply and Drinking Water sector. The Rescue Services and Civil Protection sector includes marine environmental rescue services and the environmental rescue services provided by municipal rescue services.
- **Social planning** from a preparedness perspective would involve how different processes in the field of spatial planning take preparedness aspects into account. The National Board of Housing, Building and Planning has a central role in social planning, but agencies such as the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency and the county administrative boards also have important roles to play. Municipalities are the primary providers of spatial planning. The government has announced that the National Board of Housing, Building and Planning is to become a preparedness agency.

Now that work in most preparedness sectors is beginning to consolidate, there may be reason to conduct an unbiased review of which other areas of society may need some form of national coordination and planning responsibility for preparedness. Such responsibilities could be formulated in various ways.

7.6 On the efficient use of resources

The resource-related conditions of the preparedness sectors are set out in more detail in chapter 5 of the appendix. However, we believe that it is too early to express an opinion on the efficiency of resource use.

From 2023 onwards, the government has allocated SEK 75 million as a basis for the work of the sector-responsible agencies. In 2025, some sector-responsible agencies have seen an increase in their appropriations for sectoral responsibility, which is why the total for 2025 amounts to SEK 117 million.

⁶² <https://www.naturvardsverket.se/om-oss/beredskapsmyndighet/#E-904815609> Accessed on 4 June 2025.

Viewed in relation to the SEK 8.5 billion allocated by central government for civil defence in 2025, the SEK 117 million allocated for sectoral responsibility constitutes 1.3 per cent.

Several of the sector-responsible agencies are reporting higher costs than the funds allocated to them for their sectoral responsibilities. These agencies have generally received other resources for their civil defence work which are not explicitly related to their sectoral responsibilities. However, some agencies have reported lower costs than the funds allocated to them. Staff turnover is an important underlying factor for this.

7.6.1 There are indications of more efficient use of resources, but more can be done

We assess that most of the sectors have established conditions for more efficient use of resources. The sectors constitute a new forum in which the agencies can coordinate their activities. Through the sectors, the agencies can identify and address ambiguities in the division of responsibilities between actors. We perceive potential for more efficient use of resources in this respect.

The agencies can also decide when it would be most appropriate for agencies in the sector to perform tasks jointly, and when it would be better for the agencies to hold sole responsibility for initiatives. We assume that the division of labour that emerges as a result will generally lead to more efficient use of resources than if all tasks were handled individually by the agencies.

Moreover, there are potential efficiency benefits in the sectors serving as clear interfaces for collaboration with other sectors, county administrative boards responsible for civil areas, the Swedish Armed Forces, representatives of the business sector and municipal representatives. The risk of issues ending up in limbo is reduced when regular consultations are held between sectors and civil areas.

A number of agencies have highlighted the fact that several synergies could be realised if certain issues were addressed in a more consolidated manner throughout the preparedness system, rather than being addressed individually by sectors and other actors, as is the case at present. Examples of areas where agencies interviewed recommended more centralised solutions included supply preparedness and procurement of technology for secure communications and command facilities.

Representatives of the business sector are also calling for more generalised solutions for companies in all preparedness sectors, such as the application of civil conscription and general service obligations in relation to companies, for example. They also highlight the general need for security services during periods of heightened preparedness and nationally organised repair resources.