



Myndigheten för
totalförsvarsanalys

Follow-up and evaluation of new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness

Interim report 1

29 November 2023

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1. Summary

1.1 Background and assignment

In May 2022, the government made a decision to reform the structure of civil defence and societal crisis preparedness. The new structure was introduced on 1 October 2022 and primarily covers central government agencies under the government.

In the 2023 appropriation directions for the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis (MTFA), the government has tasked the agency with

[following up and evaluating] agencies' implementation of the new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness and the agencies' prerequisites for this. In its work, the agency shall operate on the basis of the goals adopted by the Riksdag for total defence, military defence and civil defence. Follow-up and evaluation shall focus on the agencies' coordination and establishment of work under the new civil defence structure, and also on how the structure contributes to efficient use of resources in order to achieve the set goals.'


This report from MTFA constitutes a first interim report, which aims to lay a foundation for the continued work of following up and evaluating the agencies' implementation of the new structure and their prerequisites for its implementation. A second interim report is to be submitted by 30 November 2024, and the final report on the government assignment is to be submitted by 30 November 2025.

1.2 Content and boundaries of the interim report

This interim report includes a description of the various components of the new structure as interpreted by MTFA, as well as mapping of the instruments – both regulatory and economic – that form important parts of the agencies' prerequisites for implementing the new structure. The completed mapping of the conditions is based on document studies. This mapping is not comprehensive, but nevertheless it has generated a number of observations and research questions that the agency intends to examine more closely in its continued work on the assignment.

The methodological approach selected for the initial work has been based on intervention theory, a theory-based approach to follow-up and evaluation. MTFA argues that such an approach is well suited to clarifying a reform and its components, and to examining processes and mechanisms linked to the implementation of the reform. However, this methodological approach may need to be supplemented with further methods in the continued work on follow-up and evaluation as part of the government assignment.

The reformed structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness, hereafter referred to as the structural reform, included two new ordinances and a number of amendments to ordinances. Using intervention theory, MTFA reconstructs the structural reform in three steps in this interim report: see the figure.



Model of the reform

Firstly, a description of the problems as MTFA perceives them is provided, which forms a background to the structural reform. This is based on available information from the government and background material in the form of reports from the Committee on Defence and the civil defence inquiry. Working on the basis of the lines of reasoning set out in the background material referred to above, MTFA also reconstructs assumptions and ideas about how the problems identified can be resolved.

This is then followed by a description of the structural reform itself and its various components. As a final step in reconstructing the structural reform, MTFA describes the desired outcomes and effects of the reform at a general level, working on the basis of the available written documentation used as a foundation for the new structure.

1.3 Components of the structural reform

Working on the basis of MTFA's interpretation of the content of the new and amended ordinances, MTFA argues that the new structure comprises the following four elements:

- an increase in the responsibilities and tasks of central government agencies in the field of societal crisis preparedness and civil defence.
- Designation of a number of preparedness agencies, division of these into ten preparedness sectors and designation of ten sector-responsible agencies.
- Division of the country into six geographical areas (civil areas) with six designated county administrative boards responsible for civil areas.
- The coordinating role of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) in the new structure.

Firstly, the structural reform involves an increase in central government agencies' responsibilities and tasks under the government in the field of societal crisis preparedness and civil defence.

Secondly, the new structure means that around 60 central government agencies have been designated as preparedness agencies and have thus been assigned more tasks than other agencies. The structural reform also involves categorisation into ten preparedness sectors as a platform for collaboration and coordination. Each sector has a sector-responsible agency tasked with leading efforts to coordinate measures prior to and during peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness.

Thirdly, a new geographical division of Sweden is introduced, the 21 county administrative boards being divided into six civil areas. Each civil area has a county administrative board responsible for civil areas, which is responsible for coordination.

Finally, MSB is assigned a coordinating role in the new structure and is to help promote coordination between civilian agencies, and in some respects with other societal actors as well, prior to and during crises and periods of heightened preparedness. MSB must also endeavour to ensure that civil defence actors coordinate planning with military defence. MSB also has tasks to perform that involve supporting other agencies in their civil defence and crisis preparedness efforts. The other elements of the structural reform, such as the introduction of preparedness sectors and civil areas, have altered MSB's coordinating and supporting role.

1.4 MTFA's observations

Some of the observations identified to date as being of particular interest for future analysis are set out below.

Responsibilities and tasks of central government agencies

How the agencies concerned perceive the tasks and allocation of responsibilities in the relevant ordinances and associated regulations is assumed to be of major significance for the implementation of the new structure, and is therefore an important circumstance for MTFFA to examine in its forthcoming work on the government assignment. In order to follow up on the central government agencies' efforts to implement the reform, MTFFA also intends to examine how the agencies are building up the capabilities, processes and resources needed to allow them to fulfil their tasks and responsibilities. One aspect that is interesting to highlight in this section is how the agencies perceive the support available for implementing tasks that in some cases are new and in other cases expanded, as set out in the relevant ordinances.

Preparedness agencies and preparedness sectors

MTFFA intends to examine how the agencies concerned have altered both their own work on preparedness issues and their cooperation with other relevant actors. It is particularly important to examine how the introduction of preparedness sectors has impacted coordination between agencies within a preparedness sector and between different preparedness sectors, as well as coordination in relation to the civil areas.

The importance of differences in working methods and priorities between different preparedness agencies should be highlighted on the basis of the observation that preparedness agencies differ in their normal activities in terms of operational management elements, possible supervisory tasks, etc. The fact that several sector-responsible agencies also have supervisory tasks in relation to other actors is a similar aspect that can be considered more closely.

Just as there are differences between preparedness agencies, there are also differences in conditions between different preparedness sectors with regard to the number of actors involved, their size, the proportion of operational activities carried out within the public sector, financial conditions, etc. It may therefore be interesting for MTFFA to compare different preparedness sectors and to examine the significance of this relationship on the work of the preparedness sectors.

Civil areas

In the continued follow-up of the new structure, MTFFA will examine how the county administrative boards responsible for civil areas and other county administrative boards establish and build up the work within each civil area and how collaboration with other relevant actors is organised. One element of this is to examine how the work within the civil areas affects coordination between the national, higher regional and regional levels of civil defence; such as the issue of how coordination takes place between the civil areas and the preparedness sectors, and how collaboration with municipalities and regions takes place on issues that clearly relate to one or more preparedness agencies. The role of the county administrative boards and the county administrative boards responsible for civil areas in this, and how the preparedness agencies' needs for collaboration with municipalities and regions are met in the new structure, should be examined.

The county administrative boards responsible for civil areas have no powers to issue instructions to county administrative boards and other agencies on civil defence planning within their geographical area. MTFFA will therefore examine the extent to which clear lines of responsibility and leadership can be established in the existing structure where the role of the county administrative boards responsible for civil areas relates mainly to collaboration and coordination.

At the present time, the geographical division at higher regional level differs between civil and military defence. Besides examining the specific forms of collaboration and coordination

established between civil and military defence at a regional level, it is also important to highlight the potential consequences of different regional structures for collaboration and coordination.

MSB's role in the new structure

The regulatory prerequisites for the responsibility held by MSB in the new structure primarily involve the fact that the agency is tasked with promoting coordination between agencies (and, to some extent, other actors as well). The agency's tools for influencing other agencies primarily involve facilitating and supporting collaboration and coordination within different groups of actors. It is important to examine how these tools work, and how well the conditions provided to MSB are able to meet coordination needs within civil defence and between civil and military defence.

1.5 Continued work focusing on the agencies' implementation of the new structure

In the next stage of the work, MTFA intends to focus on following up the agencies' work on implementing the new structure; that is, that part of MTFA's government assignment that deals with 'coordination and establishment of work by agencies under the new structure in the field of civil defence'. Taking the mapping of the agencies' prerequisites as a basis, this involves examining how far the agencies' work has progressed, what steps have been taken, and whether there are any obvious obstacles to efforts to implement the reform.

MTFA wishes to stress that for further work, the agency has to be able to access information from all public actors within total defence. This includes existing documentation such as capability assessments, but will need to be complemented by information gathering in the form of surveys and interviews.

A number of the observations made by MTFA in its work on the first interim report will be included in the forthcoming follow-up and evaluation of how the agencies are implementing the new structure. MTFA will also be monitoring the development of the agencies' prerequisites for implementation. If these change significantly during further work on the government assignment, this will be taken into account in the work. These include, for example, the consequences of Sweden's future membership of NATO, changes in financial conditions or the introduction of new tasks and areas of responsibility for the agencies concerned.

2. On the assignment

2.1 Background to the government assignment

Planning for the re-establishment of Sweden's total defence began with the Riksdag's defence policy orientation decision in 2015.¹ Prior to that, it had been dormant for almost two decades. This policy decision meant that civil defence should be based as far as possible on the structures and processes of the crisis preparedness system.

In 2017, the Committee on Defence was tasked with performing an assessment of security policy developments and their consequences for Swedish defence and security policy. This assignment also included submitting proposals for the orientation of total defence and the design of civil defence for the period 2021–2025.² In its report *Motståndskraft* [Resilience], the Committee on Defence concluded that the crisis preparedness structures on which civil defence was based were not designed to cope with heightened preparedness and, ultimately, war. The Committee on Defence therefore submitted proposals on how the civil defence structure could be developed and supplemented, primarily in order to create clearer leadership and responsibilities, with the recommendation that these proposals be examined further.³

In 2018, the government appointed an inquiry that was tasked with analysing and proposing a structure for responsibility, leadership and coordination in civil defence and crisis preparedness at central, regional and local levels. In its terms of reference for the inquiry, the government stated that there was a need for clearer lines of responsibility and leadership and stronger coordination in the field of civil defence within the framework of total defence.⁴ This inquiry was named *Utredningen om civilt försvar*, the civil defence inquiry, and is referred to in this interim report as the structural inquiry.

In the Government Bill *Totalförsvaret 2021–2025* [Total Defence 2021–2025], the government stated that it intended to make a decision on a structure for responsibility, leadership and coordination in the field of civil defence, and that such a structure would also strengthen society's ability to address peacetime crises.⁵

In 2021, the structural inquiry presented its final report *Struktur för ökad motståndskraft*⁶ [Structure for increased resilience], which contained proposals for a new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness in order to address the problems identified.

In May 2022, the government made a number of decisions with a view to strengthening civil defence. The government described this as the largest change to the government agency structure in modern times for civil defence and crisis preparedness.⁷ This reform, hereinafter referred to in this interim report as the structural reform, included two new ordinances and a number of amendments to ordinances in respect of civil defence and societal crisis preparedness. These entered into force on 1 October 2022.

2.2 The government assignment

The government has tasked MTFA with following up and evaluating the agencies' implementation of the new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness.⁸ This

¹ Prop. 2014/15:109 Försvarspolitisk inriktning – Sveriges försvar 2016–2020.

² Ds 2017:66 Motståndskraft Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försvaret 2021–2025, p. 13.

³ Ds 2017:66 Motståndskraft Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försvaret 2021–2025, p. 13.

⁴ Dir. 2018:79, Ansvar, ledning och samordning inom civilt försvar.

⁵ Prop. 2020/21:30 Totalförsvaret 2021–2025.

⁶ SOU 2021:25, Struktur för ökad motståndskraft.

⁷ Government press conference, 18 May 2022

⁸ Fö2022/01177, Fö2022/01610 (in part).

section analyses and interprets the assignment, including its starting points and conditions. According to the assignment description, MTFA must:

Follow up and evaluate agencies' implementation of the new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness and the agencies' prerequisites for this. In its work, the agency shall operate on the basis of the goals adopted by the Riksdag for total defence, military defence and civil defence. Follow-up and evaluation shall focus on the agencies' coordination and establishment of work under the new civil defence structure, and also on how the structure contributes to efficient use of resources in order to achieve the set goals.

MTFA has carried out an initial, basic interpretation of the concept of *the new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness* and which elements make up this new structure. MTFA's interpretation is based on the new ordinances and amendments to ordinances adopted by the government in May 2022, which affect the work with civil defence and societal crisis preparedness.⁹

On this basis, MTFA assesses that the new structure comprises four main elements:

- An increase in the responsibilities and tasks of central government agencies in the field of societal crisis preparedness and civil defence.
- Designation of a number of preparedness agencies, division of these into ten preparedness sectors and designation of ten sector-responsible agencies.
- Division of the country into six geographical areas (civil areas) with six designated county administrative boards responsible for civil areas.
- The coordinating and supporting role held by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB).

The assignment identifies two different areas that are to be followed up and evaluated. The first relates to *the agencies' prerequisites* for implementing the new structure. The second concerns *the agencies' implementation* of the new structure. Although these two issues have been discussed separately, they are clearly related. The changes brought about by the new structure compared to the arrangements in place before the structural reform entered into force in October 2022 are of particular interest for follow-up and evaluation.

The assignment also includes other wording that impacts the organisation of the work. In one case, for example, it states that MTFA shall *operate on the basis of the goals adopted by the Riksdag for total defence, military defence and civil defence*. Ultimately, this concerns the ability to draw conclusions about how the implementation of the structure carried out within the timeframe for the assignment helps to fulfil these primary objectives. Here, MTFA perceives a need to carry out its evaluation in two steps. The first is to evaluate the implementation in relation to MTFA's interpretation of the objectives of introducing a new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness. The evaluation of the implementation against the primary objectives adopted by the Riksdag [Parliament] takes place in a second step.

Another condition is that the follow-up and evaluation *shall focus on the agencies' coordination and establishment of work under the new structure*. MTFA interprets this to mean that issues relating to

⁹ Such as the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), the preparedness of central government agencies; Ordinance on county administrative boards responsible for civil areas (2022:525) and the Ordinance amending the Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), (Ju2022/00000, Ju2018/04761, Ju2021/00971 (in part), Ju2021/04048, Ju2021/04219, Ju2022/00288, Ju2022/00198, 19 May 2022).

coordination and establishment should constitute important parts of the work, without thereby excluding the individual implementation tasks of the agencies concerned.

A further condition indicates that follow-up and evaluation *shall focus on how the structure contributes to efficient use of resources in efforts to attain the set goals*. The agency interprets this as meaning that the perspective of efficient use of resources should be a central component of the work.

Finally, it states that both *follow-up* and *evaluation* of the agencies' implementation should be carried out. These are interpreted as two different elements, although they are clearly linked to one another. Work on following up implementation will form the basis for its evaluation.

The agency is approaching the government assignment in stages, the first step being this interim report, which lays a foundation for further work. MTFFA is to submit two interim reports for the assignment (30 November 2023 and 30 November 2024), along with a final report by 30 November 2025. In information provided to the government in the spring of 2023, MTFFA indicated that its first interim report will constitute a foundation for further work and will include mapping agencies' collaboration and identifying issues for further analysis.¹⁰

In the forthcoming parts of the assignment, the agency intends to obtain information about relevant actors' prerequisites and the implementation of the new structure with the assistance of empirical data from interviews and surveys, for example. Going forward, the work will also include examining whether the new structure contributes to the efficient use of resources to achieve the objectives set, and if so, how. MTFFA will therefore need to access the documentation compiled by central government agencies within its area of responsibility so that it can follow up the establishment of total defence capabilities.

2.3 Purpose

The purpose of this interim report is to provide a foundation for following up and evaluating the agencies' implementation of the structural reform. One part of this involves describing an initial methodological approach in order to structure MTFFA's work on the assignment. Another part involves describing the various components of the structural reform, such as the actors involved and their various roles, as well as the instruments – both regulatory and economic – that constitute important parts of the agencies' prerequisites for implementing the new structure.

The aim of mapping of actors and instruments is to highlight the agencies' prerequisites for implementation in order to monitor the agencies' actual implementation in future work. The mapping of the agencies' prerequisites included in the interim report is not comprehensive but provides a sufficient foundation for further work, both in terms of the choice of appropriate follow-up and evaluation methods and issues that the agency intends to examine more closely.

2.4 Structure

Chapter 1 is a summary of the interim report.

Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the interim report, with background, purpose and interpretation of the government assignment.

Chapter 3 is a methodology and theory chapter presenting an initial approach to an intervention model of the structural reform.

¹⁰ Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis, *Uppföljning och utvärdering av ny struktur för civilt försvar och samhällets krisberedskap*, Ref. no. 2023:71.

Chapter 4 describes the problems that provided motivation for the new structure and the context in which it is created.

Chapter 5 provides an overview of the Swedish administrative model in order to place the structural reform in a broader context.

Chapter 6 describes the structural reform and endeavours to reconstruct the purpose of the various components of the new structure. Its desired effects are also described at a general level.

Chapters 7 to 10 provide a detailed description of the regulatory and economic prerequisites for the various components.

Chapter 11 concludes the interim report with a summary of MTFA's observations and the direction of further work on the government assignment.

3. Methodology and evaluation approach

The new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness currently comprises the reform of central government agencies that entered into force on 1 October 2022. MTFA has mapped the structural reform as a first step in the process of evaluating the new structure. This has been done by means of document studies with a view to developing an understanding of the background to the new structure and its implications. This mapping is a necessary prerequisite for MTFA's continued work on the government assignment. The knowledge generated through this work is needed both to identify areas for further evaluation and to develop follow-up and evaluation methodologies for these.

The mapping forms the basis of this interim report and builds the content of the intervention model used. Intervention theory is an evaluation methodology that offers a framework for clarifying how a reform is intended to work, what it sets out to achieve and how the success of a reform can be assessed.

The chapter briefly discusses methodological choices and how the agency intends to organise its evaluation work.

3.1 On follow-up and evaluation

Follow-up involves systematically examining and reviewing what is – or is not – happening within an activity/organisation, but without assessing and evaluating the outcome or conducting an elaborate examination of its causes. Follow-up makes it possible to provide an indication of the current status and – in the case of follow-up over time – how the area has developed between follow-up points. As regards agencies' implementation of the structural reform, follow-up involves examining the steps taken by them to implement the new structure and, on that basis, describing the progress made by implementation in relation to the set objectives. Another phase of the follow-up involves identifying any obstacles in the agencies' efforts to implement the new structure.¹¹

Evaluation allows the results emerging from follow-up and evaluation to be explored in greater depth and specified more precisely. Causes of the results can be examined, which allows for the development or amendment of initiatives linked to whatever is being evaluated.

3.1.1 Intervention theory

MTFA has chosen to use intervention theory, a theory-based evaluation method, as a starting point in its initial work on the government assignment. Intervention theory is deemed to be well suited to clarifying a reform and its components, and to examining processes and mechanisms linked to the reform.

Intervention theory has a number of methodological merits in that it clarifies the logic of the reform while also assisting in the identification of critical points that may require further evaluation. The method also has limitations in that it 'risks missing causal pathways and side effects that are not included in the intervention theory'¹². This limitation is particularly important in relation to MTFA's system perspective, as the reform may, for instance, have outcomes that were not intended, but that still have significant implications for the overall functioning of total defence. MTFA does not wish to commit itself to a single method at this stage, but is open to supplementing the intervention-theoretical approach in its evaluation work with other evaluation methods.

¹¹ Vedung, Evert, *Utvärdering i politik och förvaltning*, 3rd edition, Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2009, pp. 75–76.

¹² Vedung, Evert, *Utvärdering i politik och förvaltning*, 3rd edition, Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2009, p. 66.

3.2 The three stages of evaluation

This initial phase of the work has been divided into three general parts. These comprise (1) a description of the problems, (2) the components of the structural reform, and (3) the desired outcome.




Figure 1 Model of the reform

The first part provides a description of the problems that motivated the structural reform. It endeavours to reconstruct assumptions and ideas about how to resolve the identified problems that preceded the reform. These are derived from the proposals and line of reasoning set out in *Motståndskraft* [Resilience] and the structural inquiry. This part is developed further in chapter 4.

The second part describes the reform and its four components. Of particular interest are the changes that the new structure entails in relation to the situation that applied before 1 October 2022. This is also where work begins on mapping the agencies’ prerequisites for the implementation of the new structure and the coordination of the agencies. This mapping does not claim to be exhaustive, but instead focuses on regulatory and economic prerequisites for implementation, as well as clarifying ordinance-prescribed requirements for collaboration and coordination.

The third and final part describes the desired effects of the reform at a general level. This work is made more complicated by the fact that there are no detailed descriptions of the objectives or justifications for the changes made. This also involves interpreting the line of reasoning set out by the Committee on Defence and the structural inquiry, as well as the justification for the reform that was provided at the government’s press conference on 18 May 2022. One difficulty is that this line of reasoning is not always at the same level of detail as the amendments to the ordinances. Effects and outcomes must therefore be interpreted with caution.

4. Description of problems

The new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness needs to be placed in context on the basis of the conditions and prerequisites that influenced its design. Therefore, the first part of MTFA's model of the structural reform is made up of a description of the problems that motivated it, with a view to reconstructing the assumptions and ideas that preceded the reform (the intervention). The description of problems also includes a general description of the complexity of total defence.

Apart from the justification presented at the government's press conference in May 2022, there are no publicly available explanations or descriptions of the objectives of the changes that were introduced by the new ordinances. Besides what emerged at the press conference, MTFA's model is therefore based on an interpretation of the problems and assumptions that emerge in *Motståndskraft*, as well as in the government's terms of reference for the structural inquiry and the proposals and lines of reasoning that were subsequently put forward by the inquiry.




Figure 2 Model of the reform – step 1

4.1 Background to the structural reform

Planning for the re-establishment of Sweden's total defence began with the Riksdag's defence policy orientation decision in 2015.¹³ This policy decision meant that civil defence should be based as far as possible on the structures and processes of the crisis preparedness system.

In 2017, the Committee on Defence was tasked with performing an assessment of security policy developments and their consequences for Swedish defence and security policy. It was also tasked with submitting proposals, based on the analysis, for the orientation of total defence and the design of civil defence for the period 2021–2025.¹⁴

The Committee on Defence presented the assignment in its reports *Motståndskraft* [Resilience]¹⁵ (2017) and *Värnkraft* [Defence capability]¹⁶ (2019). The Committee pointed out that the security policy situation in Sweden's local region and in Europe has deteriorated considerably since the early 2000s, mainly as a result of Russia's actions. Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 were described as the final confirmation that Russia reserves the right to dictate other states' security policy choices and is prepared to violate international law, existing agreements and established European principles in order to assert its interests.¹⁷

The deteriorating security situation in our local region has had adverse consequences for Sweden's security. The demands now being made of total defence are, to an extent, different to those that were made up to the late 1990s.¹⁸ Globalisation, digitalisation and the privatisation of societally vital functions, as well as strategic ambiguities between war and peace (what is known

¹³ Prop. 2014/15:109 Försvarspolitisk inriktning – Sveriges försvar 2016–2020.

¹⁴ Ds 2017:66 *Motståndskraft* Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försvaret 2021–2025, p. 7 et seq.

¹⁵ Ds 2017:66 *Motståndskraft* Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försvaret 2021–2025.

¹⁶ Ds 2019:8 *Värnkraft* – Inriktningen av säkerhetspolitiken och utformningen av det militära försvaret 2021–2025.

¹⁷ Ds 2019:8 *Värnkraft* – Inriktningen av säkerhetspolitiken och utformningen av det militära försvaret 2021–2025, p. 23.

¹⁸ Ds 2017:66 *Motståndskraft* Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försvaret 2021–2025, p. 62.

as the grey zone problem), require capabilities that are different to those that were applicable in the past.¹⁹ According to the Committee on Defence, total defence must be built on a credible foundation of strong military and civil capabilities, as well as a strong will to defend. It is argued that total defence creates a clear deterrent capability by planning for a serious security policy crisis and, ultimately, war.

In *Motståndskraft*, the Committee on Defence provided proposals on how the civil defence structure could be developed in order to address identified shortcomings and create clearer lines of leadership and responsibility, and recommended that these be investigated further.²⁰

The government subsequently appointed an inquiry that was tasked with proposing a structure for responsibility, leadership and coordination in civil defence that was based on the analyses and proposals of the Committee on Defence.²¹ The structural inquiry submitted its final report to the government in 2021²², and formed the basis for the structural reform that entered into force in October 2022.

4.2 Problems

In the analysis of civil defence in *Motståndskraft*, society was found to be lacking a number of the structures, processes and resources that may be required in the event of war or threat of war. The Committee on Defence considered that the crisis preparedness system – which was designed to deal with peacetime crises – was not dimensioned to respond to an armed attack. Certain circumstances were deemed to make it particularly difficult to ensure coherent total defence capability. Unclear lines of responsibility and leadership at different decision-making levels in society and within different sectors of society were considered to have an adverse impact on the ability to coordinate civil defence actors, as well as on coordination between civil and military defence. In the long term, this was deemed to potentially make it harder to prioritise society's resources as may be necessary during periods of heightened preparedness and war.²³

In *Motståndskraft*, the Committee on Defence proposed measures to address these shortcomings. The structural inquiry was then tasked with examining these further.

In the terms of reference for the structural inquiry, a special investigator was tasked with analysing and proposing a structure for responsibility, leadership and coordination in the field of civil defence at central, regional and local level that would also strengthen society's ability to address peacetime crises. The terms of reference stated that the proposals should be based on *Motståndskraft*. The proposals for action that were put forward by the Committee on Defence and the structural inquiry mean that civil defence should follow a structure based on geographical area responsibility and a division of central government agencies into preparedness sectors. The structure would also need to function during wartime or in the event of a threat of war, as well as addressing grey zone issues. In particular, it was intended to provide conditions for coordination and collaboration between civil and military defence.

A more detailed account of some of the shortcomings identified by the Committee on Defence and the structural inquiry is presented below, along with the proposals presented in order to address them.

¹⁹ Ds 2017:66 Motståndskraft Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försvaret 2021–2025, pp. 44 et seq.

²⁰ Ds 2017:66 Motståndskraft Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försvaret 2021–2025.

²¹ Dir. 2018:79 Ansvar, ledning och samordning inom civilt försvar, p. 1.

²² SOU 2021:25, Struktur för ökad motståndskraft.

²³ Ds 2017:66 Motståndskraft Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försvaret 2021–2025, p. 46, p. 50.

4.2.1 Municipal level

At the local level, municipalities are the key actors in terms of both crisis preparedness and civil defence. The structural reform that was adopted by the government in May 2022 did not involve any changes for them, but this section sets out the problems in respect of municipalities that were identified in *Motståndskraft* and the structural inquiry.

Besides extensive operational responsibilities, municipalities also hold geographical area responsibility at a local level and have to endeavour to coordinate different activities and actors within their geographical area. The Committee on Defence assessed that municipalities needed to develop their ability to lead during periods of heightened preparedness, as well as in situations involving grey zone problems. The Committee on Defence also advocated an analysis of the resource needs required to strengthen municipalities' leadership capabilities.²⁴

The structural inquiry agreed that the responsibilities and tasks of municipalities during periods of heightened preparedness need to be clarified, and assessed that the Act on municipalities' and regions' measures prior to and during extraordinary events in peacetime and periods of heightened preparedness (2006:544) does not function appropriately. Inter alia, the structural inquiry felt that there was a need to raise the level of ambition for municipalities' planning for heightened preparedness, and to clarify municipalities' preparedness tasks in law and ordinance so that they correspond to and interact with the tasks performed by central government agencies. The Act is largely based on the concept of an extraordinary event, but the inquiry found that the meaning of this is unclear. Moreover, the criteria for reaching the 'extraordinary event' threshold were interpreted as being set at a high level and were therefore considered to restrict crisis preparedness work.²⁵

The inquiry also felt that some of the municipalities' preparedness tasks that are currently regulated in agreements between MSB and the Swedish Association of Local Agencies and Regions (SALAR) needed to be regulated by statute in order to clarify the state's steering and improve the county administrative boards' opportunities to follow up the municipalities.²⁶

With regard to the municipalities' geographical area responsibility, the inquiry found that the provisions are unclear and noted that there are differences in how the municipalities interpret this responsibility. Therefore, the inquiry proposed that new legislation with a view to making the leadership capabilities of municipalities and regions clearer and more consistent both prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness and peacetime crisis situations.²⁷ To take this proposal forward, the government tasked a special investigator with examining what basic preparedness responsibilities municipalities and regions should have prior to and during peacetime crises and periods of heightened preparedness²⁸. A report on this assignment is to be submitted to the Government Offices of Sweden (Ministry of Defence) by 29 March 2024.

4.2.2 Regional and higher regional level

The county administrative boards hold geographical area responsibility at a regional level and therefore have to promote coordination between different actors within the county. The Committee on Defence described a number of scenarios in which the county administrative boards and counties were regarded as being too small – in terms of resources and leadership – to be able to manage the coordination and prioritisation of resources at the regional level in relation

²⁴ Ds 2017:66 *Motståndskraft* Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försvaret 2021–2025, p. 100

²⁵ SOU 2021:25 *Struktur för ökad motståndskraft*, pp. 438, 446, 476

²⁶ SOU 2021:25 *Struktur för ökad motståndskraft*, p. 452

²⁷ SOU 2021:25 *Struktur för ökad motståndskraft*, p. 476

²⁸ Dir. 2023:51 *Kommuners och regioners grundläggande ansvar inför och under fredstida kriser och höjd beredskap*.

to civil defence. This is why establishment of larger geographical areas, known as civil areas, was proposed.²⁹

The Committee on Defence considered that regional coordination between the county administrative boards on the one hand and the Swedish Armed Forces and other agencies on the other was hindered by the fact that the regional structures of the Swedish Armed Forces and other agencies did not correspond to the division into counties. Therefore, it was proposed that the civil areas should correspond to the Swedish Armed Forces' military regions in geographical terms. Any new regional structures of civilian agencies should subsequently take into account the division of the total defence system into civil and military regions.

The Committee on Defence stressed that the division into four military regions had not met the needs of either military or civil defence in terms of territorial division. The Committee on Defence therefore felt that the Swedish Armed Forces' regional structure needed to be adjusted for more accurate alignment with total defence needs.³⁰

The structural inquiry shared the Committee on Defence's assessment of the need for larger geographical areas for civilian leadership and coordination, and proposed that the county administrative boards be divided into six civil areas that follow the same division as the collaborative regions (formerly the healthcare regions). It was proposed that one county administrative board per civil area should be responsible for coordination within and between civil areas. The governor of the county in question was proposed as the civil area head.

Like the Committee on Defence, the structural inquiry considered that collaboration between civil and military defence would be further facilitated if the Swedish Armed Forces were to adapt their regional organisation so that the military regions coincide with the civil areas.³¹

4.2.3 Central level

At national and central levels, the Committee on Defence assessed that a clearer, strengthened leadership structure was needed; both for coordination between central government agencies, and for the government's steering of central government agencies in respect of civil defence. 'Central level' refers to central agencies.

According to the Committee on Defence, the division of the agencies with monitoring responsibilities into collaboration areas that existed at that time needed to be reorganised on the basis of sectors of society with societally vital activities. The aim was to implement a more appropriate structure for preparedness planning. Designating a sector-responsible agency within each sector was proposed in order to strengthen leadership and coordination.³²

The structural inquiry agreed that there was a need for new division of central government agencies that more clearly reflected sectors conducting societally vital activities. The existing structure of collaboration areas and agencies with monitoring responsibilities was regarded as lacking functionality during periods of heightened preparedness. Several of these agencies indicated that they lacked a mandate to pursue important common issues, and that activities within some collaboration areas were so diverse that it was difficult to identify common issues to work on. It was also noted that the Swedish Armed Forces and MSB, which are tasked with promoting and developing coherent planning for total defence, had not used the collaboration areas as a point of departure. Therefore, the collaboration areas would not have provided a useful

²⁹ Ds 2017:66 Motståndskraft Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försvaret 2021–2025, pp. 98 et seq.

³⁰ Ds 2017:66 Motståndskraft Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försvaret 2021–2025, pp. 99 et seq.

³¹ SOU 2021:25 Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, p. 345.

³² Ds 2017:66, pp. 95–98.

framework for the work on civil defence and the planning of total defence. As a result, the structural inquiry proposed that the collaboration areas and the agencies with monitoring responsibilities be discontinued and replaced them with *preparedness agencies* and *preparedness sectors*. It was proposed that each sector should have a *sector-responsible agency*.³³

The structural inquiry identified additional societally vital activities and functions that would be particularly important to maintain during peacetime crisis situations, periods of heightened preparedness and, ultimately, war. However, for various reasons, these were deemed to be of such a nature that they could not constitute separate preparedness sectors. Some of them involve only one agency, while others include agencies outside the civil defence system, such as the Swedish Armed Forces and the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA). However, these activities were deemed to fulfil an important function in the preparedness system as a whole. This is why the creation of four *dedicated preparedness areas* was proposed (Cybersecurity, Psychological Defence, Schools and Preschools, and Migration) in order to complement the preparedness sectors. It was proposed that the civilian agencies included in these should become preparedness agencies. The inquiry considered it important for the dedicated preparedness areas to be included in the joint work on coherent planning that is being maintained by MSB and the Swedish Armed Forces.³⁴ However, these dedicated preparedness areas did not become part of the structural reform.

The inquiry also proposed the introduction of a responsibility staircase for central government agencies. The first step covers all central government agencies under the government and essentially tasks them with planning so that they can respond to peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness. The second step covers all preparedness agencies. In addition to the responsibilities arising from the first step, they are responsible for ensuring that it is possible to make the transition to a wartime organisation during periods of heightened preparedness. They are also required to assess what measures and investments are needed to safeguard societally vital activities within their area. They also have to help ensure that other agencies, municipalities, regions, businesses and organisations operating within the area have a strong capability to address both peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness. The third step involves the sector-responsible agencies, which are responsible for maintaining coherent planning for crises and periods of heightened preparedness within their respective sectors, in addition to the responsibilities arising from the previous steps.³⁵

4.2.4 National level

The national level refers to the Riksdag, the government and the Government Offices of Sweden. The government holds geographical area responsibility at a national level. In situations of heightened preparedness, therefore, the Committee on Defence considered that the government may need to be relieved of the task of coordinating the many total defence actors, since it needs to focus instead on strategic decisions of importance to the country. The Committee on Defence therefore proposed that MSB should be able to support and relieve pressure on the government by assuming responsibility for coordination during periods of heightened preparedness. The Committee on Defence also assessed that coordination between military and civil defence at a central level is impeded by the fact that the Swedish Armed Forces need to collaborate with a large number of agencies. The Committee on Defence recommended that MSB be tasked with maintaining coherence in civil defence at a central level and being the Swedish Armed Forces' primary partner at this level, and that MSB's mandate be expanded and clarified.³⁶

³³ SOU 2021:25 Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, pp. 275 et seq.

³⁴ SOU 2021:25 Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, pp. 258 et seq.

³⁵ SOU 2021:25 Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, pp. 30 et seq.

³⁶ Ds 2017:66 Motståndskraft Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försvaret 2021–2025 pp. 93 et seq.

However, the structural inquiry did not consider it appropriate for MSB to be automatically granted an extended mandate for the coordination of civil defence in acute situations. Besides the aim of relieving pressure on the government, the structural inquiry interpreted the Committee on Defence's reasoning on granting MSB an extended mandate as indicating that there was also a more implicit objective of aligning the steering of civil defence more closely with the steering of military defence. The structural inquiry noted that civil defence comprises a range of actors operating in different areas, and that the civilian agencies fall under different ministries and are autonomous and equal to one another. Therefore, the conditions for leadership of the overall activities that make up civil defence are different from military defence, which is essentially maintained by the Swedish Armed Forces – a single organisation, that is – with the support of a few additional defence agencies, all of which fall under the Ministry of Defence. The inquiry therefore assessed that the prerequisites for allowing an agency to take over the command of civil defence were not in place, nor was it appropriate or effective to do so. Instead, the inquiry assessed that the government should normally continue to lead civil defence, but that there should be scope for the government to decide, where necessary, that MSB should support the government and the Government Offices of Sweden in coordinating it.³⁷

4.2.5 The business sector

The structural inquiry also highlighted the business sector. Its reasoning was based on the inquiry on the role of the business sector in total defence.³⁸ The structural inquiry pointed out that in today's society, there are many private companies that carry out a significant proportion of the activities required to meet total defence needs. This mutual dependence between the public and private sectors is extensive, but collaboration between them is largely voluntary and insufficient.³⁹ When the government presented the new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness, it also established a cross-sectoral industrial policy council to strengthen collaboration with the business sector in the work prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness.⁴⁰ However, the establishment of this council falls outside the scope of this government assignment and is not covered in this interim report.

4.3 The complexity of total defence

The systems perspective is a key element in MTFFA's analysis and evaluation work. This perspective involves MTFFA monitoring how the various total defence elements interact to form the complex whole that constitutes total defence. From a systems perspective, the actors' interfaces, collaboration and information exchanges with other actors are of particular interest as these impact the overall functioning of total defence.

Total defence is a complex system that is difficult to assess. The degree of predictability in the system's behaviour is what makes total defence a complex system, rather than a complicated system. The behaviour of a complex system is generally difficult to predict. This difficulty is a consequence of three characteristics of particular relevance to total defence.

One such characteristic is the fact that complex systems are marked by non-linear interactions. A non-linear interaction can be understood as an interaction where cause and effect are not proportional to one another. Minor changes can lead to major impacts, while major changes can have relatively minor impacts.

³⁷ SOU 2021:25 Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, pp. 419 et seq.

³⁸ SOU 2019:51 Näringslivets roll inom totalförsvaret.

³⁹ SOU 2021:25 Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, pp. 319 et seq.

⁴⁰ Government of Sweden, tillsättande av ett tvärsektorielt näringslivsråd för totalförsvaret och krisberedskap (Ju2022/00000, Ju2021/03876, 19 May 2022).

Another characteristic is that complex systems are marked by dependencies between the constituent parts. These dependencies may be both explicit and hidden; and the more dependencies and constituent parts there are, the more difficult it becomes to assess and control the effects of individual changes. Today's total defence includes central agencies, municipalities, county administrative boards, regions, voluntary defence organisations and the private business sector. The number of elements and their apparent and hidden dependencies on one another render the system's complexity apparent.

The system's adaptive capacities are a third characteristic contributing to complexity. The elements referred to in the previous paragraph are constantly adapting to one another, to the environment in which they operate, and to the situations and events against which they are acting. To be able to function effectively, the system must be adaptable as reality is constantly changing, particularly in crisis and war situations. However, adaptive capacities also mean that the system and its elements are in constant motion and that the system's behaviour is highly responsive to events that, in turn, can be hard to predict.

5. Administrative policy prerequisites

The Swedish administrative model is a fundamental prerequisite, both for agencies' civil defence work and for the implementation of the new structure that MTFFA is to follow up and evaluate in accordance with the government assignment. This chapter briefly describes the model, as well as the practices for crisis management work that have evolved over time in Sweden.

5.1 The Swedish administrative model

Under the Constitution, the government governs the country and is accountable to the Riksdag.⁴¹ Executive power rests with the government, which has the central government administrative agencies at its disposal.

In international comparison, the Swedish administrative model exhibits a number of distinctive features.⁴² One of these is the organisational independence of the agencies from the government. In other words, the agencies are not part of the ministries, as is the case in many countries. This explains why the Government Offices of Sweden are relatively small. The government has delegated many central government administrative tasks and operational responsibility for various areas to the agencies, which means that expertise is largely located there rather than within the Government Offices of Sweden. There are currently 342 agencies under the government.⁴³

Sweden has also prohibited what is known as ministerial rule, which means that individual ministers are not allowed to make decisions concerning the agencies.⁴⁴ This follows from the provision indicating that the government must make its decisions collectively.⁴⁵

Although the government always bears ultimate responsibility for its agencies and for steering them, under this model the government is dependent on the agencies being able to provide adequate documentation and assessments. However, the agencies are dependent on how the government steers them so that they can carry out their tasks effectively. The model places demands on the government's steering, and also on the relationship between the government and the agencies. The organisational separation between them may pose a challenge for communication between the government and the agencies.

The agencies' position in relation to the government is also marked by how the government chooses to steer them in practice. In recent decades, the government's ambition has been to reduce detailed steering. However, there are no formal obstacles preventing the government from exercising more detailed steering of the agencies.

Government steering takes place through the Agency Ordinance and agencies' instructions, as well as through other ordinances, appropriations, appropriation directions, assignments and – not least – informal contacts that can clarify formal steering and often have a significant role to play in the interaction between the government and the agencies.⁴⁶ Chapter 12(5) of the Instrument of Government sets out what is known as the appointment power, which is a particularly important instrument of authority within the administrative model. This means that the government appoints and dismisses the leadership of its agencies.

⁴¹ RF Chapter 1(6).

⁴² In its report *Förvaltningsmodellen under coronapandemin, 2020* [The administrative model during the coronavirus pandemic, 2020], the Swedish Agency for Public Management has analysed some of them on the basis of aspects that need to be managed in the event of a national crisis.

⁴³ Information taken from the Swedish Agency for Public Management website, <https://www.statskontoret.se/fokusomraden/fakta-om-statsforvaltningen/myndigheterna-under-regeringen/>, version dated 1 November 2023.

⁴⁴ RF Chapter 7(3).

⁴⁵ RF Chapter 7(4).

⁴⁶ Eka, Anders, Hirschfeldt, Johan, Jermsten, Henrik and Svahn Starrsjö, Kristina, *Regeringsformen – med kommentarer*, 2nd edition, Karnov Group, 2018.

Another distinctive feature is the extensive decentralisation, whereby a large proportion of administrative tasks have been allocated to the regional and municipal levels. The model has three administrative levels: national, regional and municipal. There is also the EU level. The various levels are responsible for different issues. The allocation of responsibilities is regulated through a number of statutes and can be changed by the Riksdag and the government, which means that it may vary over time.

One of the strengths of decentralisation is that decisions can be made close to citizens and adapted to local conditions. However, it has proven to pose challenges for government steering during a national crisis.⁴⁷ In such situations, the government must take into account municipal self-government and the principles of crisis management: the principles of responsibility, proximity and similarity (see below).

Municipal self-government is one of the foundations of Swedish democracy.⁴⁸ However, the degree of self-government is dependent on the extent to which the Riksdag and the government choose to regulate the areas for which municipalities and regions hold responsibility.

In contrast to the government's steering of central government agencies, the steering options for municipalities and regions are significantly more limited. According to the Instrument of Government, state steering of municipalities and regions is to take place through legislation or pursuant to legislation. However, there is also scope for what are known as soft steering instruments that are non-binding. For instance, the government is able to task agencies with providing support and information (knowledge-based steering) and collaborating with regions and municipalities. The Riksdag and the government may also use financial steering through decisions on taxes, fees, grants or subsidies.

Under normal circumstances, extensive decentralisation poses certain challenges for agencies at all administrative levels: both information exchange and collaboration between agencies are needed to implement government policies and achieve the objectives set by the Riksdag. Information exchange and collaboration are crucial for effective crisis management. The high degree of decentralisation, together with municipal self-government, may therefore complicate state steering, and thus also efforts to manage a national crisis.

5.2 Key principles of crisis management

Another essential starting point for crisis management in Swedish society is provided by the principles of responsibility, proximity and similarity on which the crisis preparedness and crisis management system is based. In broad terms, they mean that activities should, as far as possible, function in the same way as under normal conditions, even during societal disruptions.⁴⁹

Geographical area responsibility is another fundamental part of the Swedish crisis preparedness and crisis management system. This means that there must be a body within a geographical area that is responsible for ensuring that coordination between different actors functions properly.⁵⁰ However, this body does not assume responsibility from actors; instead, all actors retain their responsibility in accordance with the principle of responsibility. The government holds geographical area responsibility at a national level. County administrative boards hold responsibility at a regional level, and municipalities at a local level.

⁴⁷ See, for example, SOU 2022:10 Sverige under pandemin.

⁴⁸ KU 1973:26 Betänkande med anledning av Kungl. Maj:ts proposition 1973:90 med förslag till ny regeringsform och ny riksdagsordning m. m. jämte motioner.

⁴⁹ For a more detailed discussion of these principles, see chapter 9, SOU 2022:10 Sverige under pandemin.

⁵⁰ Geographical area responsibility was originally part of civil and military command and collaborative structures during the Cold War: see Eriksson, Pär, Larsson, Per och Welander, Frej, *Kommunerna och det lokala geografiska områdesansvaret*, FOI-R--4800--SE, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2019.

Several evaluations of the ways in which crises affecting Sweden have been addressed show that the principle of responsibility has limitations, and that strict application of it may even impair crisis management.⁵¹ For instance, signals to external actors may be delayed if the agency responsible is unable to resolve the crisis on its own.⁵² The principle also risks imposing constraints if actors are reluctant to act beyond their normal remit, while a crisis often involves different, and sometimes more stringent demands than the demands applicable under normal conditions.⁵³

The principle of geographical area responsibility has also presented challenges. Inter alia, there are problems with defining boundaries between the geographical area responsibilities of the government, the county administrative boards and the municipalities in relation to other actors.⁵⁴

In Sweden, what is known as the principle of legality⁵⁵ has to be upheld even in times of crisis, despite the fact that the need for rapid and previously unforeseen decisions may be substantial. Apart from the provisions of the Instrument of Government relating to war and the threat of war, the Constitution has no specific rules relating to peacetime crises. Nor are there any provisions on states of emergency; and what is known as the constitutional doctrine of necessity – which is based on customary law – has been regarded in Sweden as too uncertain a foundation on which to rely. Therefore, peacetime crises must be managed on the basis of the same general constitutional provisions governing law-making, decision-making processes and steering that are applicable in normal circumstances.

⁵¹ See SOU 2022:10 Sverige under pandemin [Sweden during the pandemic] and the references to previously completed evaluations of crises where the principle of responsibility was identified as a complicating factor.

⁵² In the forest fire inquiry, Ju Fö 2014:02, it was noted that many actors delayed taking action until it became clear that the forest fire was an extraordinary event and a matter of national concern. This hesitation complicated efforts to fight the fire.

⁵³ For a discussion with specific examples where actors were reluctant to take action, see SOU 2005:104 Sverige och tsunamin – granskning och förslag [Sweden and the tsunami – review and proposals].

⁵⁴ See SOU 2017:12 Att ta emot människor på flykt.

⁵⁵ In the field of constitutional law, the principle of legality means that public power is exercised under the law, such that public authorities may only undertake measures that have legal support.

6. Components of the structural reform

This chapter describes the structural reform and its components. Attempts are also made for each component to visualise and interpret the intentions underlying the adopted changes, and the desired outcomes and effects to which the changes can be linked (see

Figure 3).




Figure 3 Model of the reform – steps 2 and 3

MTFA's interpretation of the intentions underlying the structural reform is based on aspects such as the rationale presented at the government's press conference in May 2022. As the government made no other documentation available when presenting the structural reform, apart from the relevant government decisions, *Motståndskraft* and the structural inquiry's report are also used here as background material in order to attempt to reconstruct intentions and desired outcomes and effects.

Several sectors of the business community are responsible for most of the societally vital activities within the sector's area of responsibility. Therefore, it is impossible to equate the line of reasoning in the inquiry with the considerations made by the government in connection with the decision on the structural reform.⁵⁶

6.1 Design of the new structure

The new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness is a reform that currently regulates only central government agencies, although other actors may be indirectly affected.⁵⁷

This structure came about due to a number of amendments to ordinances affecting work on civil defence and crisis preparedness. These included the repeal of the Ordinance on crisis preparedness and measures by agencies with monitoring responsibilities during periods of heightened preparedness (2015:1052), and the introduction of the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), hereinafter referred to as the Preparedness Ordinance. The reform also included the introduction of the Ordinance on county administrative boards responsible for civil areas (2022:525), a number of amendments to the Ordinance on total defence and heightened preparedness (2015:1053) and amendments to the Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002). A number of minor adjustments were also made to the instructions relating to several other agencies.

⁵⁶ MTFA has mapped the structural inquiry's 63 proposal items and 21 assessment items and estimates that as of November 2023, about 60 per cent of proposals and 60 per cent of assessments have resulted in decisions. A list of the proposals and assessments made is provided in a separate document.

⁵⁷ Such as the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), the preparedness of central government agencies; Ordinance on county administrative boards responsible for civil areas (2022:525) and the Ordinance amending the Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), (Ju2022/00000, Ju2018/04761, Ju2021/00971 (in part), Ju2021/04048, Ju2021/04219, Ju2022/00288, Ju2022/00198, 19 May 2022).

The government presented the following objectives for the reform at the time when the decision was made on the new structure:⁵⁸

- A concerted effort in respect of work prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness
- Strengthening the resilience of the most vital societal functions
- Greater clarity on roles and responsibilities
- Enhanced ability to carry out targeted geographical interventions
- Strengthening collaboration with the business sector

MTFA assesses that the main components of the new structure are:

- An increase in the responsibilities and tasks of central government agencies in the field of societal crisis preparedness and civil defence.
- Designation of a number of preparedness agencies and division of these into ten preparedness sectors with ten sector-responsible agencies.
- Division of the country into six geographical areas (civil areas) with six designated county administrative boards responsible for civil areas.
- MSB's coordinating and supporting role.

Sections 6.1.2 to 6.1.4 provide a brief account of these key changes. Attempts are also made for each element of the new structure to interpret the potential intentions and desired outcomes and effects behind the reform.

6.1.1 Expanding the responsibilities and tasks of central government agencies

The Preparedness Ordinance means that the government is expanding, and in some cases strengthening, the responsibilities and tasks held by agencies under the government in their work on civil defence and crisis preparedness (342 agencies as of November 2023⁵⁹). The most important change lies in the nature of the tasks themselves, which represent a higher level of ambition compared to previous arrangements. This is applicable in relation to peacetime crisis situations, but particularly in relation to periods of heightened preparedness. MTFA assesses that the choice to consolidate the general provisions for the work of the agencies in a single ordinance has been made in order to make it easier for the agencies to gain an overview of their responsibilities and tasks within the area. The introduction of new definitions in the Preparedness Ordinance is also helping to facilitate the agencies' interpretation of the meaning of responsibilities and tasks.⁶⁰ A more detailed account of the responsibilities and tasks of central government agencies is provided in chapter 7.

MTFA assumes that the motive behind this part of the reform is that activities that are deemed to need to function even during periods of heightened preparedness need to establish the capabilities, processes and resources required to cope with an armed attack. Similarly, there ought to be an underlying assumption that by working actively on crisis preparedness and civil defence, agencies will strengthen their general ability to handle different types of disruptions in their activities and thereby also reduce vulnerabilities in various societal functions. Overall, this is

⁵⁸ These objectives were presented at the government's press conference on 18 May 2022, where the reform was presented.

⁵⁹ Information taken from the Swedish Agency for Public Management website, <https://www.statskontoret.se/fokusomraden/fakta-om-statsforvaltningen/myndigheterna-under-regeringen/>, version dated 1 November 2023.

⁶⁰ SOU 2021:25 Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, pp. 30, 289.

expected to help strengthen societal resilience. The raised level of ambition is intended to contribute to concerted efforts prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness.⁶¹

6.1.2 Introduction of preparedness agencies and preparedness sectors

The new structure means that some central government agencies will become preparedness agencies, with enhanced tasks compared to other agencies. More agencies have been designated as preparedness agencies than those that were previously referred to as agencies with monitoring responsibilities. There were 47 agencies with monitoring responsibilities prior to the reform.⁶² The introduction of the reform has resulted in these being replaced by 60 preparedness agencies.⁶³ Moreover, the tasks of the preparedness agencies are more extensive than those of the agencies with monitoring responsibilities.

The new structure also involves division into ten preparedness sectors which include most of the preparedness agencies. These sectors are based on societally vital activities and functions, and are intended to provide the agencies with a platform for collaboration and coordination within each sector.⁶⁴ Each sector has a sector-responsible agency tasked with leading efforts within its preparedness sector to coordinate measures prior to and during peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness.⁶⁵ A more detailed account of the tasks of the preparedness agencies, division into preparedness sectors and the tasks of the sector-responsible agencies is provided in chapter 8.

The Swedish National Agency for Education, the Swedish Migration Agency and the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency are preparedness agencies that do not form part of any preparedness sector. These agencies, like other preparedness agencies, have areas of responsibility for societally vital activities and functions. MTFFA assumes here that these have not been assessed as being clearly attributable to a sector.⁶⁶

The requirements for individual preparedness agencies to maintain good capabilities to address their tasks during peacetime crisis situations and period of heightened preparedness are assumed to help reduce vulnerability in society and, ultimately, to strengthen resilience in the most vital societal functions.⁶⁷ Inter alia, the introduction of preparedness sectors is assumed to lead to better coordination between relevant agencies operating in the same field, as well as better coordination on a national level between different areas of society in terms of crisis preparedness and incident management.⁶⁸ MTFFA also infers an intention to create a clearer leadership structure by providing the sector-responsible agencies with coordinated assignments within their respective preparedness sectors.⁶⁹ Another assumed intention is that the changes will help to enhance clarity in respect of tasks and allocation of responsibilities, while also leading to more effective cooperation within civil defence and faster decision-making pathways.⁷⁰

6.1.3 Division into civil areas

The new structure introduce a new geographical division, the 21 county administrative boards being divided into six civil areas. Each civil area has a county administrative board responsible for civil areas, which is responsible for coordination. The governor of a county administrative board

⁶¹ SOU 2021:25 Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, pp. 499, 502.

⁶² Agencies with monitoring responsibilities consisted of 26 central agencies and the 21 county administrative boards.

⁶³ Preparedness agencies currently consist of 39 central agencies and the 21 county administrative boards. The Swedish Payments Agency will be added in 2024, bringing the number of preparedness agencies to 61.

⁶⁴ SOU 2021:25 Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, pp. 213–214, 218.

⁶⁵ SOU 2021:25 Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, pp. 213–216.

⁶⁶ See, for example, SOU 2021:25 Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, pp. 213–214, 220–221, 258–259, 279–281.

⁶⁷ SOU 2021:25 Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, pp. 208–218, 502.

⁶⁸ SOU 2021:25 Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, pp. 208–211, 218, 312–314.

⁶⁹ Government press conference, 18 May 2022.

⁷⁰ Government press conference, 18 May 2022.

responsible for a civil area is known as the civil area head. A more detailed account of the division of civil areas and the tasks of county administrative boards responsible for civil areas is provided in chapter 9.

MTFA assumes that the division into civil areas is intended to strengthen coordination within civil defence, improve coordination between national, higher regional and regional levels, and facilitate coordination between civil and military defence at the higher regional level. In other respects, it is assumed that the aim is to clarify roles and allocation of responsibilities, as was the case for the introduction of preparedness sectors. It is assumed that a further aim is to improve the scope for targeted geographical interventions.⁷¹

6.1.4 MSB's role and tasks

The new structure involves certain changes to MSB's role, responsibilities and tasks in the field of civil defence and crisis preparedness. This includes supporting other agencies in their civil defence and crisis preparedness efforts, maintaining coherence in overall preparedness planning, identifying issues for which other agencies are not responsible, and representing the interests of civil defence when allocating society's resources.⁷² A more detailed account of MSB's role and tasks is provided in chapter 10.

MTFA interprets that the purpose underlying the design of MSB's various roles – including maintaining a supporting role in relation to other agencies, a coordinating role in respect of preparedness planning and a role as a civil 'counterpart' to the Swedish Armed Forces at a central level – is to create better conditions for the development of civil defence, and hence total defence. Part of this is assumed to be motivated by capitalising on the opportunities for better coordination within civil defence that are made possible by the division into preparedness sectors and civil areas. This includes both the coordination of crisis preparedness and the coordination of incidents that need to be managed.⁷³

⁷¹ Government press conference, 18 May 2022; Ds 2017: 66, pp. 98 et seq. and SOU 2021:25 Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, pp. 339 et seq.

⁷² See the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524) and the Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002).

⁷³ SOU 2021:25 Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, pp. 419 et seq., pp. 427–428 and Ds 2017:66, pp. 93 et seq.

7. Responsibilities and tasks of central government agencies

This chapter sets out the prerequisites for the work of all central government agencies under the government relating to peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness. Specific prerequisites for central government agencies in their roles as preparedness agencies, sector-responsible agencies, county administrative boards or county administrative boards responsible for civil areas are presented in the following chapter. The responsibilities and tasks of central government agencies can be illustrated in the form of a responsibility staircase as shown in Figure 4. The base – the first step – is made up of tasks that all central government agencies are required to perform. There are then additional tasks for agencies in the role of preparedness agency (step 2), and even more tasks for agencies in the role of sector-responsible agency (step 3).




Figure 4 The responsibility staircase under the Preparedness Ordinance

Given the fact that the regulations presented in this chapter are aimed at a very broad group of agencies, many of which do not have specific tasks in the field of crisis preparedness and civil defence, this chapter also sets out the support available for the implementation of the tasks resulting from relevant ordinances.

7.1 Regulatory prerequisites

For central government agencies under the government, tasks prior to and during peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness are primarily regulated by the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524).

Further provisions on total defence and heightened preparedness that must be observed by these agencies are included in the Act on total defence and heightened preparedness (1992:1403) and the Ordinance on total defence and heightened preparedness (2015:1053).

In the Preparedness Ordinance, the term ‘peacetime crisis situations’ refers to situations that deviate from the norm, affect many people and large parts of society or threaten fundamental values, involve a serious disruption or an imminent risk of serious disruption of vital societal functions, and demand coordinated and urgent measures by a number of actors.⁷⁴ The Preparedness Ordinance does not provide a more detailed specification of the concepts involved, such as *fundamental values* or *vital societal functions*.

Exemptions from the provisions of the Preparedness Ordinance apply to the Government Offices of Sweden, the committee system and the Swedish Armed Forces. Exemptions with regard to information obligations and work on risk and vulnerability analyses apply to several other agencies that work with issues within the military element of total defence, as well as the Swedish Security Service. Finally, certain exemptions apply to a number of designated smaller agencies: the Swedish Accounting Standards Board, the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council and the Swedish Climate Policy Council.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 6(1).

⁷⁵ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 3.

There are approximately 190 agencies in the group of central government administrative agencies impacted solely by the basic tasks of the Preparedness Ordinance prior to and during peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness comprises, excluding the preparedness agencies. These include a mix of large, medium-sized and small agencies. Of these, 45 agencies have more than 500 employees, 69 have 51–500 employees, 50 have 10–49 employees, and finally, about 50 – mainly boards and committees – have 0–9 employees.⁷⁶

A number of new tasks have been introduced and certain clarifications made compared to previous ordinances. For instance, it is stated that each agency must identify societally vital activities within its own area of responsibility, that they must conduct systematic work so that they can maintain their own societally vital activities (continuity) and stand responsible for ensuring that staff designated for wartime service at the agency receive the training and practice they need to perform their duties during periods of heightened preparedness. It has also been clarified that work on risk and vulnerability analysis must include the heightened preparedness perspective.

The amendments to the ordinances that entered into force in 2022 represent a higher level of ambition for the work of central government agencies, particularly in situations involving heightened preparedness. They also provide greater clarity by consolidating the general provisions for the agencies' preparedness work into a single ordinance. The following section first sets out the overall responsibilities and tasks incumbent upon the agencies. There is specific indication of areas where new tasks have been added compared to previous provisions, or where the tasks have clearly changed. Comments are also made for each task on any specifications of the task in the form of regulations and general recommendations and other available documentation intended to support the agencies' work with these.

7.1.1 Responsibilities and tasks

The work on **risk and vulnerability analyses** is a key task for each agency. One element of this involves identifying societally vital activities within the agency's area of responsibility.⁷⁷ This is a new task compared to the previous ordinance. Each agency must:

- continuously analyse whether there are any vulnerabilities and threats or risks, prior to or during peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness, that could seriously threaten, damage or impair the capacity to conduct societally vital activities within the area of responsibility.
- at least every two years, assess and compile the results of the analysis work... in a risk and vulnerability analysis. The risk and vulnerability analysis must also include the measures undertaken and planned by the agency in order to reduce vulnerability to identified threats and risks, as well as an overall assessment of what other measures should be undertaken within the agency's area of responsibility for the same purpose.

Compared to previous provisions, it is now even clearer that the analysis work to be carried out by all agencies must also include periods of heightened preparedness.

It is also specified that each agency must conduct systematic work so as to be able to maintain its own societally vital activities (continuity) and work to ensure that other actors within the area of responsibility also carry out such work. This is also a new task compared to the previous ordinance. Outside the ordinance, the term *continuity management* is commonly used to refer to the

⁷⁶ Swedish Agency for Government Employers, *Anställda i staten*, <https://www.arbetsgivarverket.se/statistik-och-analys/staten-i-siffror-anstallda-i-staten/>, version dated 30 October 2023. Please note that courts are not included in the figures presented in this section; only central government administrative agencies under the government are included.

⁷⁷ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 7(1).

work described in the task.⁷⁸ MSB presents methodological descriptions, examples and training material on continuity management on its website.⁷⁹

The Preparedness Ordinance includes a definition of the term ‘societally vital activity’, which reads: ‘an activity, service or infrastructure that maintains or ensures societal functions that are necessary for society’s basic needs, values or security’.⁸⁰ However, there is no clarification of what constitutes *society’s basic needs, values or security*.

The term *societal functions that are necessary* is assumed by MTFAs to correspond to the term *vital societal functions* used in the definition of peacetime crisis situations in the Preparedness Ordinance.

Nor is there any clarification of the term *the agency’s area of responsibility*. A given point of departure is the responsibility that is usually set out in the opening provision of each agency’s instructions. However, the term is used in other parts of the ordinance in a manner that presupposes that the activities, or parts of the activities, of (some) other actors are also included.⁸¹ According to the structural inquiry, examples of areas of responsibility could include supervision or coordination responsibility for actors operating in a particular area (such as electricity producers, telecommunications operators or food producers), or the provision of expert knowledge.⁸²

MSB provides methodological support for identifying societally vital activities. This includes a description of the methodology and a documentation template.⁸³ MSB has also published a list of vital societal functions.⁸⁴ This list claims to identify the functions that are necessary for society’s basic needs, values or security.

MSB has produced regulations and general recommendations that regulate what a risk and vulnerability analysis should include, and how it should be presented.⁸⁵

The agencies’ responsibilities and tasks **prior to and during peacetime crisis situations** include the following:

- each agency must stand responsible for ensuring that staff at the agency receive the training and practice needed to enable them to perform their tasks during peacetime crisis situations.⁸⁶
- each agency whose area of responsibility is impacted by a peacetime crisis situation must undertake the measures needed to deal with the situation that has arisen and its consequences. Agencies must collaborate with and support one another in any such crisis situation.⁸⁷

With regard to training and practice, MSB must ensure that training in crisis preparedness and civil defence is provided in accordance with its instructions. MSB must also conduct exercises

⁷⁸ See, for example, Swedish Institute for Standards, *Vägledning för kontinuitetshantering*, SS 22304:2014.

⁷⁹ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Kontinuitetshantering*, <https://www.msb.se/sv/amnesomraden/krisberedskap--civilt-forsvar/samhallsviktig-verksamhet/kontinuitetshantering/>, version dated 3 October 2023.

⁸⁰ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 6(2).

⁸¹ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 7(3).

⁸² SOU 2021:25 Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, section 6.4.2.

⁸³ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Identifiera samhällsviktig verksamhet*, publication number MSB1408, 2019.

⁸⁴ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Lista med viktiga samhällsfunktioner – Utgångspunkt för att stärka samhällets beredskap*, publication number MSB1844, 2023.

⁸⁵ MSBFS 2016:7 Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskaps föreskrifter om statliga myndigheters risk- och sårbarhetsanalyser, Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap. Please note that these regulations refer to Section 8 of the now repealed Ordinance on crisis preparedness and measures by agencies with monitoring responsibilities during periods of heightened preparedness (2015:1052).

⁸⁶ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 8.

⁸⁷ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 9.

within its area of responsibility⁸⁸ and offer support for planning and conducting exercises in the form of guidelines.⁸⁹ MSB also offers a number of introductory training courses on different approaches and general methodology for dealing with crisis situations (such as staff methodology and crisis communication).⁹⁰

The agencies' responsibilities and tasks **prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness** include the following:

- each agency must take into account the requirements of total defence in its activities. This includes planning so as to ensure that the agency is able to continue its operations as far as possible during periods of heightened preparedness, taking into account the availability of staff and other conditions.⁹¹
- personnel who are employed by an agency and who are not otherwise required for total defence purposes may be designated for wartime service at the agency, pursuant to their contract of employment.---

each agency must stand responsible for ensuring that staff designated for wartime service at the agency receive the training and practice needed to enable them to perform their tasks during periods of heightened preparedness.⁹²

The Act on total defence and heightened preparedness (1992:1403) contains a provision stating that total defence resources are to be designed so that they can also be used for international peace support operations and humanitarian assistance, and to strengthen society's ability to prevent and deal with severe strains on society.⁹³

The task that involves planning for the continuation of the agency's activities can be viewed as an operationalisation of the principle of responsibility prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness. There is no clarification of what constitutes *the requirements of total defence*.

The Swedish Armed Forces and MSB have jointly set out planning assumptions for total defence on behalf of the government. These are presented in the document titled *Handlingskraft* [Capacity for action].⁹⁴ Although the assignment stated that the planning assumptions would apply to what were then the agencies with monitoring responsibilities, the document and its contents are publicly available and accessible to other agencies as well (with the exception of a classified appendix).

The requirement for training and practice for periods of heightened preparedness is a new general task for central government agencies. MSB has produced guidelines on wartime service aimed at public and private actors who need to establish and staff wartime organisations.⁹⁵ It should be noted that the Preparedness Ordinance does not impose any explicit obligation for agencies to designate staff for wartime service at the agency.

The Preparedness Ordinance also includes **provisions in the field of information security**.⁹⁶ These mean that each agency is responsible for ensuring that its own information management

⁸⁸ Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), section 5.

⁸⁹ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, Övningsstöd och verktyg, <https://www.msb.se/sv/utbildning--ovning/ovningsstod-och-verktyg/>, version dated 3 October 2023.

⁹⁰ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, Utbildning och övning, <https://www.msb.se/sv/utbildning--ovning/> version dated 3 October 2023.

⁹¹ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 10.

⁹² Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 11.

⁹³ Act on total defence and heightened preparedness (1992:1403), section 2.

⁹⁴ Swedish Armed Forces and Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Handlingskraft – handlingsplan för att främja och utveckla en sammanhängande planering för totalförsvaret 2021–2025*, FM2021-1 7683:2, MSB2020-16261-3, 27 August 2021.

⁹⁵ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Rätt person på rätt plats – Vägledning för krigsorganisation och krigsplacering*, publication number MSB2097, 2023.

⁹⁶ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524).

systems meets such basic and specific security requirements that the agency's activities can be carried out in a satisfactory manner. This responsibility includes a specific requirement for agencies to take into account the need for secure command and control systems.⁹⁷

According to its instructions, MSB is to support and coordinate societal information security and analyse and assess global developments in the field. This includes providing advice and support, in relation to preventive work, to other government authorities, municipalities, regions, companies and organisations.⁹⁸ MSB has produced regulations and general recommendations on information security⁹⁹ and security measures in information systems¹⁰⁰ for central government agencies. MSB offers various forms of methodological support for such work¹⁰¹, as well as training and advisory services under the heading *systematic information security management*.¹⁰²

In addition to the above-mentioned tasks and responsibilities, which are applicable to all agencies required to apply the Preparedness Ordinance, two further tasks are specified: duty officer¹⁰³ and command function¹⁰⁴. Which agencies are to comply with these provisions are set out in specific government decisions. In both cases, the government makes decisions on the basis of proposals from MSB.

As regards the cryptographic preparedness of civilian agencies, MSB may decide, pursuant to the Ordinance on total defence and heightened preparedness (2015:1053), which agencies are to have secure cryptographic functions.¹⁰⁵ The basic requirement for the agencies concerned is that they must be able to send and receive encrypted messages during normal office hours. During peacetime crisis and periods of heightened preparedness, they must be able to send and receive encrypted messages even outside normal office hours.¹⁰⁶ MSB has developed regulations on the cryptographic preparedness of civilian agencies¹⁰⁷.

MSB offers a web-based introduction to the field of communications security, for instance.¹⁰⁸ The Swedish Armed Forces' Signal Protection School, which is part of the Swedish Armed Forces, offers a number of qualifying courses in the field of communications security.¹⁰⁹

7.1.2 Requirements for collaboration

With regard to collaboration, it is the responsibility of each agency to undertake the measures necessary during peacetime crisis situations to deal with the situation that has arisen and its

⁹⁷ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 13.

⁹⁸ Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), section 11a.

⁹⁹ MSBFS 2020:6 Föreskrifter om informationssäkerhet för statliga myndigheter, Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap. These regulations refer to Section 19 of the now repealed Ordinance on crisis preparedness and measures by agencies with monitoring responsibilities during periods of heightened preparedness (2015:1052). The wording corresponds almost word for word to the current wording of section 13 of the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524).

¹⁰⁰ MSBFS 2020:7 föreskrifter om säkerhetsåtgärder i informationssystem för statliga myndigheter, Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap. These regulations refer to Section 19 of the now repealed Ordinance on crisis preparedness and measures by agencies with monitoring responsibilities during periods of heightened preparedness (2015:1052). The wording corresponds almost word for word to the current wording of section 13 of the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524).

¹⁰¹ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Informationssäkerhet/ Metodstöd*, <https://www.informationssakerhet.se/metodstodet/>, version dated 12 October 2023.

¹⁰² Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Om systematiskt informationssäkerhetsarbete*, <https://www.msb.se/sv/annesomraden/informationssakerhet-cybersakerhet-och-sakra-kommunikationer/systematiskt-informationssakerhetsarbete/om-systematiskt-informationssakerhetsarbete/>, version dated 12 October 2023.

¹⁰³ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 15.

¹⁰⁴ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 16.

¹⁰⁵ Ordinance on total defence and heightened preparedness (2015:1053), section 16.

¹⁰⁶ Ordinance on total defence and heightened preparedness (2015:1053), section 18.

¹⁰⁷ MSBFS 2009:11 föreskrifter om civila myndigheters kryptoberedskap, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (This regulation refers to the previous, now repealed ordinance that gave the agency a corresponding mandate equivalent to that which it holds today to issue regulations in this respect.)

¹⁰⁸ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Säkra kryptografiska funktioner*, <https://www.msb.se/sv/annesomraden/informationssakerhet-cybersakerhet-och-sakra-kommunikationer/sakra-kommunikationer/sakra-kryptografiska-funktioner/>, version dated 12 October 2023.

¹⁰⁹ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Kurser hos Totalförsvarets signälskyddsskola (TSS)*, <https://www.informationssakerhet.se/kompetensutveckling/kurser-hos-totalforsvarets-signalskyddsskola-tss/>, version dated 12 October 2023.

consequences, and to collaborate and support one another.¹¹⁰ No interpretation or specification of this task has been identified by MTFAs. The agencies' planning for total defence must take place in collaboration with the other central government agencies, municipalities, regions, associations and businesses concerned.¹¹¹ As the task is not specified further, it should primarily be up to the individual agency to assess which other actors are involved.

In its coordinating role, MSB has initiated regular collaboration meetings with sector-responsible agencies and county administrative boards responsible for civil areas.

If necessary, MSB is also able to convene specific operational collaboration conferences, where participating actors are given the opportunity to collaborate on a specific issue or incident that may cause societal disruption. This may involve sharing information, agreeing on common orientations, ensuring coherent crisis communication to the general public, or allocating national reinforcement resources.¹¹²

MSB offers several forms of support for collaboration when dealing with specific incidents. This includes the framework for collaboration and command known as *Gemensamma grunder* [Common foundations], methodological support for staff procedures and the provision of technical systems for information exchange.¹¹³

MSB has produced guidance on planning for crisis preparedness and civil defence which is aimed at preparedness agencies, and this should be useful for other agencies as well.¹¹⁴

7.1.3 Requirements for reporting and information

With regard to reporting and information requirements, the following applies:

- At the request of the Government Offices of Sweden, each agency is obliged to provide the information needed for overall situation reports.¹¹⁵
- Each agency, when requested by MSB, must provide the information needed to allow MSB to carry out a number of specified tasks. These relate to the coordination of measures in the event of a crisis or a period of heightened preparedness, as well as the ability to assist the Government Offices of Sweden with material and information in connection with serious accidents and crises, and also during periods of heightened preparedness.¹¹⁶

One change from earlier provisions is that the task has been extended to include heightened preparedness as well.

MSB has produced supporting material with associated instructions for working with overall situation reports.¹¹⁷ One change from earlier provisions is that the task has been extended to include heightened preparedness.

¹¹⁰ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 9.

¹¹¹ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 10.

¹¹² Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, Samordning och inriktning vid samhällsstörningar, <https://www.msb.se/sv/amnesomraden/msbs-arbete-vid-olyckor-kriser-och-krig/inriktning-och-samordning-vid-samhallsstorningar/>, version dated 3 October 2023.

¹¹³ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, Samverkan och ledning, <https://www.msb.se/sv/amnesomraden/krisberedskap--civilt-forsvar/samverkan-och-ledning/>, version dated 12 October 2023.

¹¹⁴ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Vägledning – Planering för civil beredskap – process och metod*, publication number MSB2167, February 2023.

¹¹⁵ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 12.

¹¹⁶ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 12, with further reference to the Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), section 7.

¹¹⁷ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, Lagesbild, <https://www.msb.se/sv/amnesomraden/krisberedskap--civilt-forsvar/gemensamma-grunder-ramverk-for-samverkan-och-ledning/rutiner-och-checklistor/lagesbild/>, version dated 3 October 2023.

Agencies must report promptly to MSB in the event of IT incidents occurring within that agency's information system and that could seriously impact the security of the agency's information management.¹¹⁸ This obligation also applies in cases where an agency provides information management services to other principals; in which case there is also a requirement to consult them. MSB has produced regulations on the reporting of IT incidents for central government agencies¹¹⁹. These regulations specify which IT incidents are subject to the obligation and how such reporting is to take place. MSB also provides practical information and a reporting tool to be used in the first instance.¹²⁰

MSB may decide in individual cases that central government agencies that are not preparedness agencies are to submit a summary report based on a risk and vulnerability analysis.¹²¹ The risk and vulnerability assessment is a summary report of the risk and vulnerability analysis that all agencies are obliged to conduct. On the most recent occasion when such a summary report was to be submitted, the requirement included what were then agencies with monitoring responsibilities (all of which are preparedness agencies as of 1 October 2022), as well as about 20 additional agencies (several of which are now preparedness agencies). The category of other agencies that are required to report on this occasion included seven agencies that are not currently preparedness agencies.¹²²

See section 7.1.1 for supporting material relating to the agencies' work on risk and vulnerability analysis.

7.2 Financial conditions

No central government agencies have received increased appropriations for the new general preparedness responsibility, the first step in the responsibility staircase. Moreover, there are only limited opportunities for agencies that are not preparedness agencies to receive additional funding in order to develop their preparedness. For instance, only preparedness agencies, or other specifically designated agencies, may apply for grants under appropriation 2:4 Crisis Preparedness (ap.5) for development projects in the field of crisis preparedness and civil defence (within expenditure area 6 Defence and societal crisis preparedness).

7.3 Observations

7.3.1 Support for the interpretation of tasks

A number of factors influence the responsibilities and tasks of central government agencies under section 7.1, and hence their ability to fulfil these tasks. One such factor is the degree to which a task is clarified and concretised through regulations and general recommendations, for example. The work on risk and vulnerability analyses, information security, reporting of IT incidents and the maintenance of cryptographic preparedness are all examples of tasks that are largely clarified. For other tasks, it has not been possible to identify further supporting material to assist with their interpretation and specification. These include, in particular, those linked to agencies' own circumstances, such as ensuring adequate training and practice for staff, being able

¹¹⁸ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 14.

¹¹⁹ MSBFS 2020:8 Föreskrifter om rapportering av IT-incidenter för statliga myndigheter, Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap. These regulations refer to Section 20 of the now repealed Ordinance on crisis preparedness and measures by agencies with monitoring responsibilities during periods of heightened preparedness (2015:1052). The wording corresponds almost word for word to the current wording of section 14 of the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524).

¹²⁰ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, Så här rapporterar du IT-incidenter, <https://www.msb.se/sv/amnesomraden/informationssakerhet-cybersakerhet-och-sakra-kommunikationer/it-incidentrapportering-for-statliga-myndigheter/sa-har-rapporterar-du-it-incidenter/>, version dated 12 October 2023.

¹²¹ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 17.

¹²² The Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management, the National Board of Trade, the Swedish National Space Board, the Geological Survey of Sweden, the Swedish Geotechnical Institute, the Swedish National Board of Institutional Care and the Swedish Election Authority (source: Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, Beslut om att lämna en sammanfattande redovisning av risk- och sårbarhetsanalyser för icke-bevakningsansvariga myndigheter utifrån regeringsbeslut Ju2022/02143, MSB 2022-08838, version dated 29 June 2022).

to undertake the necessary measures in a peacetime crisis situation, and taking into account the requirements of total defence in their planning prior to periods of heightened preparedness.

One aspect that would be interest for MTFA to examine in greater detail relates to how the actors concerned interpret responsibilities and tasks in the relevant statutes and associated regulations.

7.3.2 Agencies without specific responsibilities for crisis preparedness and civil defence

How the category of central government agencies that are not preparedness agencies deal with the tasks arising from the ordinances presented in this chapter should be examined in order to extend knowledge of how responsibilities and tasks are perceived by various agencies.

8. Preparedness agencies and preparedness sectors

This chapter sets out the division into preparedness sectors and the prerequisites for the work of preparedness agencies and sector-responsible agencies prior to and during peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness.

8.1 Preparedness agencies and division into preparedness sectors

The elements of the structural reform that relate to preparedness agencies and the division into preparedness sectors are regulated in the Preparedness Ordinance¹²³. Besides the tasks assigned to each central government agency under the ordinance, which are described in chapter 7, there are a number of tasks for the agencies that are also designated as preparedness agencies. The category of preparedness agencies includes ten sector-responsible agencies that have been assigned additional tasks. See Figure 4 in chapter 7 for the basic allocation of tasks between the different categories.

8.1.1 Preparedness agencies

The Preparedness Ordinance sets out which agencies are preparedness agencies. To date, 61 preparedness agencies have been designated, comprising 40 central agencies and the 21 county administrative board: see Table 1.

Table 1 Preparedness agencies

List of preparedness agencies	
Affärsverket svenska kraftnät	Swedish Pensions Agency
Swedish Public Employment Service	Swedish Police Authority
Swedish Companies Registration Office	Swedish Post and Telecom Authority
Swedish National Courts Administration	Swedish National Debt Office
Swedish eHealth Agency	Swedish Maritime Administration
Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate	Swedish Tax Agency
Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority	National Board of Health and Welfare
Public Health Agency of Sweden	Swedish Energy Agency
Swedish Social Insurance Agency	Swedish Board of Agriculture
Prison and Probation Service	National Government Service Centre
Swedish Coast Guard	Swedish National Agency for Education
Lantmäteriet (the Swedish mapping, cadastral and land registration agency)	Swedish Veterinary Agency
Swedish Food Agency	Swedish Radiation Safety Authority
Swedish Civil Aviation Administration	Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute
Swedish Medical Products Agency	Swedish Security Service
County administrative boards (21 boards)	Swedish Transport Administration
Migration Agency	Swedish Transport Agency
Agency for Digital Government	Swedish Customs
Swedish Psychological Defence Agency	Swedish Payments Agency (from 1 Jan 2024)
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency	Swedish Prosecution Authority

¹²³ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524).

Besides the provisions of the Preparedness Ordinance, each preparedness agency has a specific provision included in its instructions which sets out the agency's role(s) under the Preparedness Ordinance. These provisions have often been introduced as section 1a immediately following the opening provision of the agency's instructions.¹²⁴ Compared to the previous system, this may be viewed as additional emphasis on the tasks and responsibilities of the agencies concerned in the field of societal crisis preparedness and civil defence.

The Ordinance on total defence and heightened preparedness (2015:1053) contains a provision on the obligation of preparedness agencies and sector-responsible agencies to submit supporting material to the Swedish Armed Forces.

The structural inquiry proposed that eleven agencies that previously had no monitoring responsibilities should become preparedness agencies.¹²⁵ The government decided in accordance with this proposal, but also appointed the Swedish National Courts Administration as a new preparedness agency. The new Swedish Psychological Defence Agency was added in 2022, and the new Swedish Payments Agency will be added in 2024. By 2024, there will be 15 preparedness agencies that previously had no monitoring responsibilities.

8.1.2 Division into preparedness sectors

The Preparedness Ordinance sets out the division into preparedness sectors, as well as the designation of each sector and the sector-responsible agency. There are currently ten preparedness sectors comprising a total of 58 agencies: see Table 2. The Swedish National Agency for Education, the Swedish Migration Agency and the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency are preparedness agencies without being included in any preparedness sector. There are also other areas that encompass a wide range of societal activities and involve a number of clearly identifiable actors, but that do not constitute preparedness sectors.

Some agencies form part of several preparedness sectors. There are also agencies that are sector-responsible in one preparedness sector and while participating as a preparedness agency in another.

It may be noted that most preparedness sectors are made up of agencies that report to various ministries. Only in the Energy Supply sector does a single ministry hold responsibility for all the agencies included in the sector.

¹²⁴ From a legislative technical perspective, this constitutes a form of double regulation that adds nothing beyond the regulation that already exists in the Preparedness Ordinance.

¹²⁵ The Swedish Public Employment Service, the Swedish Companies Registration Office, the Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate, the Prison and Probation Service, Lantmäteriet (the Swedish mapping, cadastral and land registration agency), the Agency for Digital Government, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, the Swedish National Agency for Education, the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute, the National Government Service Centre and the Swedish Prosecution Authority.

Table 2 Division into preparedness sectors and agencies included

Designation of preparedness sector	Sector-responsible agency	Other agencies included in the preparedness sector
Economic Security	Swedish Social Insurance Agency	Swedish Public Employment Service Swedish Pensions Agency Swedish National Debt Office Swedish Tax Agency National Government Service Centre Swedish Payments Agency ¹²⁶
Electronic Communications and Postal Services	Swedish Post and Telecom Authority	Affärsverket svenska kraftnät Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency Swedish Transport Administration
Energy Supply	Swedish Energy Agency	Affärsverket svenska kraftnät Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate Swedish Radiation Safety Authority
Financial Services	Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority	Swedish National Debt Office
Provision of Core Data	Swedish Tax Agency	Swedish Companies Registration Office Lantmäteriet (the Swedish mapping, cadastral and land registration agency) Agency for Digital Government
Health, Care and Welfare	National Board of Health and Welfare	Swedish eHealth Agency Public Health Agency of Sweden Swedish Medical Products Agency
Food Supply and Drinking Water	Swedish Food Agency	County administrative boards Swedish Environmental Protection Agency Swedish Board of Agriculture Swedish Veterinary Agency
Security, Law and Order	Swedish Police Authority	Swedish National Courts Administration Prison and Probation Service Swedish Coast Guard Swedish Security Service Swedish Customs Swedish Prosecution Authority
Rescue Services and Civil Protection	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency	Swedish Coast Guard County administrative boards Swedish Police Authority

¹²⁶ As from 1 January 2024.

		Swedish Maritime Administration Swedish Radiation Safety Authority Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute
Transport	Swedish Transport Administration	Swedish Civil Aviation Administration Swedish Maritime Administration Swedish Transport Agency

8.2 Role and responsibilities of the preparedness agencies

This section sets out the tasks of agencies responsible for preparedness and the differences that can be identified between these and the former agencies with monitoring responsibilities.

8.2.1 Responsibilities and tasks

The provisions of the Preparedness Ordinance concerning the tasks of the preparedness agencies begin with the overall requirement for them to ‘have a good capacity to withstand threats and risks, prevent vulnerabilities, manage peacetime crisis situations and perform their tasks during periods of heightened preparedness’.

The same paragraph also states that they must ‘endeavour to ensure that other central government agencies, municipalities, regions, associations and businesses concerned develop their capacities in these respects’.¹²⁷

In addition to this, preparedness agencies have a number of specific tasks which require them to:

- take into account the need for research and development initiatives and other forms of knowledge gathering such as lessons learned from past incidents,
- take into account the need for security and compatibility in the technical systems necessary for the agencies to carry out their work,
- take into account the need for participation in the society-wide radio communications system for protection and security that is administered by MSB.

These provisions correspond to the tasks previously assigned to agencies with monitoring responsibilities.

The preparedness agencies must ‘carry out the external monitoring, development initiatives and other preparations, including the procurement of supplies and equipment, that are necessary for the agency to fulfil its tasks during peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness’. Compared to the previous Crisis Preparedness Ordinance, this means that the requirement for advance planning has been tightened, as the subordinate clause ‘if such procurement cannot be deferred until a deteriorating security policy situation’ has been removed.

Preparedness agencies must ‘plan, exercise and train personnel and also have the plans that are otherwise necessary to be able to make the transition to a wartime organisation during periods of

¹²⁷ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 20.

heightened preparedness'. Compared to the Crisis Preparedness Ordinance, the obligation is extended here through the explicit requirement relating to wartime organisation.

A new provision in the Preparedness Ordinance assigns the task of 'planning in order to be able to accelerate necessary measures prior to heightened preparedness, following a decision by the government', which tightens the requirements for advance planning and alternative planning.

The ordinance also states that the preparedness agencies 'shall primarily focus their activities on tasks that are of significance for total defence' during periods of heightened preparedness, and that agencies have an obligation to participate in the work of the preparedness sector(s) to which they belong.

8.2.2 Requirements for collaboration

Under the Preparedness Ordinance, preparedness agencies are obliged to collaborate with several types of actors.

The preparedness agencies must:

- collaborate with one another,
- collaborate with relevant county administrative boards and county administrative boards responsible for civil areas in their role as agencies responsible for geographical areas,
- collaborate with the other central government agencies, municipalities, regions, associations and businesses concerned,
- collaborate with the Swedish Armed Forces in respect of the need for support for military defence.¹²⁸

The preparedness agencies must 'take into account the cooperation taking place within the Nordic region, the European Union, international forums and organisations on matters relating to societal crisis preparedness and total defence'. Compared to the earlier Crisis Preparedness Ordinance, the obligation is extended in two directions: firstly, by also including issues relating to total defence; and secondly, by adding the Nordic countries and international organisations to the list of partners.

Clear collaborative tasks for agencies have been highlighted in bold in Table 3.

8.2.3 Requirements for reporting and information

Preparedness agencies must submit a risk and vulnerability assessment to the Government Offices of Sweden and MSB every two years. This must include information on the measures undertaken or planned in relation to the threats and risks identified by the agency in its risk and vulnerability analysis. The risk and vulnerability assessment must also include an overall assessment of measures that should be undertaken within the agency's operational area, along with how these should be prioritised. The preparedness agencies that form part of a preparedness sector must also submit their risk and vulnerability assessment to their sector-responsible agency.¹²⁹

Preparedness agencies must notify MSB of their exercise activities. They are obliged to participate in exercise activities related to the agency's area of responsibility.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 20(1–4).

¹²⁹ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 19.

¹³⁰ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 22(2).

Preparedness agencies are obliged to keep the government informed of developments, the situation, anticipated developments and available resources within its area of responsibility, and also of measures undertaken and planned.¹³¹

Prior to and during peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness, preparedness agencies – if they are part of a preparedness sector – are also obliged to notify the sector-responsible agency of the information needed to allow it to fulfil its tasks.¹³²

Prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness – but not prior to and during peacetime crisis situations – preparedness agencies must also provide supporting material to the county administrative boards responsible for civil areas so that they can fulfil their tasks.¹³³

Prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness, the preparedness agencies are also obliged to submit supporting material to the Swedish Armed Forces.¹³⁴ This provision, unlike the others included in the Preparedness Ordinance, can be found in the Ordinance on total defence and heightened preparedness (2015:1053).

¹³¹ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 22(1).

¹³² Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 22(3).

¹³³ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 22(5).

¹³⁴ Ordinance on total defence and heightened preparedness (2015:1053), section 8.

Table 3 Tasks for all central government agencies, preparedness agencies and sector-responsible agencies in accordance with the Preparedness Ordinance (clear collaborative tasks are marked in bold)

All central government agencies	Preparedness agencies	Sector-responsible agencies
<p><u>Risk and vulnerability analysis</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify societally vital activities within the agency's area of responsibility Continuously analyse whether there are any vulnerabilities and threats and risks, prior to or during peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness, that could seriously threaten, damage or impair the capacity to conduct societally vital activities within the area of responsibility Conduct systematic work to ensure the continuity of their societally vital activities and promote such work among actors within their area of responsibility At least every two years, assess and compile the results in a risk and vulnerability analysis <p><u>Crisis preparedness</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Train and exercise staff for peacetime crisis situations During peacetime crisis situations, undertake measures as needed and collaborate with and support other agencies <p><u>Civil defence</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Take into account total defence requirements Plan for the continuation of operations during periods of heightened preparedness Planning for total defence must take place in collaboration with central government agencies, municipalities, regions, associations and businesses Training and exercising staff designated for wartime service <p><u>Obligation to provide information</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide information for an overall situation report at the request of the Government Offices of Sweden and MSB Provide information for an overall situation report to the Government Offices of Sweden and MSB <p><u>Information security</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Meet security requirements within their own information management systems Pay particular attention to the need for secure command and control systems Report IT incidents to MSB 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide a risk and vulnerability assessment Be capable of withstanding threats and risks, preventing vulnerabilities, managing peacetime crisis situations and performing their tasks during periods of heightened preparedness Work to ensure that capabilities are developed among the central government agencies, municipalities, regions, associations and businesses concerned Collaborate with one another Collaborate with county administrative boards and county administrative boards responsible for civil areas Collaborate with other central government agencies, municipalities, regions, associations and businesses Collaborate with the Swedish Armed Forces Take into account cooperation in the Nordic region, the EU, international forums and organisations Take into account the need for R&D initiatives and other forms of knowledge gathering such as lessons learned from past incidents Take into account the need for security and compatibility in technical systems Take into account participation in RAKEL Inform MSB about their exercise activities Participate in exercise activities related to their area of responsibility Carry out external monitoring, development initiatives and other preparations that are necessary to fulfil their tasks during peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness Plan, exercise and train personnel for war organisation Plan to be able to accelerate measures prior to periods of heightened preparedness During periods of heightened preparedness, focus its activities primarily on tasks that are of significance for total defence <p><u>Reporting</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The government and MSB during peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness To the sector-responsible agency prior to and during peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness To the county administrative board responsible for the civil area before and during periods of heightened preparedness 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Within the preparedness sector, lead efforts to coordinate measures prior to and during peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness Drive work within the preparedness sector Support the preparedness agencies Ensuring that tasks and roles are clarified within the preparedness sector Ensure that the measures undertaken by preparedness agencies within the preparedness sector are coordinated with the measures performed by other preparedness agencies and the Swedish Armed Forces Ensure that there is collaboration with the business sector to the extent necessary Report on the situation within the preparedness sector's area of responsibility prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness During peacetime crisis situations or periods of heightened preparedness, provide supporting material to the government on the prioritisation and allocation of resources in the preparedness sector, if necessary

8.3 Economic conditions for the preparedness agencies

8.3.1 Funding for new preparedness agencies

In 2022, the government proposed that new preparedness agencies that were not previously agencies responsible for monitoring should receive a SEK 3.5 million annual increase in funding in order to implement the new structure for societal crisis preparedness and civil defence.¹³⁵ This may be compared with the structural inquiry's proposal that the agencies that were not previously responsible for monitoring should be each reinforced with three full-time equivalents, which was estimated to involve a cost increase of SEK 4.2 million per year.¹³⁶ The Riksdag decided in favour of the government's proposal.

In their consultation responses to the structural inquiry, several of the new crisis preparedness agencies stated that the need was greater than three full-time equivalents, and that the inquiry had not taken into account the necessary investments in skills development, infrastructure, leadership capability and secure communications, including communications security and protective security, as well as support functions such as IT, legal affairs and procurement. Several agencies felt that they needed at least five to six full-time equivalents initially.¹³⁷

8.3.2 Funding of former agencies with monitoring responsibilities

When the new structure was introduced, no additional funds were allocated to former agencies with monitoring responsibilities linked to their new roles as preparedness agencies. However, a number of agencies have received increased budget appropriations for their civil defence work.

8.3.3 Funding at preparedness sector level

The Total Defence Bill for 2021–2025¹³⁸ includes a financial allocation that was made prior to the government's decision on the preparedness sectors. The allocation can partly be related to the preparedness sectors, and partly directed at specific actors or activities.

The financial allocation will increase gradually from SEK 1 billion in 2021 to SEK 3.8 billion in 2025. Together with the SEK 430 million allocated as of 2018, the total amount will be SEK 4.2 billion in 2025. The 2025 allocation shows that health and medical care receives the largest share, amounting to SEK 1,050 million (health and medical care forms part of the Health, Care and Welfare sector). Other budget items related to preparedness sectors include food and drinking water (SEK 500 million), transport (SEK 400 million), civil protection and rescue services (SEK 240 million), energy supply (SEK 200 million), electronic communications (SEK 180 million), financial preparedness¹³⁹ (SEK 50 million), and security, law and order (SEK 50 million).¹⁴⁰

In addition to these funds, there are already dedicated preparedness appropriations for electricity preparedness and electronic communications, which are funded by fees within each sector.

¹³⁵ Prop. 2022/23:1 Budgetpropositionen för 2023, p. 106.

¹³⁶ SOU 2021:25 Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, pp. 504 et seq.

¹³⁷ See, for example, the consultation responses from the eHealth Agency and the Medical Products Agency. (Swedish Medical Products Agency, Yttrande över remissen Struktur för ökad motståndskraft 2021:25 (Ref no Ju2021/00971), Uppsala, 2021, 2.), <https://www.regeringen.se/remisser/2021/03/remiss-av-betankandet-struktur-for-okad-motstandskraft-sou-2021x/>, version dated 6 November 2023.

¹³⁸ Prop. 2020/21:30 Totalförsvaret 2021–2025.

¹³⁹ This includes agencies in both the Economic Security and Financial Services sectors.

¹⁴⁰ Prop. 2020/21:30 Totalförsvaret 2021–2025, p. 126.

The funds allocated in the Total Defence Bill may be allocated to preparedness agencies in the form of long-term funding for various civil defence tasks. Agencies can also receive temporary funds linked to government assignments.

The overall view is that the distribution between sectors differs significantly. At the same time, the sectors themselves differ in scope. The extent to which the differences in funding impact agencies' ability to implement the new structure needs to be analysed further.

8.4 Role and responsibilities of sector-responsible agencies

This section sets out the tasks of the sector-responsible agencies. The administrative law conditions for the sector-responsible agencies are the same as for the preparedness agencies.

8.4.1 Responsibilities and tasks

The Preparedness Ordinance states that a sector-responsible agency is primarily responsible for tasks relating to coordination and collaboration within the sector in question; but also for tasks that are directed outwards, towards actors outside the sector. The latter concern the coordination of measures and collaboration with the business sector and are described in greater detail in the next section.

The tasks of the sector-responsible agency within the preparedness sector are to:

- lead efforts to coordinate measures prior to and during peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness,
- drive the work forward,
- support the preparedness agencies; and
- ensure that tasks and roles are clarified within the preparedness sector.¹⁴¹

8.4.2 Requirements for collaboration

As noted above, within their individual preparedness sectors, sector-responsible agencies must lead efforts to coordinate measures prior to and during peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness. Given the fact that coordination is viewed as a result of leadership or collaboration¹⁴², and given the fact that sector-responsible agencies lack a mandate for leadership in the form of regulatory powers, the sector-responsible agency's task of leading the work also becomes a requirement to collaborate with the preparedness agencies that make up the sector. Without collaboration, coordination of the preparedness sector's measures cannot be achieved.

Sector-responsible agencies shall also endeavour to ensure that the measures undertaken by the preparedness agencies within the sector are coordinated with the measures undertaken by other actors. Even in this case, where the sector-responsible agency has no mandate for leadership, the requirement for coordination becomes a requirement for collaboration. The sector-responsible agency must therefore collaborate with other preparedness agencies and the Swedish Armed Forces and, where necessary, ensure that there is collaboration with the business sector.¹⁴³

8.4.3 Requirements for reporting and information

Sector-responsible agencies are required to provide information to two actors. Firstly, the sector-responsible agency is required to provide information to the Swedish Armed Forces to the extent necessary to allow the Swedish Armed Forces to fulfil their information obligations to the

¹⁴¹ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 24(1).

¹⁴² , Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Gemensamma grunder för samverkan och ledning vid samhällsstörningar*, 4th edition, publication number MSB777, Ödeshög, 2018.

¹⁴³ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 24(2).

government. Such information must also include the status within the preparedness sector's area of responsibility.¹⁴⁴ Secondly, during a peacetime crisis situation or period of heightened preparedness, the sector-responsible agency is required to provide information to the government on the prioritisation and allocation of resources in the preparedness sector, if necessary.¹⁴⁵

8.5 Financial conditions for sector-responsible agencies

Sector-responsible agencies were each allocated an increased appropriation of SEK 7.5 million per year for the new assignment from 2023.¹⁴⁶ This increase applies until further notice. All sector-responsible agencies received the same increase, regardless of the scope of activities in the different preparedness sectors.

The societal sector *Health, Care and Welfare* comprised about 274,000 employees in municipal operations in 2020.¹⁴⁷ Within the regions, this involved most of their about 283,000 employees.¹⁴⁸ Therefore, this means up to 550,000 employees in municipalities and regions alone. In addition, there are staff employed by private providers of health and social care, pharmaceutical companies, pharmacies, manufacturers and distributors of medical equipment, providers of digital healthcare services, etc. Collectively, this is an extensive sector.

The societal sector *Rescue Services and Civil Protection* comprises significantly fewer employees. The largest group of actors is the municipal rescue service, amounting to about 16,000 people (full-time staff about 6,000 and about 10,000 rescue service staff on standby).¹⁴⁹ The Coast Guard has about 850 employees¹⁵⁰, while SOS Alarm Sverige AB has about 1,350 employees¹⁵¹. Within the Swedish Police Authority, the county administrative boards and the Swedish Maritime Administration, staff working full-time on rescue service matters constitute only a small proportion of overall operations. Civil protection is currently a limited activity, comprising staff working on shelter issues and the planning of large-scale evacuations. Overall, the sector is likely to comprise fewer than 20,000 employees, which would correspond to just under four per cent of the number of public sector employees within *Health, Care and Welfare*. The number of private actors is also limited in comparison to *Health, Care and Welfare*.

8.6 Observations

8.6.1 Collaboration is a prominent element of extended responsibility

For both preparedness agencies and sector-responsible agencies, tasks and responsibilities for collaborating with other actors are an essential element of the obligations arising from the Preparedness Ordinance. Therefore, the procedures and working methods created in order to make such collaboration possible are an important part of the implementation of the new structure and need to be examined going forward.

¹⁴⁴ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 25(1).

¹⁴⁵ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 25(1).

¹⁴⁶ Prop. 2022/23:1, bet. 2022/23:FiU1, rskr 2022/23:51 and bet. 2022/23:FöU1, rskr 2022/23:79, 80 and 81.

¹⁴⁷ Statistics from the Swedish Association of Local Agencies and Regions,

<https://skr.se/skr/arbetsgivarekollektivavtal/uppfoljninganalys/personalstatistik/personalenisiffror/tabellerkommunalpersonal2022.62991.html>, version dated 24 November 2023.

¹⁴⁸ Statistics from the Swedish Association of Local Agencies and Regions,

<https://skr.se/skr/arbetsgivarekollektivavtal/uppfoljninganalys/personalstatistik/personalenisiffror/tabellerregionanstalldpersonal2022.62992.html>, version dated 24 November 2023.

¹⁴⁹ Ministry of Defence, *Promemoria Aktivering av civilplik i inom den kommunala räddningstjänsten och elförsörjningsområdet*, 2023.

¹⁵⁰ Coast Guard, <https://www.kustbevakningen.se/jobba-hos-oss/att-arbeta-som-kustbevakare/#:~:text=Inom%20Kustbevakningen%20arbetar%20drygt%20850%20medarbetare%20som%20alla,lyssna%20p%C3%A5%20v%C3%A5ra%20medarbetare%20och%20tillgodose%20deras%20behov>, version dated 24 November 2023.

¹⁵¹ SOS Alarm, *Arsberättelse 2022, 2023*.

8.6.2 Differences in the financial conditions of preparedness agencies

The financial conditions for implementing the new structure differ between preparedness agencies. This variation is dependent on whether or not the agencies previously held the role of agency with monitoring responsibilities. There are also differences in the historical allocation of funding for civil defence to former agencies with monitoring responsibilities. Thus, both past responsibilities and historical allocation of funding impact each individual agency's financial ability to implement the new structure.

The financial prerequisites for implementing the new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness differ between agencies, although it is not always clear how the allocation of funds is related to assignments, or the complexity or scope of tasks in respect of civil defence.

8.6.3 Scope of the preparedness sectors

The Preparedness Ordinance provides for the inclusion of certain preparedness agencies in preparedness sectors. However, this may be interpreted as meaning that work within the preparedness sectors also involves other actors, even though the government only regulates the relationship between central government agencies in the Preparedness Ordinance. There is reason to study how different sector-responsible agencies and preparedness agencies have interpreted which actors should be involved in the work of the preparedness sectors. The interpretation adopted will affect the scope of the tasks for the sector-responsible agencies.

8.6.4 Societal functions in the preparedness sectors

In contrast to the proposals of the structural inquiry, which indicated which vital societal functions should be included in each preparedness sector, the Preparedness Ordinance identifies only the ten preparedness sectors. In its *Lista med viktiga samhällsfunktioner*¹⁵² [List of vital societal functions], MSB has described which vital societal functions are included in each preparedness sector. MSB's list deviates in several respects from the division in the structural inquiry's proposal. For instance, MSB included *Digital platforms, services and information systems* in the Electronic Communications and Postal Services sector. This function was missing from the description of the sector in the inquiry, which focused mainly on the communications infrastructure. Another example is the Rescue Services and Civil Protection sector. The structural inquiry included collaboration between the emergency services in this. Collaboration between the emergency services refers to actors other than the emergency services, such as ambulance services and the interventions of the Swedish Police Authority. MSB has not included collaboration between the emergency services in its list.

The fact that the government has not described the content of the sectors in greater detail may result in a degree of uncertainty among actors about the structure of the sectoral classification in more specific terms. Whether this is the case, and if so how it affects work within the preparedness sectors, should be examined by MTFA.

8.6.5 Sectoral responsibility at multiple levels

One ambiguity relating to sectoral responsibility is whether it can and should be exercised only at a central level. For instance, the Swedish Transport Administration has started to apply its sectoral responsibility at a higher regional level. Within its Western region, the agency has initiated collaboration with actors in the field of transport. Going forward, the Swedish Transport Administration intends to apply its sectoral responsibility in all its regions.¹⁵³ The Swedish Transport Administration will also be adapting its regional structure to make it consistent with the division into civil areas. It should be noted that the Swedish Transport Administration has

¹⁵² Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis, *Lista med viktiga samhällsfunktioner*, publikationsnummer MSB1844, 2023.

¹⁵³ Telephone conversation with a head of unit at the Swedish Transport Administration, 12 October 2023.

held coordinating responsibility for crisis preparedness and planning for heightened preparedness in the transport sector since 2017, and thus has had more time to develop its coordinating role within the sector.

The Swedish Police Authority also has a regional structure (police regions) that is partly similar to the division into civil areas. The Swedish Police Authority also has a county level structure (police areas). Thus – in theory, at least – the Swedish Police Authority could take on a coordinating role at these levels in relation to the actors in the Security, Law and Order sector.

It may be interesting to study the allocation of roles between a sector-responsible agency acting at a higher regional level and the county administrative boards responsible for civil areas.

8.6.6 The differing roles of the sector-responsible agencies

In several cases, both preparedness agencies and sector-responsible agencies have other tasks that involve responsibility for interacting with actors that they encounter in their work within the preparedness sectors. There are different conditions and challenges to be addressed, depending on whether an agency is a supervisory agency, an enterprise or an expert agency. One aspect of this that MTFA intends to examine more closely in relation to the implementation of the new structure concerns potential difficulties in combining a supervisory role with sectoral responsibilities for one and the same agency, given the fact that collaboration is to be conducted with actors that are also supervisory objects.

9. Civil areas

Since October 2022, Sweden has been divided into six civil areas, each with a designated county administrative board responsible for the civil area. This chapter describes the division into civil areas and the conditions for the work of the county administrative boards and the county administrative boards responsible for civil areas.

9.1 Regulatory prerequisites

The Ordinance on county administrative boards responsible for civil areas (2022:525) adjusts the division of the country into six civil areas. It also includes the responsibilities and tasks of the county administrative boards responsible for civil areas.

The county administrative boards' other work on crisis preparedness and tasks relating to heightened preparedness is governed by the Preparedness Ordinance, the Ordinance on county administrative boards' crisis preparedness and tasks prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness (2017:870), and the Ordinance on instructions for county administrative boards (2017:868).

The municipalities' reporting obligations to the county administrative board are set out in the Act on measures among municipalities and regions prior to and during extraordinary events in peacetime and periods of heightened preparedness (2006:544) and the Ordinance on measures among municipalities and regions prior to and during extraordinary events in peacetime and periods of heightened preparedness (2006:637).

The way in which other preparedness agencies are intended to collaborate with the agencies responsible for civil areas is set out in the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524).

The Ordinance on the regional division of certain administrative agencies (2022:593) includes provisions on regional division. This is applicable to administrative agencies under the government to the extent prescribed by the government in the instructions to the agency or some other ordinance, or as decided separately. The ordinance follows the same division as the civil areas. At things stand present, the National Government Service Centre and the Swedish Public Employment Service are divided in accordance with this structure through their respective instructions from the government.¹⁵⁴

The Swedish Transport Administration has announced that the agency will be adapting its regional division as of 1 January 2024. The geographical division will then be the same as that resulting from the civil areas in the civil defence structure. This decision has been made by the agency, and not through government steering.

The basic organisation of the Swedish Armed Forces – that is, the division of the agency's peacetime organisational units – is regulated in the Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Armed Forces (2007:1266). According to the ordinance, the Swedish Armed Forces must have four military regional staff units, which are to be organised at four designated locations.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴ Ordinance containing instructions for the National Government Service Centre (2012:208), section 5a and Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Public Employment Service (2007:1030), section 20a.

¹⁵⁵ Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Armed Forces (2007:1266), section 14 and Appendix 1.

9.1.1 Geographical division into civil areas

County administrative boards can be divided into two categories: those with and those without responsibility for civil areas. The county administrative boards responsible for civil areas have the tasks that are assigned to all county administrative boards, in addition to the tasks arising from their responsibility for civil areas.

As of 1 October 2022, the following civil areas will have county administrative boards responsible for civil areas:

- Northern Civil Area (Civo N) comprising the county administrative boards of Västernorrland, Jämtland, Västerbotten and Norrbotten, with the Norrbotten county administrative board responsible for the civil area.
- Central Civil Area (Civo M) comprising the county administrative boards of Uppsala, Södermanland, Västmanland, Värmland, Örebro, Dalarna and Gävleborg, with the Örebro county administrative board responsible for the civil area.
- Eastern Civil Area (Civo Ö) comprising the county administrative boards of Stockholm and Gotland, with the Stockholm county administrative board responsible for the civil area.
- South East Civil Area (Civo SÖ) comprising the county administrative boards of Jönköping, Kalmar and Östergötland, with the Östergötland county administrative board responsible for the civil area.
- Western Civil Area (Civo V) comprising the county administrative boards in Halland and Västra Götaland, with the Västra Götaland county administrative board responsible for the civil area.
- Southern Civil Area (Civo S) comprising the county administrative boards of Kronoberg, Blekinge and Skåne, with the Skåne county administrative board responsible for the civil area.¹⁵⁶

See Figure 5 below for an illustration.



Figure 5 Illustration showing the civil area division (illustration provided by from MSB)

¹⁵⁶ Ordinance on county administrative boards responsible for civil areas (2022:525), annex.

9.1.2 Responsibilities and tasks of the county administrative boards

The county administrative board is the highest civil total defence agency within its county. It is also the agency responsible for the geographical area.¹⁵⁷ Through its activities, the county administrative board must reduce vulnerability in society and ensure that risk and preparedness considerations are included in social planning. Moreover, the county administrative board must develop a strong capacity to perform its tasks during peacetime crises and periods of heightened preparedness. The county administrative board must have a regional council for crisis preparedness, protection against accidents and total defence.¹⁵⁸

The county administrative boards are also responsible for coordinating crisis preparedness within their geographical area before, during and after a crisis. In particular, they must also:

- stand responsible for compiling a comprehensive regional situation report in crisis situations,
- support the actors responsible for crisis preparedness in the county in respect of planning, risk and vulnerability analyses, training and exercises,
- compile regional risk and vulnerability analyses that can be used as a basis for both their own and other relevant actors' crisis preparedness measures,
- follow up the municipalities' application of the Act on measures among municipalities and regions prior to and during extraordinary events in peacetime and periods of heightened preparedness (2006:544),
- report annually to MSB on the preparedness measures undertaken by municipalities and regions prior to a crisis, and at the same time report an assessment of the impact of the measures undertaken,
- report annually to MSB and the county administrative board responsible for the civil area under section 7a of the Ordinance on instructions for county administrative boards (2017:868) on the preparedness measures undertaken by municipalities and regions prior to periods of heightened preparedness, and at the same time report an assessment of the impact of the measures undertaken,
- work to ensure that the activities conducted by relevant actors within the county with regard to crisis preparedness assist in achieving basic civil defence capability, and
- collaborate with the county administrative board responsible for the civil area and other county administrative boards within the civil area to assist with joint work within the civil area.¹⁵⁹

In the event of a crisis, the county administrative board must work to ensure that the necessary collaboration takes place continuously within the county and with adjacent counties. It must coordinate activities between municipalities, regions and agencies and coordinate the distribution of information to the general public and media representatives. Following a decision by the government, the county administrative board must prioritise and direct national and international resources that have been made available.

¹⁵⁷ Section 7 of the Ordinance on instructions for county administrative boards (2017:868) and the Ordinance on county administrative boards' crisis preparedness and tasks prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness (2017:870).

¹⁵⁸ Ordinance on county administrative boards' crisis preparedness and tasks prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness (2017:870), section 1a.

¹⁵⁹ Ordinance on county administrative boards' crisis preparedness and tasks prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness (2017:870), section 4.

During periods of heightened preparedness, the county administrative board, as the highest total defence agency in the county, must work to ensure that the greatest possible defence effect is achieved. In particular, the county administrative board must:

- coordinate civil defence measures,
- promote a coherent approach to activities among civilian agencies and other civil bodies that are of relevance to the defence effort,
- work in consultation with the Swedish Armed Forces and the county administrative board responsible for the civil areas to coordinate civil and military defence,
- work in consultation with the county administrative board responsible for the civil area to ensure that the county's assets are allocated and utilised in such a way as to promote defence efforts, and stand responsible for compiling a comprehensive regional situation report.¹⁶⁰

9.1.3 Responsibilities and tasks of county administrative boards responsible for civil areas

The county governor of the county administrative board responsible for a civil area also serves as the civil area head. The civil area head leads the work with the support of a preparedness administration, which is led by an administration head. This person reports directly to the civil area head.¹⁶¹

As the highest civilian total defence agency within the civil area, county administrative boards responsible for civil areas are to work prior to peacetime crisis situations to ensure cross-county coordination of the county administrative boards' planning and preparations. During peacetime crisis situations involving several counties within the civil area, the county administrative board responsible for the civil area must have the capacity to provide a joint function to support the county administrative boards in managing the crisis.¹⁶²

A county administrative board responsible for a civil area may also take over responsibility for municipal rescue services within its civil area if the initiative is particularly extensive or there are other exceptional reasons.¹⁶³ If several civil areas are impacted by a rescue initiative, the relevant county administrative boards responsible for the civil areas may agree on which of the county administrative boards is to take over responsibility for rescue services in the municipalities.¹⁶⁴

The county administrative boards responsible for civil areas have a geographical area responsibility for civil defence. Prior to periods of heightened preparedness, they must work to ensure that total defence has a uniform orientation during periods of heightened preparedness. In particular, the county administrative boards responsible for civil areas must:

- take the initiative to coordinate planning between central government agencies and between these and the Swedish Armed Forces,
- collaborate with the Swedish Armed Forces on matters relating to total defence,
- support county administrative boards' planning and preparations within their respective counties,

¹⁶⁰ Ordinance on instructions for county administrative boards (2017:868), section 6.

¹⁶¹ Ordinance on instructions for county administrative boards (2022:868).

¹⁶² Ordinance on instructions for county administrative boards (2022:868), sections 5 and 6.

¹⁶³ Civil Protection Ordinance (2003:789), chapter 4, section 33(1).

¹⁶⁴ Civil Protection Ordinance (2003:789), chapter 4, section 33(2).

- take the initiative for actions and coordinate the planning and preparation of civilian aspects of host nation support.¹⁶⁵

During periods of heightened preparedness, the county administrative boards responsible for civil areas, as the highest civilian total defence agency in the civil area, must work to ensure that the greatest possible defence effect is achieved. In particular, the county administrative boards responsible for civil areas must:

- coordinate civil defence measures,
- in consultation with the Swedish Armed Forces, work to coordinate civil and military defence, stand responsible for compiling an overall situation report and keep the government informed of developments, the situation, expected developments, available resources and measures undertaken and planned,
- coordinate the civilian component of host nation support.¹⁶⁶

During periods of heightened preparedness, the county administrative boards responsible for civil areas must provide guidance to the county administrative boards within the civil area on the orientation and prioritisation of their activities and endeavour in every way to maintain liaison with the government, relevant agencies, county administrative boards within the civil area and other county administrative boards responsible for civil areas.¹⁶⁷

The county administrative boards responsible for civil areas must stand responsible for the necessary collaboration between civil areas when performing all tasks.¹⁶⁸

Regional level of the Swedish Armed Forces

The regional structures of the Swedish Armed Forces are referred to as military regions (MR), and there are four of them. These are led by a military regional staff unit (MRS) and are organised at four designated locations: Boden, Upplands-Bro/Kungsängen, Skövde and Lund/Revinge. The location of the military regional staff units is regulated by the Ordinance containing guidelines for the Swedish Armed Forces (2007:1266). The Gotland Regiment (P 18) in Visby operates as a military region, as it performs the same tasks as a military region within the county of Gotland, but it is not formally a military region under the ordinance.

The tasks of the military regions are determined not by the government, but by the Swedish Armed Forces. Their tasks are set out in the internal regulations of the Swedish Armed Forces. Essentially, these can be described as the military regions' responsibilities consisting of collaboration with regional and local actors, regional defence planning, host nation support, mobilisation preparations, command of home guard and operational units, and command of security and intelligence services.¹⁶⁹

9.1.4 Requirements for collaboration

As indicated in section 9.1.2, most of the tasks assigned to the county administrative boards within the framework of work relating to civil areas – regardless of whether they are responsible for civil areas – involve collaboration with other agencies. This concern process responsibility and coordination with other agencies. The county administrative boards thus have an important

¹⁶⁵ Ordinance on county administrative boards responsible for civil areas (2022:525), section 8.

¹⁶⁶ Ordinance on county administrative boards responsible for civil areas (2022:525), section 9.

¹⁶⁷ Ordinance on county administrative boards responsible for civil areas (2022:525), sections 10 and 11.

¹⁶⁸ Ordinance on county administrative boards responsible for civil areas (2022:525), sections 7 and 4 respectively.

¹⁶⁹ FIB 2022:6 Försvarsmaktens interna bestämmelser (ArbO), Swedish Armed Forces, 2022.

role to play within the central government administration as a point of contact for the region and the municipalities within each county.

As regards regulating collaboration between civil defence and military defence, individual county administrative boards – and not just county administrative boards responsible for civil areas – also have an obligation to consult with the Swedish Armed Forces.¹⁷⁰

The Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Armed Forces (2007:1266) states that the Swedish Armed Forces themselves decide which organisational units are to collaborate with county administrative boards, county administrative boards responsible for civil areas, municipalities, etc.¹⁷¹

9.1.5 Requirements for reporting and information

Preparedness agencies are required to provide material to the county administrative boards responsible for civil areas prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness, so that they can fulfil their tasks under the Ordinance on county administrative boards responsible for civil areas (2022:525).¹⁷² As each individual county administrative board is a preparedness agency, the provision covers both internal information obligations within the civil area and the obligation for other preparedness agencies – within or outside the preparedness sectors – to provide information to county administrative boards responsible for civil areas.

Prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness, county administrative boards responsible for civil areas must provide the Swedish Armed Forces with the supporting material needed to allow the agency to fulfil its obligation to provide information to the government.¹⁷³

A third provision in this context is more specific, stating that the county administrative boards must report annually on the preparedness measures undertaken by the county's municipalities and regions prior to periods of heightened preparedness. This report is submitted to MSB and the county administrative board responsible for the civil area.¹⁷⁴ In connection with this, county administrative boards must report an assessment of the impact of the preparations undertaken.

9.2 Financial conditions

The structural inquiry carried out an impact assessment of the number of posts that would be required to fulfil the proposed tasks of the six county administrative boards responsible for civil areas, and the associated cost. For three of them, it was estimated that each preparedness administration would require one head, two support functions and eight administrators. The number of administrators varies slightly for the others, and in one case the number of support functions also varies. In addition to the preparedness administrations, it was assessed that two full-time equivalents per county administrative board would be needed for the relevant county administrative boards, including for legal support.¹⁷⁵

The structural inquiry assessed that the cost profile differed slightly for the civil areas. This assessment was based on an assumption that the tasks will vary slightly between civil areas,

¹⁷⁰ Ordinance on county administrative boards' crisis preparedness and tasks prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness (2017:870), section 6(3).

¹⁷¹ Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Armed Forces (2007:1266), section 16.

¹⁷² Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 22 (in part).

¹⁷³ Ordinance on total defence and heightened preparedness (2015:1053), section 8.

¹⁷⁴ Ordinance on county administrative boards' crisis preparedness and tasks prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness (2017:870), section 4(6).

¹⁷⁵ SOU 2021:25. Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, pp. 504 et seq.

depending on the number of counties included in it, and also on different geographical conditions.

The government allocated SEK 132 million per year in the Budget Bill for 2023 for this part of the reform. Three civil areas were allocated funds on that basis at precisely the level proposed by the structural inquiry, while three were allocated higher funding than proposed, as shown in Table 4.

Table 4 The structural inquiry’s proposal for allocation of funding per county administrative board responsible for a civil area, and the government’s decision on allocation (SEK million)

Civil area	Structural inquiry	Government
Northern	22.2	22.2
Southern	20.7	20.7
South East	20.7	20.7
Central	20.7	22.6
Western	17.4	20.7
Eastern	19.6 ¹⁷⁶	25.1 ¹⁷⁷

In addition to the funds allocated for the structural reform, the county administrative boards have received general funding increases from 2018 onwards in order to strengthen their organisation and leadership in respect of civil defence. This includes SEK 36 million from 2018 and SEK 30 million from 2021 (totalling SEK 66 million annually).

9.3 Observations

9.3.1 Civil area and regulatory powers

The county administrative boards responsible for civil areas have no powers to issue instructions to county administrative boards and other agencies within their geographical area. Instead, their role is predominantly coordinating and collaborative in nature. The structural inquiry included a proposal to grant regulatory powers to the county administrative boards responsible for civil areas in respect of civil defence planning and in situations during periods of heightened preparedness. It is therefore interesting to follow up the matter of the extent to which clear lines of responsibility and leadership can be established in the existing structure without such regulatory powers.

Examining the ability of the county administrative board responsible for the civil area to maintain an overview of other collaboration between other agencies and the county administrative boards within the civil area, given the obligations in respect of collaboration that exist within these separate relationships, is also of interest.

9.3.2 Discrepancies between civil and military regional structures

In the terms of reference to the structural inquiry, the government emphasised the importance of a coherent geographical division for civil and military defence in order to create effective lines of leadership and coordination.¹⁷⁸

In connection with the decision to introduce the civil areas, the government allocated the Swedish Armed Forces a supplementary assignment that involved considering the need to adapt

¹⁷⁶ Of which Stockholm 12.2 and Gotland 7.4.

¹⁷⁷ Of which Stockholm 20.7 and Gotland 4.4.

¹⁷⁸ Dir. 2018:79 Ansvar, ledning och samordning inom civilt försvar.

its regional command structure to the higher regional command within civil defence. The response to the government was submitted on 1 November 2022, one month after the introduction of the civil areas. Even before the response was submitted, however, the Swedish Armed Forces had presented an interim solution for the handling of the regional structure. This interim solution means that the Swedish Armed Forces are to adapt to the civil areas as soon as possible; as soon as methodological and organisational conditions allow.¹⁷⁹ However, this adaptation is limited to civil-military collaboration in matters relating to total defence. Other tasks for the military regions, such as territorial activities and regional intelligence and security services, remain unchanged.

In their response to the government, the Swedish Armed Forces proposed that the interim solution should become permanent.^{180,181} The Swedish Armed Forces insisted on retaining the structure of four military regions, but adapting these according to the civil areas so that every civil area head has a clear counterpart within the Swedish Armed Forces. The Swedish Armed Forces considered it inappropriate to add two new military regions, as the county administrative boards responsible for civil areas do not have a mandate to lead and direct the county administrative boards within the civil area. The Swedish Armed Forces argued that they still need to relate to all county administrative boards, and not just the boards responsible for civil areas.

Given this fact, it may be argued that one of the overall purposes of the reform – namely, achieving a coherent geographical division for civil defence and military defence – has not yet been achieved. This means that there are still shortcomings in respect of the differences in regional structures between military defence and civil defence as identified previously.¹⁸² How these differences impact specific collaboration and coordination within the new structure should be examined more closely.

9.3.3 Differences and similarities in regional structures

Regional structures differ to varying degrees among central government agencies that have regional structures. To date, the government has decided that two preparedness agencies should align their regional structure with the corresponding regional structures of the civil areas: the National Government Service Centre and the Swedish Public Employment Service (see 9.1 above). One sector-responsible agency, the Swedish Transport Administration, has itself decided to adapt its regional structure to correspond with the civil areas.¹⁸³

The Swedish Police Authority is a preparedness agency that is also a sector-responsible agency and has previously taken a position against reorganisation of its structure to correspond to the civil areas. The main reason given is that the agency was reorganised in 2015, when it was divided into seven police regions. According to the Swedish Police Authority, therefore, a further structural change would lead to major difficulties.¹⁸⁴

The county administrative boards responsible for civil areas currently have to deal with a situation in which several agencies operate with varying regional structures. The consequences of this for the collaboration and cooperation that are to take place at a regional level should be examined more closely. This is applicable to preparation, planning and coordinated action during peacetime crisis situations and periods of heightened preparedness.

¹⁷⁹ Swedish Armed Forces, Beslut om interimslösning för militärregionernas samverkan med civilområdena, FM2022-21222:1.

¹⁸⁰ Swedish Armed Forces, Försvarsmaktens underlag för fortsatta politiska ställningstaganden, FM2022-19979:13.

¹⁸¹ With an adjustment regarding the transfer of tasks in respect of the counties of Örebro and Värmland from MR West to MR Central.

¹⁸² Dir. 2018:79 Ansvar, ledning och samordning inom civilt försvar.

¹⁸³ Swedish Transport Administration, TRV 2022/124574, 1 November 2022. The decision involves an adjustment of the Swedish Transport Administration's regional structure from 1 January 2024.

¹⁸⁴ Swedish Police Authority, consultation response with reference number A159.458/2018, 30 August 2018.

9.3.4 Relationship between preparedness sectors and civil areas

In the current allocation of tasks and responsibilities, there are a small number of explicit links between work within the civil areas and work within the preparedness sectors. There are no more detailed provisions in the ordinances governing the new structure as to how coordination between preparedness sectors and civil areas is to take place. Coordination can be facilitated in instance where a preparedness sector includes actors with a clear geographical division. However, all preparedness sectors should have national aspects that need to be coordinated with the civil areas. The way in which the relevant agencies organise and implement coordination between preparedness sectors and civil areas is a matter of interest for further examination.

A related issue concerns how collaboration with municipalities and regions takes place on matters relating clearly to one or more preparedness agencies. Many preparedness agencies and other actors have no regional division. The role of the county administrative boards and the county administrative boards responsible for civil areas in this, as well as how the preparedness agencies' needs for collaboration with municipalities and regions are met, should be examined in further work.

10. MSB's role in the new structure

MSB plays a coordinating role in the new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness and is to help promote coordination between civilian agencies, and in some respects with other societal actors as well, prior to and during crises and periods of heightened preparedness. MSB must also endeavour to ensure that civil defence actors coordinate planning with military defence and represent civil defence at the central level in trade-offs between civil and military defence needs for society's resources. Furthermore, MSB is to provide the government with aggregated supporting material linked to civil defence and societal crisis preparedness. The following section sets out these tasks and responsibilities in greater detail.

Alongside its coordinating role, MSB also forms part of the structure as a preparedness agency in the Electronic Communications and Postal Services preparedness sector and the Rescue Services and Civil Protection preparedness sector. MSB is also the sector-responsible agency in the latter sector.¹⁸⁵ The task and area of responsibility for preparedness agencies and sector-responsible agencies are set out in chapter 8.

Besides the roles held by MSB in the structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness, the agency also has other tasks and responsibilities only a weak link to civil defence, or no link at all. These are not included in the following report.

10.1.1 Responsibilities and tasks

MSB's operational area is set out in the Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002). MSB is responsible for matters relating to protection against accidents, crisis preparedness and civil defence, insofar as no other agency holds such responsibility. This responsibility relates to measures before, during and after an accident, crisis, war or threat of war.

This task includes:

- developing and supporting civil defence work,
- helping to minimise the impact of accidents, crises, wars and threats of war,
- following up and evaluating society's work on crisis preparedness and civil defence,
- ensuring that training and exercises within the agency's area of responsibility are provided,
- to represent civil defence at a central level in matters of significance for the balance between civil and military needs for society's resources, unless otherwise provided by other legislation.¹⁸⁶

In peacetime, the agency is to develop and support efforts to establish civil defence with the relevant actors and, in particular, promote coordination of planning between actors and with military defence.¹⁸⁷

According to the ordinance, the agency has also been assigned the following tasks related to civil defence and periods of heightened preparedness:

¹⁸⁵ The tasks and responsibilities arising from these roles are set out in the Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524) and are described in greater detail in earlier chapters of this interim report.

¹⁸⁶ Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), section 1.

¹⁸⁷ Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), section 6.

- ensuring that leadership methods and support systems for rescue services, crisis management and civil defence, as well as equipment for rescue services and crisis management, are developed and made available,¹⁸⁸
- following up and evaluating crisis preparedness and civil defence by preparedness sector, by geographical area and at an overall societal level, and assessing whether the measures undertaken have had the desired effect,¹⁸⁹
- commissioning, performing quality assurance and disseminating research and development work for protection against accidents, crisis preparedness and civil defence,¹⁹⁰
- working together with other relevant actors to create coherent information on protection against accidents, crisis preparedness and total defence, and also on security policy.¹⁹¹

MSB is also tasked with deciding which agencies – besides a specified group designated by the government – should have secure cryptographic functions.¹⁹² MSB also decides which companies are to be given access to secure cryptographic functions by agreement. MSB also decides on entering into allocation agreements with municipalities and organisations with corresponding needs.

MSB has a number of additional temporary tasks and assignments to perform alongside the criteria set out in laws and ordinances. The agency's appropriation directions for 2023 emphasise the fact that its supportive and coordinating role is of particular importance for work on prevention and management of accidents, crises and, ultimately, war.¹⁹³

According to the appropriation directions, MSB must also report on the progress of work in the planning groups within NATO in the field of civil preparedness, and how this work is developing Swedish crisis preparedness and civil defence. Furthermore, MSB and the Swedish Armed Forces are to jointly report on mapping of exercises involving civilian and military actors that are scheduled to take place up to 2026, with a view to 2030.¹⁹⁴ The agency is also to develop guidance for the identification of societally vital activities necessary for total defence.¹⁹⁵

MSB has been assigned a number of specific government assignments relating to civil defence. This includes proposing measures to strengthen civil defence¹⁹⁶ and testing reporting capability during periods of heightened preparedness.¹⁹⁷

10.1.2 Requirements for collaboration

MSB's responsibilities include working with and promoting coordination between relevant societal actors in order to prevent and manage accidents, crises and the consequences of war and threats of war.¹⁹⁸ MSB is also to strengthen society's ability to manage accidents, crises and the

¹⁸⁸ Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), section 5.

¹⁸⁹ Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), section 10.

¹⁹⁰ Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), section 12.

¹⁹¹ Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), section 15.

¹⁹² Ordinance on total defence and heightened preparedness (2015:1053), section 16. According to the ordinance, the Government Offices of Sweden, the Swedish Police Authority, the Swedish Security Service, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, the Coast Guard, the Swedish Psychological Defence Agency, the Swedish Armed Forces, the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, the National Defence Radio Establishment, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the Swedish Defence Conscriptioin and Assessment Agency, the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis, the Swedish Fortifications Agency and the Swedish Defence University must have secure cryptographic functions.

¹⁹³ Fö2023/01205.

¹⁹⁴ Fö2023/01205.

¹⁹⁵ Fö2023/01205.

¹⁹⁶ A selection: JU2022/01209, JU2022/00865, JU2021/02444, JU2020/04658.

¹⁹⁷ JU2022/02410.

¹⁹⁸ Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), section 1.

consequences of war and threats of war through collaboration with organisations tasked with initiatives in the field of crisis preparedness and civil defence.¹⁹⁹

In the event of a crisis or during a period of heightened preparedness, MSB must ensure that the relevant actors have the opportunity to:

- coordinate measures,
- coordinate information provided to the general public and media,
- make effective use of society's collective resources and international reinforcement resources,
- coordinate support to central, regional and local bodies with regard to information and situation reports.²⁰⁰

MSB shall work in collaboration with agencies, municipalities, regions, organisations and companies to identify and analyse vulnerabilities, threats and risks in society that are considered to be particularly serious.²⁰¹ MSB then presents a national risk and vulnerability assessment.²⁰² The supporting material is provided by preparedness agencies, which themselves perform a risk and vulnerability assessment of their own activities which is then communicated to MSB.²⁰³ MSB also has the right, in individual cases, to request supporting material from central government agencies that are not preparedness agencies.²⁰⁴

MSB is to support and coordinate societal information security and analyse and assess global developments in the field. This assignment includes providing advice and support, in relation to preventive work, to other central government agencies, municipalities, regions, companies and organisations.

The agency also has regulatory powers in respect of a number of issues relating to reporting and planning. This mandate includes the right to issue detailed regulations on:

- security requirements for information management systems,²⁰⁵
- risk and vulnerability analyses,
- IT incident reporting,
- the information obligation of preparedness agencies,
- tasks prior to (planning and wartime service) and during (preparations and transition to wartime organisation) heightened preparedness.²⁰⁶

10.1.3 Requirements for reporting and information

MSB is to assist the Government Offices of Sweden with supporting material and information of significance within the agency's area of responsibility during periods of heightened preparedness and in connection with serious accidents and crises.²⁰⁷

¹⁹⁹ Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), section 15.

²⁰⁰ Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), section 7.

²⁰¹ Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), section 2.

²⁰² Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), section 2.

²⁰³ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 19.

²⁰⁴ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), section 17.

²⁰⁵ The Government Offices of Sweden, the committee system and the Swedish Armed Forces are exempt in respect of information management systems. The Coast Guard, the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, the National Defence Radio Establishment, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the Swedish Fortifications Agency and the Swedish Defence University are exempt in respect of tasks prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness.

²⁰⁶ Ordinance on the preparedness of central government agencies (2022:524), sections 26– 27.

²⁰⁷ Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), section 7.

With regard to society's information security, MSB is to submit a report to the government each year that summarises the incidents reported to the agency.²⁰⁸

The Ordinance on county administrative boards' crisis preparedness and tasks prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness (2017:870) states that county administrative boards must report annually to MSB on the preparedness measures undertaken by municipalities and regions prior to periods of heightened preparedness, as well as providing an assessment of the impact of the measures undertaken.²⁰⁹ The regions must also report to MSB on the preparedness measures undertaken, and on other conditions linked to civil defence within the region's area of responsibility.²¹⁰

MSB must submit a national risk and vulnerability assessment to the government every two years. When producing its risk and vulnerability assessment, MSB must take into account the risk and vulnerability analyses submitted to the agency by the preparedness agencies.²¹¹

10.2 Financial criteria for MSB's work

The structural inquiry assessed that its proposals impact MSB in a number of ways that both increase and decrease its activities. Overall, the effects of the proposals were assessed as cancelling one another out. That is why no increase or decrease in MSB funding was proposed.²¹²

In its consultation response, MSB estimated that the structural inquiry's proposals would require MSB to be allocated SEK 40 million in order to fund 25 full-time equivalents, as well as additional operational funding. MSB assessed that the task generating the greatest need for resources involved support to cross-sectoral collaboration. The task of following up and evaluating preparedness was also deemed to require additional resources for analysis, evaluation and follow-up. MSB also assessed that a number of smaller tasks would place more stringent demands on MSB, which – collectively – would result in extensive resource requirements.²¹³

In 2022, the government proposed that MSB's appropriation be increased by SEK 7.5 million annually as of 2023 in order to fund the new structure for societal crisis preparedness and civil defence. This funding related solely to MSB's new role as a sector-responsible agency.²¹⁴

10.3 Observations

10.3.1 MSB's role in the new structure

In several respects, MSB can be viewed as a hub in the new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness. The agency has a coordinating role and has to promote coordination between different civil actors, and between civil and military defence. The agency is also to represent civil defence and monitor its needs in respect of the allocation of resources, as well as providing the government with general, national situation reports. MSB is thus a central actor in the structure, with highly important tasks and responsibilities for total defence capability.

MTFA notes that the regulatory support available to MSB in its role as a cohesive and coordinating organisation mainly involves being able to support and facilitate collaboration

²⁰⁸ Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), section 11.

²⁰⁹ Ordinance on county administrative boards' crisis preparedness and tasks prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness (2017:870), section 4.

²¹⁰ Ordinance on measures among municipalities and regions prior to and during extraordinary events in peacetime and periods of heightened preparedness (2006:637), section 7.

²¹¹ Ordinance containing instructions for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002), section 2.

²¹² SOU 2021:25 Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, pp. 500 et seq.

²¹³ Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskaps remissvar på SOU 2021:25 Struktur för ökad motståndskraft, p. 27, Case number MSB 2021-03599.

²¹⁴ Prop. 2022/23:1 Budgetpropositionen för 2023, p. 97.

between different actors, while the scope for steering collaboration between actors is limited. MSB's opportunities to bring about collaboration between actors is therefore an area that MTFAs considers to be of interest for further examination.

10.3.2 Assessment of financial conditions

As indicated in section 10.2, the financial resources allocated are lower than MSB's own assessment of its resource requirement. However, MSB has been allocated funding for its civil defence work on a number of occasions since 2017. Further analysis is required to be able to assess MSB's financial conditions for addressing its tasks within the new framework of the new structure for civil defence and societal crisis preparedness.

11. Following up and evaluating implementation by agencies – the next steps

This interim report has focused on the background to the reform, describing the content of the reform itself and mapping some of the conditions for the agencies' implementation of the reform. This concluding chapter focuses on the next steps for the government assignment, and on areas that have so far been identified as being of particular interest for future analysis.

In the next phase of the work, MTFFA intends to focus on following up the work of the agencies on implementing the new structure (see Figure 6). This step largely corresponds to the part of the government assignment that deals with 'coordination and establishment of work by agencies under the new civil defence structure'. Taking the mapping of the agencies' prerequisites as a basis, this essentially involves examining how far the agencies' work has progressed, what steps have been taken, and whether there are any obvious obstacles to efforts to implement the reform.

In the final report for the government assignment, MTFFA's goal is to highlight the part of the assignment that deals with 'how the structure contributes to the efficient use of resources in order to achieve the defined objectives'. This is illustrated by the last part of the model, which relates to desired outcomes and effects. MTFFA assesses that the structural reform will still be in the implementation phase, which may make it difficult to draw far-reaching conclusions regarding the efficient use of resources.




Figure 6 Focus for next steps in the work

MTFA also wishes to stress that in order to carry out this work, as well as further assignments, the agency has to be able to access information from public actors within total defence.²¹⁵ This is also indicated in the report that forms the basis for the establishment of MTFFA, where the investigator argues that emphasis on the system perspective means that MTFFA will need the supporting material compiled by central government agencies within their areas of responsibility.²¹⁶

11.1 General criteria for the implementation of the reform

MTFA's mapping of the agencies' criteria for implementation of the new structure shows that there are certain circumstances and ambiguities that could affect implementation. Some of these observations relate to prerequisites for the interpretation of legislation, access to advice and support for implementation, financial conditions, conditions for reporting, connections and collaboration. Based on the observations made in previous chapters, a brief description is presented below of areas and circumstances that may be of interest to examine or consider in MTFFA's future work.

As a large number of actors are affected by and included in the new structure for crisis preparedness and civil defence, coordination between them is key to the structure's overall functioning, resource efficiency and goal attainment. How collaboration and coordination

²¹⁵ Ordinance with instructions for the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis (2022:1768), section 2(3).

²¹⁶ SOU 2021:103 Totalförsvarsanalys – en oberoende myndighet för uppföljning och utvärdering.

function will therefore be key aspects in ongoing work, alongside the functioning of the exchange of information within the new structure.

11.2 Expanding the responsibilities and tasks of central government agencies

As a result of the structural reform, all central government agencies have been assigned additional responsibilities and tasks related to preparedness. MTFFA intends to monitor how responsibilities and tasks are perceived by various agencies, and will examine how the category of central government agencies that are not preparedness agencies approach the additional preparedness-related responsibilities and tasks arising from the reform.

Agencies that are not assigned specific responsibility for crisis preparedness and civil defence can generally be assumed to be further removed from preparedness issues in their regular day-to-day activities than preparedness agencies. In chapter 7, it was noted that guidance has been developed for some responsibilities and tasks, while for others there is no support or guidance. Highlighting the impact of access to support on the understanding of tasks within this agency category would be of interest in further work.

11.3 Preparedness agencies and preparedness sectors

When continuing its work of following up and evaluating the reform, MTFFA needs to examine how the agencies concerned have altered their own work and their cooperation with other relevant actors. Existing capability assessments constitute an important part of the foundation for further work.

Collaboration is a prominent part of the increased preparedness responsibility assigned to agencies within the new structure, and in particular for those preparedness agencies that are part of preparedness sectors. Therefore, it is important for MTFFA to examine what procedures and working methods are established for collaboration. As part of its evaluation, MTFFA intends to examine the coordination between agencies within a preparedness sector and between different preparedness sectors.

Chapter 8 described how the scope of preparedness sectors is not entirely clear with regard to whether actors other than central government agencies are included in a sector, and if so, which ones. The way in which agencies in a preparedness sector interpret which other actors form part of the sector is of importance for the implementation of the structure, and also affects the scope of tasks for the agencies in a preparedness sector. Correspondingly, the Preparedness Ordinance provides scope for different interpretations of which vital societal functions are included in a preparedness sector. It may be interesting to examine which interpretations are applied, and whether any differences in interpretation affect the work in the new structure.

Another ambiguity identified in chapter 8 concerns whether sector-responsible agencies can and should operate only at a central level, or whether they can also exercise their responsibilities at a regional level. In this respect, it will be interesting here to examine how the relevant agencies interpret their responsibilities, and how issues linked to regional and/or local levels are addressed by sector-responsible agencies and preparedness agencies. A related area of interest to examine involves the allocation of roles between sector-responsible agencies at a higher regional level and county administrative boards responsible for civil areas.

The fact that several sector-responsible agencies also have supervisory tasks within adjacent legislative areas, and thus hold multiple roles in relation to other actors, depending on the issue, is a similar aspect that can be considered more closely.

Just as there are differences between preparedness agencies, there are also differences in conditions between different preparedness sectors with regard to the number of actors involved, their size, the proportion of operational activities carried out within the public sector, financial conditions, etc. It may therefore be of interest to compare different preparedness sectors and to examine the significance of this relationship on the work of the preparedness sectors.

As described in chapter 8, there are differences in the financial conditions of preparedness agencies. It is not always clear how the allocation of funding to different preparedness agencies relates to their assignments, complexity and tasks. For this reason, it is particularly interesting to examine how different preparedness agencies perceive their financial capacity to handle the new tasks and responsibilities assigned to them through the reform.

11.4 Civil areas

In the continued follow-up of the new structure, MTFAs will examine how the county administrative boards responsible for civil areas and other county administrative boards, together with other actors, establish and build up the work within each civil area and how collaboration with other relevant actors is organised. With this as a foundation, questions with regard to how work in the civil areas contributes to the desired effects in the form of stronger coordination in the field of civil defence can be examined in more detail.

Facilitation of coordination between civil and military defence at a regional level is a desired effect resulting from the introduction of civil areas. The consequences of differences in the geographical division within the fields of civil and military defence also need to be examined in this respect. A further area of interest for follow-up may concern the differing leadership arrangements for civil and military defence, respectively; where military defence is largely represented by one agency, while civil defence comprises a large number of actors, including agencies that are autonomous and equal.

Another element of the continued work will involve examining how work in the civil areas affects the coordination between national, higher regional and regional levels in the field of civil defence. Many central government agencies lack an organisation structured across different levels (central and regional); and of those that do have a regional structure, only a few correspond to the civil areas. How county administrative boards responsible for civil areas cope with a situation involving varying regional structures among agencies, as well as any consequences of this for the conditions for collaboration and coordination at a regional level, is an interesting aspect to examine in MTFAs' study of the implementation of the new structure.

It will also be interesting to monitor the development of the relationship between the preparedness sectors and the civil areas. There are a small number of explicit links between the aspects in the current allocation of tasks and responsibilities. The way in which the relevant agencies organise and implement coordination between preparedness sectors and civil areas is also a matter of interest for further examination.

11.5 MSB's role and tasks

Civil defence comprises a wide range of activities that need to be coordinated prior to and during periods of heightened preparedness in order to provide the best possible defence capability. Civil defence also needs to be coordinated with military defence, and the needs of civil defence at an aggregated level must be met. MSB is the agency that is assigned responsibility, through specifically assigned tasks, for maintaining an overview of civil defence and working to ensure coordination within it.

The regulatory prerequisites for the responsibility assigned to MSB in this respect primarily involves the agency being assigned the task of working to ensure coordination between agencies (and, to a certain extent, with other actors as well), in parallel with specifically assigned responsibility among preparedness agencies and preparedness sectors to coordinate work within and between sectors. Therefore, MSB's ability to direct other agencies in order to achieve collaboration mainly involves facilitating and supporting collaboration and coordination. It will be interesting to examine how these tools work, and how well the conditions provided to MSB are able to meet coordination needs within civil defence and between civil and military defence.

11.6 Other observations

11.6.1 Appropriations for civil defence

Up to SEK 600 million per year has been earmarked for strengthening the organisation and leadership of civil defence.²¹⁷ MTFAs review of the structural inquiry, consultation responses, budget bills and individual agencies' assessments shows that there are different perceptions of what financial resources are required to implement the new structure. There are also observations that different groups of agencies have received approximately equal resource allocations, even though the scope of their assignments and areas of responsibility appears to differ significantly. A comparison between preparedness agencies as a group and other agencies reveals differences in the allocation of appropriations. Any consequences of such differences in financial conditions will continue to be analysed going forward.

One overall impression following a review of all budget bills, spring fiscal policy bills, amending budgets and supplementary budgets between 2012 and the autumn of 2023 is that attempting to account for which appropriations come under the concept of civil defence, and which investments have been made in this area year on year, is a challenging task. One complicating factor is that the language and terminology used for civil defence – and crisis preparedness as well – may vary over time, as well as between expenditure annexes within one and the same budget bill. Furthermore, the funds reported in budget bills do not provide a complete overview of the funds allocated to civil defence. This may partly be because agencies use other funds for such work, and partly because funds that are actually specifically earmarked for civil defence are not visible at the level of the central government budget.

11.6.2 The structure in an international context

Although crisis preparedness and civil defence are primarily a national concern, there are a number of areas in which the EU's ongoing development work and regulatory framework may impact the conditions for the new structure. Examples include security of supply, hybrid threats, cyber threats and climate threats. MTFAs notes the importance of analysing how current or future regulatory frameworks at EU level or in the context of NATO membership impacts the conditions for the new structure.

11.6.3 Command and control support systems

MSB's role is to support the coordination of measures by the relevant agencies during periods of heightened preparedness. In peacetime, MSB is to develop and support efforts to establish civil defence with the relevant actors and, in particular, promote coordination of planning between actors and with military defence. A functioning and appropriate command and control support system that meets total defence needs is a fundamental prerequisite for MSB's ability to support the coordination of civil defence. MTFAs assesses that this aspect should be taken into account in future follow-ups of both civil defence and total defence.

²¹⁷ Prop. 2020/21:30 Totalförsvaret 2021–2025, p. 126.

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