



Myndigheten för
totalförsvarsanalys

Development of total defence guidelines

– interim report on the assignment Evaluation of
the *Handlingskraft* action plan



Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis

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Summary

This is an interim report on the assignment Evaluation of the Handlingskraft action plan in the 2024 appropriation directions for the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis (Myndigheten för totalförsvarsanalys, MTFA). This interim report concerns the part of the assignment that involves submitting proposals for how future guidelines for coherent total defence planning could be developed. The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis notes that coherent total defence planning – which involves many different actors – needs to be based on a shared understanding of what could happen in the event of an armed attack.

The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis has also identified a need to create a shared understanding of the terminology used in efforts to develop total defence in order to clarify what type of planning is meant in different contexts, and to facilitate the integration of planning processes within the civil and military defence sectors with corresponding processes in which Sweden participates as a NATO member.

The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis proposes that the government issue a joint assignment to the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, based on their respective areas of responsibility and in close collaboration with the agencies responsible for the sector, to further develop descriptions of the threat landscape and produce scenarios and planning assumptions for various potential developments in wartime situations. The content should cover the actions of an adversary both in wartime and in what are known as hybrid situations.

Given the lessons learned from Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, we propose that the assignment should include an indication of aspects such as which parts of society could be targeted and the impact of such attacks on various societal functions. We would also like to emphasise the importance of total defence actors being capable of dealing with developments that deviate from established typical situations, scenarios and assumptions. Therefore, these guidelines should emphasise the fact that planning also takes into account the need for flexibility in total defence.

In this context, the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis would like to provide a reminder of the importance of having a common starting point for all total defence actors. Information should be available that can form a basis

for the development of total defence capability, and that all parties involved are able to access and use as a foundation in their own planning. Such information can also be used by actors who form part of total defence but do not participate in the work of the preparedness sectors or civilian areas, for instance, or are not involved in defence planning with the Swedish Armed Forces.

It should be possible to disseminate threat landscapes and planning assumptions to all relevant total defence actors, such as government agencies, regions, municipalities, the business community and voluntary organisations, insofar as this is effective and appropriate. Information that is more detailed or sensitive must be distributed in accordance with applicable provisions in respect of confidentiality and protective security.

The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis notes that there is a need for clear objectives, indications of which measures are to be prioritised, and defined levels of ambition in efforts to strengthen total defence capability. The clearer the support for planning – by means of capability targets or key figures, for example – the better the conditions for the preparedness agencies to take responsibility for developing and strengthening capabilities within their areas of responsibility.

The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis proposes that the government instruct the preparedness agencies in the preparedness sectors, as well as the central preparedness agencies outside these sectors, to develop capability targets within their areas of responsibility. A key element of such an assignment should be to perform an initial analysis of the criteria for developing effective target models in various areas of responsibility. The Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency should provide support on the basis of their areas of responsibility. It is particularly important that the agencies contributing to NATO's Seven Baseline Requirements for National Resilience be awarded such assignments. Given the security policy situation, this work should commence as soon as possible.

1. Introduction

This is an interim report on the assignment Evaluation of the Handlingskraft action plan in the 2024 appropriation directions for the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis (Myndigheten för totalförsvarsanalys, MTFA). This interim report focuses on the part of the assignment that involves submitting proposals for how future guidelines could be developed.

1.1 The assignment

The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis has received the following assignment from the government in the 2024 appropriation directions:

Evaluation of the Handlingskraft action plan

The agency will be evaluating the implementation of the assignment received by the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency from the government concerning the promotion and development of coherent total defence planning in 2021–2025 in collaboration with the agencies with monitoring responsibilities. The agency is to focus its evaluation on whether the action plan has resulted in a developed and coherent total defence planning process, and to provide proposals on how future guidelines could be developed.

A final report is to be submitted to the Government Offices of Sweden (Ministry of Defence) no later than 30 November 2025, along with an interim report on 30 November 2024.¹

The task assigned to the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis is to evaluate the implementation of the joint assignment being conducted by the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap, MSB) to promote and develop coherent total defence planning. The assignment referred to here is titled *Inriktning för en sammanhängande planering för totalförsvaret* [Direction for coherent total defence planning] and was adopted by the government on 17 December 2020.²

The government highlights two specific areas for evaluation.

¹ Ministry of Defence, Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2024 avseende Myndigheten för totalförsvarsanalys, Fö2023/00322 (in part), Fö2023/01892 (in part), 14 December 2023, p. 2

² Ministry of Defence, Inriktning för en sammanhängande planering för totalförsvaret, Fö2016/00864 et al., 17 December 2020

The first is to examine whether the *Handlingskraft* action plan developed jointly by the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency throughout the assignment has resulted in a developed and coherent total defence planning process.³

The second is to present proposals on how future guidelines to the agencies could be developed. The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis interprets this wording to mean that we are to present development proposals for guidelines that the government can issue to agencies for the purposes of coherent total defence planning. As part of the 2020 defence decision, the government issued such guidelines in the decision on the joint assignment to the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency.

Under the assignment to the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis, an interim report must be submitted to the Government Offices of Sweden no later than 30 November 2024.

Given the fact that the next defence decision is planned for December 2024, the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis has chosen in its interim report to focus on the part of the assignment that involves proposing how future guidelines could be developed. Moreover, the interim report is being brought forward to 1 October 2024 in order to provide a foundation for efforts to draft new guidelines that the government may adopt in connection with future defence decisions.

Under the assignment to the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis, the final report must be submitted no later than 30 November 2025. In this report, the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis will report on other elements of the assignment; that is, provide an evaluation of the implementation of the joint assignment with emphasis on the matter of whether the *Handlingskraft* action plan has contributed to a developed and coherent total defence planning process. In the final report, we may also set out supplementary proposals in respect of potential development of further and future guidelines to agencies.

1.2 Questions

The main question addressed in the interim report relates to how future guidelines for coherent total defence planning could be developed. To

³ Swedish Armed Forces and Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Handlingskraft – handlingsplan för att främja och utveckla en sammanhängande planering för totalförsvaret 2021–2025*, FM2021-I 7683:2, MSB2020-I6261-3, 27 August 2021

answer this question, the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis has based its work ahead of this interim report on the following supplementary questions:

- How have the government’s guidelines for coherent planning for the period 2021–2025 been perceived by the agencies?
- How do the agencies think future guidance could be developed?
- What criteria are in place for developing the guidelines ahead of the next defence decision period?

1.3 Implementation

The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis has analysed a number of documents as part of its work on this interim report, including the guidelines issued by the government that were adopted in connection with the 2020 defence decision, as well as reports from the Swedish Defence Commission, the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. We have interviewed individuals at agencies who have participated in the work on coherent total defence planning in a variety of ways.⁴

The Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency were the direct recipients of the 2020 guidelines for coherent total defence planning. They also have prominent parts to play in the coordination of total defence. For the purposes of this interim report, therefore, our interview work focused on obtaining comments from these two agencies. Valuable comments and suggestions were also provided by other agencies interviewed.

⁴ Agencies interviewed are specified in the list of references.

2. Background

In December 2015, the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency were tasked with joint submission of proposals for common foundations (a basic approach) for coherent total defence planning. As part of this assignment, the government stressed the importance of coordinated management of planning and indicated that coherent total defence planning is ensured through planning guidelines to the relevant agencies.⁵ No further description of what coherent planning should involve was otherwise included.

The Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency presented the report *Gemensamma grunder (grundsyn) för en sammanhängande planering för totalförsvaret* [Common foundations (a basic approach) for coherent total defence planning] in June 2016. The agencies stated in this that coherent planning ‘comprises a shared target profile, a common understanding of the effects that we wish to achieve, an overall schedule for key joint activities, and a common understanding of the threat and the threat landscape on which the agencies are to base their planning’.⁶

A number of these elements of coherent planning are also highlighted in the Defence Commission’s report *Motståndskraft* [Resilience], in its proposal for a common total defence objective. The Defence Commission justified the proposal by stating that collective total defence capability involving many different actors requires common starting points and objectives, as well as a common direction.⁷ In line with the Defence Commission, the government proposed in its bill *Totalförsvaret 2021–2025* [Total defence 2021–2025] a comprehensive total defence objective to which all relevant actors contribute. The government justified this proposal in the same way as the

⁵ Ministry of Defence, Uppdrag till Försvarsmakten och Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap avseende totalförsvarsplanering, Fö2015/0916/MFI (in part), 10 December 2015

⁶ Swedish Armed Forces and Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, Sverige kommer att möta utmaningarna. Gemensamma grunder (grundsyn) för en sammanhängande planering för totalförsvaret, FM2016-13584:3, MSB2016-25, 10 June 2016, pp. 13–14

⁷ Ds 2017:66, *Motståndskraft*, pp. 80–81

Defence Commission.⁸ The comprehensive total defence objective was adopted by the Riksdag in accordance with the government's proposal.⁹

In its bill *Totalförsvaret 2021–2025*, the government stated its intention to adopt revised guidelines for planning in the fields of civil defence, military defence and total defence. The government emphasised the importance of continuing to develop coherent total defence planning, and identified dimensioning and endurance as starting points for total defence planning. The government also noted that common objectives and starting points improve the criteria for achieving coherent total defence direction, planning and development.¹⁰

Given the Riksdag's position on the government bill *Totalförsvaret 2021–2025*,¹¹ the government decided on 17 December 2020 to issue a number of assignments to the relevant agencies through guidelines for military defence, civil defence and total defence.¹²

One of these assignments was a joint assignment, with guidelines to the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, to promote and develop coherent total defence planning for 2021–2025 in collaboration with the agencies with monitoring responsibilities.¹³ By 1 September 2021, the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency were to report on how they intended to promote and develop coherent total defence planning during the defence decision period, and on the planning assumptions regarding total defence that were to be developed for the agencies responsible for monitoring at the time. As stated in the introduction, these guidelines form the focal point for this interim report.

⁸ Government Bill 2020/21:30, *Totalförsvaret 2021–2025*, p. 86

⁹ Government Bill 2020/21:30, Försvarsutskottets betänkande 2020/21:FöU4, riksdagsskrivelserna 2020/21:133–136

¹⁰ Government Bill 2020/21:30, *Totalförsvaret 2021–2025*, p. 97

¹¹ Government Bill 2020/21:30, Försvarsutskottets betänkande 2020/21:FöU4, riksdagsskrivelserna 2020/21:133–136

¹² See, for example, Ministry of Defence, *Inriktning för Försvarmakten 2021–2025*, Fö2018/01425 et al., 17 December 2020, Ministry of Justice, *Anvisningar för det civila försvaret för försvarsbeslutsperioden 2021–2025*, Ju2020/04658 (in part), 17 December 2020 and Ministry of Justice, *Uppdrag till Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap att göra en samlad bedömning av förmågan inom det civila försvaret*, Ju2020/04658 (in part), 17 December 2020

¹³ Ministry of Defence, *Inriktning för en sammanhängande planering för totalförsvaret*, Fö2016/00864 et al., 17 December 2020

According to the government's guidelines, the agencies' work to promote and develop planning is to be carried out in accordance with a number of specified planning assumptions. These comprise a selection of phrases from the government bill *Totalförsvaret 2021–2025*, in which several passages are reproduced verbatim from the defence policy's direction and starting points. General descriptions of the threat landscape and a comprehensive capability target are also reproduced, stating that coherent total defence planning must be based on the assumption that total defence would, for at least three months, be able to manage a security policy crisis involving acts of war occurring on Swedish territory for part of that period.¹⁴

In addition to the joint assignment involving the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, a number of other assignments relating to the direction and development of both military and civil defence were decided at the same time. The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis notes that these decisions differ in terms of the level of detail in the descriptions of the threat landscape that are presented. For instance, the decision *Inriktning för Försvarsmakten för försvarsbeslutsperioden 2021–2025* [Direction for the Swedish Armed Forces for the defence decision period 2021–2025] contains a more detailed description of armed attack than in the joint assignment issued to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency and the Swedish Armed Forces.¹⁵ The information regarding armed attack provided in the decision on the direction of the Swedish Armed Forces is a slightly more developed description of what is set out in the government bill *Totalförsvaret 2021–2025*. It may also be stated that the government decision on civil defence guidelines for the defence decision period 2021–2025 provides a brief description of the threat landscape, while also stating that the work of the agencies is to be carried out on the basis of the government bill *Totalförsvaret 2021–2025*.

¹⁴ Ministry of Defence, *Inriktning för en sammanhängande planering för totalförsvaret*, Fö2016/00864 et al., 17 December 2020

¹⁵ Ministry of Defence, *Inriktning för Försvarsmakten 2021–2025*, Fö2018/01425 et al., 17 December 2020, pp. 2–3

3. The concept of coherent planning

The joint assignment with guidelines for the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency in December 2020 does not include any detailed description or clarification of the concept of coherent planning. In the assignment, the government states that ‘civil and military defence need to be developed in a coordinated manner, and there should be coherent total defence planning’.¹⁶

One interpretation of this is that coherent total defence planning is synonymous with coordinating civil and military defence planning and achieving coherent total defence through such coordination.

Another interpretation is that the government perceives a need for separate planning for total defence alongside planning for civil and military defence in order to address issues not dealt with there. However, the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis finds no explicit support for such an interpretation in the assignment.

In its previous assignments issued to the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency concerning total defence planning, the government has emphasised ‘the importance of coordinated management of total defence planning’ and stated that ‘coherent total defence planning is ensured through planning guidelines to relevant agencies’.¹⁷ The government has issued such planning guidelines to the civil defence and the Swedish Armed Forces in the form of separate assignments.¹⁸ Therefore, the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis interprets the term ‘coherent’ to mean that civil and military defence planning should be coordinated with a view to achieving coherent total defence.

This interpretation is also supported by the response to the joint assignment issued by the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies

¹⁶ Ministry of Defence, Inriktning för en sammanhängande planering för totalförsvaret, Fö2016/00864 et al., 17 December 2020, p. 3

¹⁷ Ministry of Defence, Uppdrag till Försvarsmakten och Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap avseende totalförsvarfsplanering, Fö2015/0916/MFI (in part), 10 December 2015, p. 2

¹⁸ See Ministry of Defence, Inriktning för Försvarsmakten 2021–2025, Fö2018/01425 et al., 17 December 2020 and Ministry of Justice, Anvisningar för det civila försvaret för försvarsbeslutsperioden 2021–2025, Ju2020/04658 (in part), 17 December 2020

Agency in the form of the *Handlingskraft* action plan. In this, the agencies state that in order to achieve coherent total defence planning, they are introducing an annual process that ‘aims to coordinate planning between civil and military defence so that dependencies can be identified and specific initiatives highlighted to the government’.¹⁹

The term ‘planning’ in the joint assignment also provides scope for different interpretations. There are two main types of capability-related planning in the expenditure area of defence and crisis preparedness. The first is ‘capability-building planning’, which involves planning the implementation of measures to develop and maintain capabilities. The second is ‘capability employment planning’, which involves planning how existing capabilities are to be used in various hypothetical scenarios or ongoing situations. Shortcomings or imbalances in capability that can be identified in connection with capability employment planning form one of a number of inputs to capability creation planning. The two main types of planning are regulated and implemented in different ways, and so it is necessary to distinguish between them in governance.

The joint assignment issued to the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency does not specify which type of planning is meant. It may be interpreted as meaning that the assignment includes both capability-building and capability employment planning. However, in other documents where the government refers to the joint assignment, the government writes about ‘the work of the Swedish Armed Forces and Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency on developing a coherent total defence capability’²⁰ and states that their work ‘contributes to the ongoing process of increasing the overall capability and, in the long term, achieving the overall objective of total defence’²¹. The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis interprets this as meaning that the joint assignment issued to the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency relates to capability-building planning. In that part of *Krigets krav* [The demands of war], the response by the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency to the assignment relating to an assessment of total

¹⁹ Swedish Armed Forces and Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Handlingskraft – handlingsplan för att främja och utveckla en sammanhängande planering för totalförsvaret 2021–2025*, FM2021-1 7683:2, MSB2020-16261-3, 27 August 2021, p. 2

²⁰ Government Bill 2021/22:1, Utgiftsområde 6, Försvar och samhällets krisberedskap, p. 16

²¹ Government Bill 2022/23:1, Utgiftsområde 6, Försvar och samhällets krisberedskap, pp. 12–13

defence capability, they also state that planning ‘to date has been based primarily on a capability-building perspective’.²²

4. Agencies’ perceptions of the guidelines

The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis has interviewed individuals at government agencies who, in various ways, have participated in work on issues relating to coordination within total defence. This work included asking questions about how the 2020 guidelines were perceived, and how future guidelines could be developed.

4.1 About the 2020 guidelines

In the interviews, the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency made comments on the design of the 2020 guidelines. The answers to the questions asked by the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis show that the guidelines in the joint assignment were perceived as unclear. This is true of the task of ‘presenting the total defence planning assumptions developed for the agencies with monitoring responsibilities’, for instance. It was not clear from the assignment whether the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency were expected to produce other assumptions in addition to those presented by the government as planning assumptions in the assignment, whether they were supposed to add further assumptions, or whether the task involved developing and breaking down the assumptions provided by the government in the assignment in the form of planning assumptions. The interpretation selected, which is reflected in the *Handlingskraft* action plan, was to produce clearer assumptions on the basis of the planning assumptions specified in the government assignment. The Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency chose to produce an armed attack scenario in order to provide further concrete assumptions.

It emerged from these interviews that this scenario has served as a framework for the agencies’ planning work. At the same time, it was emphasised in the interviews that the scenario was distributed to only a limited extent and had been classified as restricted, which was why not all actors were allowed to access it. Given on this observation, it was noted that

²² Swedish Armed Forces and Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, *Krigets krav. En samlad bedömning av förmågan inom totalförsvaret*, FM2021-17683:6, MSB 2022-08173-31, 29 September 2023, p. 17

it is highly important to ensure that there are common scenarios for total defence actors, and that new scenarios should be distributed more widely to the relevant total defence actors. Particular emphasis was placed on ensuring that they can also be distributed to municipalities, regions and the business community.

4.2 About future guidelines

The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis notes that the agencies' comments and proposals on future guidelines consistently call for greater clarity and greater precision.

In this chapter, we summarise the agencies' comments under the following themes:

- updated and clear assumptions,
- capability targets.

Updated and clear assumptions

The agencies interviewed stated that the planning assumptions developed after the 2020 defence decision are regarded as being too general. It was noted that these need to be updated and specified. Furthermore, it was argued that assumptions highlighting the consequences both for society as a whole and for key societal functions should be developed. It is proposed that more detailed planning assumptions should be developed, tailoring them to different preparedness sectors, and that preparedness agencies should be involved in this work. It was emphasised that the development of more specific planning assumptions should be based on the availability of updated threat landscapes and developed scenarios.

According to the agencies interviewed, there is a need for clearer specification of timeframes in the planning assumptions. For instance, they are calling for assumptions regarding the demands to be made of total defence after the three months in which total defence must be capable of dealing with a security policy crisis involving acts of war occurring on Swedish territory for part of the period. According to the agencies interviewed, such specifications may relate to aspects such as how long individual actors should be able to manage disrupted conditions. In this regard, the agencies are calling for clearer planning for the receipt of support from other countries; mainly within NATO, but also within the framework of EU cooperation.

According to the agencies interviewed, there is a need to be able to assess both the consequences of a security policy crisis and a wartime situation at both the overall societal level and the sectoral level, as well as in different geographical areas. It was noted that there is a need for impact analyses indicating how different threat landscapes affect different parts of total defence. According to the agencies interviewed, such analyses could be used to calculate different capability levels within the various preparedness sectors.

Capability targets

In the interviews, there were calls for the preparedness agencies to be given assignments for calculating key figures based on assumptions concerning time, geography and the threat landscape. It was stated that the key figures could then form a foundation for assessing the need for development and resources in various areas such as staffing, repair preparedness and supply preparedness. This would allow the government to clarify what level of capability actors are expected to achieve and how this is to be funded. It was proposed in the interviews that the agencies concerned should jointly be awarded government assignments to develop and propose specific levels of ambition, directions and targets on which the government can then make decisions.

A number of agencies stated that an analysis needs to be conducted regarding the issue of whether it is possible to quantify what total defence must be able to manage. In this context, it was argued that civil defence needs operational capability goals comparable to those of military defence. In the interviews, there were calls for clearer assessment criteria, measurable objectives or performance indicators to support the planning process. It was suggested that this would enable clearer governance of planning for a coherent total defence and improve the conditions for evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of various activities.

5. Conditions for developing new guidelines

The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis considers the agencies' comments and proposals on future guidelines to be relevant. This is true of the comments stating that threat landscapes, scenarios and assumptions should be updated and adapted to the global changes that have taken place in recent years, for example, and of the proposals highlighting the need for clearer levels of ambition, indicators or key figures. However, we consider it necessary to examine more closely the conditions for translating these proposals and comments into government decisions.

At the time of writing, the government has not yet presented the bill that will form the foundation for future defence decisions. As a result, we are unable to report on how the agencies' comments and proposals relate to the government's policy direction for total defence. Instead, we have therefore examined the extent to which these proposals and comments are supported in the documents prepared for future defence decisions, and in agency reports.

In this section, we highlight documentation from the Swedish Defence Commission, the Swedish Armed Forces, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency and other agencies, providing the conditions for accommodating the agencies' proposals and comments.

5.1 Conditions for clear and updated planning assumptions

The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis shares the assessment of the agencies interviewed that Sweden's membership of NATO and the lessons learned from Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine should provide the starting point for future guidelines.

In the national security strategy, the government states that Sweden's membership of a defence alliance with binding mutual defence commitments represents a paradigm shift in Swedish security and defence policy and for all aspects of Swedish total defence.²³ The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis notes that the objectives for total defence, military

²³ Government communication 2023/24:163, Nationell säkerhetsstrategi, 4 July 2024, p. 18

defence and civil defence need to be based on Sweden's membership and the commitments arising from it. In preparation for the upcoming defence decision, the Defence Commission has proposed revised definitions of objectives for total defence, military defence and civil defence in order to reflect this change.²⁴

The Defence Commission notes that Sweden, as an ally, is to participate in NATO's joint operations and capability planning processes, and that Sweden's national capability requirements will continue to provide a central starting point for Swedish involvement in NATO's capability and operational planning.²⁵ Going forward, Sweden will be integrated into NATO's various planning processes and the various capability needs, requirements and objectives resulting from these. In the guidelines for agencies' activities within NATO, the government states that Sweden is to work towards greater integration between NATO's work on operational and capability planning and NATO's work on resilience and civil preparedness.²⁶

The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) is a key element in joint capability-building planning within the alliance. Capability employment planning includes NATO's joint operational planning, where Sweden is part of a regional plan, and planning within the framework of NATO's crisis management mechanism (the NATO Crisis Response System, NCRS), including what are termed Crisis Response Measures (CRM), measures decided upon in advance. NATO's force generation process also forms part of capability employment planning.

Societal resilience is essential to the alliance's deterrence and defence capability and credibility. Work within NATO on resilience and civil preparedness is both a national responsibility and a collective commitment. Joint planning for resilience and civil preparedness cannot be classified with the same clarity as NATO's military planning. Three critical functions, or core capabilities, are highlighted as being of particular importance to the functioning of society.²⁷ On this basis, seven civil capability requirements –

²⁴ Ds 2023:34, Kraftsamling. Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försvaret, 19 December 2023, pp. 21–24

²⁵ Ds 2024:6, Stärkt försvarsförmåga. Sverige som allierad, 26 April 2024, p. 119

²⁶ Ministry of Defence, Instruktion för myndigheters verksamhet i Nato, Fö2023/01701, 26 October 2023, p. 4

²⁷ The three areas are continuity of government, continuity of essential services to the population and civil support to military operations.

the Seven Baseline Requirements for National Resilience – are identified as being of particular importance for strengthening civil resilience.²⁸

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has resulted in sharp deterioration of Sweden's security situation. That said, the war has served as a reminder that efforts to develop total defence need to be taken seriously. On 31 May 2024, the Swedish Armed Forces reported on a government assignment regarding insights and lessons learned from the war in Ukraine and how these can be applied in Swedish Armed Forces activities and the continued development of military defence.²⁹ On 7 June 2024, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency reported on a corresponding assignment regarding insights and lessons learned from the war in Ukraine can be applied in the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's activities and the continued development of civil defence.³⁰

Sweden's membership of NATO and Russia's war against Ukraine provide the starting points for the Swedish Armed Forces' budget documentation for 2025. The description of the military-strategic context states that the task of defending Sweden against armed attack is handled within the framework of collective defence together with allies, and that Sweden forms part of the defence of allied territory. Therefore, the dimensioning assumption is that an attack must initially be met mainly with national resources. In its budget documentation, the Swedish Armed Forces specify seven typical situations³¹ that describe plausible elements of a military conflict and that form the dimensioning basis for the continued development of Swedish Armed Forces capabilities. A real conflict would probably include combat actions that deviate – to varying degrees – from or consist of a combination of what is described in the typical situations. The typical situations are divided into three categories.

- Defence against hybrid warfare and host nation support capabilities.

²⁸ The seven capabilities are 1) Assured continuity of government and critical government services, 2) Resilient energy supplies, 3) Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people, 4) Resilient food and water resource, 5) Ability to deal with mass casualties, 6) Resilient civil communications systems, and 7) Resilient civil transport systems

²⁹ Swedish Armed Forces, Försvarsmaktens lärdomar från kriget i Ukraina, FM2023:2379-9, 2 November 2023 and Fördjupade lärdomar och erfarenheter från kriget i Ukraina, FM2023-2379:18 31 May 2024

³⁰ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, Erfarenheter från Ukraina – Lärdomar för det civila försvaret. Slutredovisning av regeringsuppdrag Fö2023/01325, MSB2381, 7 June 2024

³¹ Regarding the Swedish Armed Forces' use of the term 'typical situation', see Swedish Armed Forces, Försvarsmaktens strategiska inriktning 2021–2030, FM2021-7333:1, 19 March 2021, p. 30

- Defence against armed attack involving combat on Swedish territory.
- Defence against armed attack involving combat outside Swedish territory within the framework of NATO's activities.³²

The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis considers that these openly reported typical situations described by the Swedish Armed Forces are also of relevance for civil defence planning and coherent total defence.

Threat landscapes and assumptions that can serve as a basis for coordinated total defence planning are also described in the Defence Commission's documentation ahead of future defence decisions. Several of these largely correspond to the starting points set out in the 2020 defence decision, but have now been adapted to Sweden's membership of NATO. For instance, it is stated that planning must be based on the assumption that Sweden is at war, and that acts of war are taking place both on other allied territory and on Swedish territory, and that the North Atlantic Council has invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and that the government has declared the highest level of preparedness. As was the case prior to the 2020 defence decision, it is proposed that planning should ensure that activities essential to total defence are able to operate for three months despite severe strain, which will allow time to adjust in order to cope with a longer period of serious security policy crisis or war.³³

In a corresponding manner, the Defence Commission has indicated the same areas as before when identifying strategically important geographical areas, but has also added certain areas that are important for NATO's military operations in Northern Europe in the event of war.³⁴

Drawing on lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, the Defence Commission has described the consequences for key societal functions in the event of a security policy crisis or war. It notes that Russia has brutally, deliberately and indiscriminately attacked civilians and civilian infrastructure, impacting on the emergency services and civil protection, for instance. The Defence Commission also describes how other civil assets such as energy

³² Swedish Armed Forces, Försvarsmaktens budgetunderlag för 2025, FM2023-24770:10, Annex 1, 1 March 2024, pp. 4–5.

³³ Ds 2023:34, Kraftsamling. Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försvaret, 19 December 2023, p. 47

³⁴ Ds 2023:34, Kraftsamling. Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försvaret, 19 December 2023, p. 46

supply, electronic communications, the financial sector and healthcare may be subjected to various types of attack.³⁵

The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis considers that the more specific and detailed descriptions of the societal consequences of war provided by the Defence Commission provide a useful foundation for efforts to develop clearer guidelines for total defence planning.

5.2 Conditions for capability targets

As indicated above, proposals and comments were set out during the interviews conducted by the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis regarding the need for key figures and indicators in order to specify levels of ambition for aspects such as resources and capabilities within different parts of total defence. The aim of this would be both to enable clearer planning and to improve the conditions for evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of different activities. The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis concurs with this assessment.

Total defence development takes place at different levels, and with different actors. The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis notes that a number of preparedness agencies are working on the issue of needs and ambition levels within total defence; in areas such as energy supply, transport, food supply and health and medical care, for example.³⁶

The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis wishes in particular to highlight the assignment given by the government to the National Board of Health and Welfare regarding the development of key figures and capability targets for health and medical care planning for civil defence. The purpose of this assignment was to determine what health and medical care needs may arise in wartime, thereby allowing their activities to be planned and dimensioned so that health and medical care can be maintained even in wartime. The capability targets presented in December 2023 are intended to be used by

³⁵ Ds 2023:34, Kraftsamling. Inriktningen av totalförsvaret och utformningen av det civila försvaret, 19 December 2023, pp. 180–181, 184, 199, 203, 231, 236–237, 246–247, 259, 283, 296.

³⁶ See, for example, the Swedish Energy Agency's report *Energiförsörjning för totalförsvaret – redovisning av regeringsuppdrag* (KN2023/03802), 20 December 2023, the Swedish Transport Administration's report *Åtgärder för att stärka förmågan inom krisberedskap och civilt försvar inom beredskapssektorn för transporter*, LI2023/02842, TRV 2023/75532, 15 January 2024, and the joint report by the Swedish Food Agency, the Swedish Board of Agriculture and the National Veterinary Institute titled *Uppbyggnad av livsmedelsberedskapen 2021–2023*, 27 March 2024

regions and municipalities to support training or planning for resource utilisation, for example. The scenarios used are based on various forms of armed attacks affecting the civilian population. Injury patterns and casualty outcomes for typical events were calculated in order to describe different casualty outcomes for attacks on major cities or municipalities with urban communities of different sizes. The information produced is scalable and can be used to calculate the expected casualty outcome in individual municipalities or areas under given conditions. The capability targets include the number of injured persons and the types of injuries in different types of scenarios involving armed attacks. The National Board of Health and Welfare stresses that the targets presented are based on a large number of assumptions and should therefore be regarded as a forecast. It is also noted that the results are based on calculation models that are still being developed, which is why the capability targets reported should be viewed as a first step in the development of more robust figures.³⁷ In the 2024 appropriation directions, the National Board of Health and Welfare has been tasked with developing and updating the information for these key figure calculations and capability targets by incorporating the dimensioning requirements resulting from NATO membership.³⁸

³⁷ National Board of Health and Welfare, Nyckeltal och dimensionerande målbilder för hälso- och sjukvårdens planering för civilt försvar, 2023-12-8916, December 2023, pp. 7 and 16–17

³⁸ Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2024 avseende Socialstyrelsen, S2020/05537 et al., 21 December 2023

6. Proposals for the development of future guidelines

The proposals in this interim report concern identified areas for development relating to the government assignment to the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency on coordinated planning for coherent total defence, and to guidelines and assignments to preparedness agencies regarding developed planning within various preparedness sectors. The aim of our proposals is to assist in efforts to prepare new guidelines that the government may adopt in connection with future defence decisions.

The starting point is that coherent total defence planning involving many different actors needs to be based on a shared understanding among those actors of the overall threat landscape. There should also be a shared understanding of how an adversary might act during a security policy crisis or war, and of the societal consequences of such an attack. It should be possible to adapt, process and break down these threat landscapes and impact assessments so that they can be used for planning in different geographical areas and for different activities.

Over time, the guidelines for coordinated planning may need to be supplemented with further government assignments that focus on promoting and developing more detailed planning in certain areas of society and preparedness sectors, for instance.

There is also a need for a shared understanding of the key terminology used in efforts to develop total defence. Referring to coherent total defence planning may be assumed to imply that there is a separate planning process of this kind alongside the planning that takes place in civil and military defence, which in turn is already subject to coordination. The actual situation becomes clearer if reference is made instead to coordinated planning for coherent total defence, in line with what is stated in the *Handlingskraft* action plan (see chapter 3 of this report). Furthermore, conditions, processes and the division of responsibilities differ for capability-building planning and capability employment planning. Future guidance in respect of planning for coherent total defence should therefore make it clear which type of planning the guidance is referring to, or alternatively that the guidance covers both types of planning.

6.1 Proposal on clear and updated planning assumptions

The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis proposes that the government task the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency – on the basis of their areas of responsibility – with joint preparation of descriptions of the threat landscape, further developed scenarios and assumptions regarding the evolution of the situation in the event of an armed attack involving combat operations on or outside Swedish territory within the framework of NATO’s activities. Given what is stated in the Defence Commission’s report *Kraftsamling*, for example, we propose that the assignment should include indicating possible civil targets that could be attacked and the impact of such attacks on various societal functions. It must be possible for a wide range of public and private actors to use these scenarios and planning assumptions to support total defence planning. The assignment should be carried out in close cooperation with the relevant agencies responsible for sectors.

The government’s guidelines should state that the threat landscape that forms the basis for the 2024 defence decision and the agencies’ own threat landscape analyses and planning documents provide the intended starting point for the work. That said, the guidelines should point out that the work must also reflect the fact that a real security policy crisis or wartime situation may only correspond in part to what can be described in the scenarios and assumptions produced. It should be clearly stated that there is a need for flexibility in planning that also provides scope for total defence actors to deal with unforeseen events.³⁹

To support planning efforts for coherent total defence – working on the basis of what is set out in the forthcoming defence decision and the information underlying it – scenarios and assumptions should further develop:

- which parts of society and which societal functions may be subject to attack by an adversary in a security policy crisis or war,
- which geographical areas in Sweden may be of strategic interest and constitute priority targets for an adversary and therefore require special attention in the planning process,

³⁹ See Swedish Armed Forces, *Försvarsmaktens nya budgetunderlag för 2025*, FM2023-24770:26, Annex 1, 5 June 2024, p. 10

- assumptions regarding timeframes, working on the basis of what is set out in the defence decision.

The scenarios and assumptions should be designed in such a manner that they can be used as a basis for efforts to strengthen total defence. They should cover war situations of different types and include information on how an adversary might potentially act against Swedish interests, by what means, and the consequences this would have for society. The content should cover the actions of an adversary both in wartime and in what are known as hybrid situations.

The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis notes that there are two possible options for producing such scenarios, assumptions and impact assessments. One option is for the government to give separate assignments to the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, based on their areas of responsibility. Another option is for the government to give any such assignment jointly to both agencies.

The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis considers that guidelines issued in connection with future defence decisions should be given jointly to the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. Joint assignments with guidelines for the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency were issued in connection with the defence decisions for both 2015 and 2020. The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis notes that issuing a joint assignment to the agencies may result in additional effort in implementation; in terms of coordination, division of responsibilities and reporting, for example. However, we also wish to emphasise the fact that the symbolic value of the joint support of the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency for information on which a broad range of total defence actors can base their continued efforts to develop total defence capabilities should not be underestimated.

Future guidelines should make it clear that working on a joint assignment of this kind also involves a division of labour based on the agencies' areas of responsibility. The Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency have different roles in producing threat landscapes and analyses of societal consequences.

The guidelines for the Swedish Armed Forces state that the Armed Forces are to gather intelligence and detect and identify external threats to Sweden and Swedish interests. They also state that the Swedish Armed Forces must

regularly provide information to the relevant agencies about defence planning circumstances that are of significance for their activities.⁴⁰ The guidelines for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency state that the agency is to work with and promote coordination between the relevant societal actors in order to prevent and manage the consequences of war and the threat of war, as well as helping to reduce the consequences of war and the threat of war. Furthermore, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency has to represent civil defence at a central level in matters of significance for the balance between civil and military needs for society's resources, unless otherwise provided by other legislation.⁴¹

In this context, the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis would like to provide a reminder of the importance of having a common starting point for all total defence actors. Information should be available that can form a basis for the development of total defence capability, and that all parties involved are able to access and use as a foundation in their own planning. Such information can also be used by actors who form part of total defence but do not participate in the work of the preparedness sectors or civilian areas, for instance, or are not involved in defence planning with the Swedish Armed Forces.

It should be possible to disseminate planning assumptions and descriptions of the threat landscape to all relevant total defence actors, such as government agencies, regions, municipalities, the business community and voluntary organisations, insofar as this is effective and appropriate. Information that is more detailed or sensitive must be distributed in accordance with applicable provisions in respect of confidentiality and protective security.

6.2 Proposals on capability targets

The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis proposes that the government instruct the agencies in the preparedness sectors, as well as the central preparedness agencies outside these sectors, to develop capability targets within their areas of responsibility. A key element of such an assignment should be to perform an initial analysis of the criteria for developing effective target models in various areas of responsibility. The Swedish

⁴⁰ Section 3 of the Ordinance containing guidelines for the Swedish Armed Forces (2007:1266)

⁴¹ Section 1 of the Ordinance containing guidelines for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (2008:1002)

Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency should provide support on the basis of their areas of responsibility. It is particularly important that the agencies contributing to NATO's Seven Baseline Requirements for National Resilience be awarded such assignments. Given the security policy situation, this work should commence as soon as possible.

The Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis notes that there is a need for clear objectives, indications of which measures are to be prioritised, and defined levels of ambition for efforts to plan for total defence. The clearer the support for planning – by means of impact assessments, capability targets and key figures, for example – the better the conditions for the preparedness agencies to take responsibility for developing and strengthening capabilities within their areas of responsibility. The scenarios and planning assumptions developed in accordance with the proposal in the section above should be capable of being analysed, broken down and specified in terms of consequences and capability needs within different preparedness sectors. However, the Swedish Agency for Defence Analysis notes that the conditions for producing capability targets and key figures may vary between different areas of society. Developing capability targets with measurable indicators regarding the supply of goods in the field of total defence differs from corresponding work regarding the supply of services, for instance. Therefore, the preparedness sectors face different methodological challenges in such development work. To be able to produce capability targets and key figures, the preparedness agencies should initially analyse the conditions for producing such targets and figures within their own areas of responsibility.

As stated previously, a number of preparedness agencies have started working on specifying needs and levels of ambition within their own areas of responsibility.

The National Board of Health and Welfare, for example, has been tasked by the government with analysing and reporting on capability targets for health and medical care for civil defence.⁴² Other preparedness sectors are also calling for specific common starting points and clearer capability

⁴² As part of the National Board of Health and Welfare's assignment for urgent strengthening of national and regional capability in managing mass-casualty incidents, capability targets and key figures are intended to form the basis for how patients should be distributed between hospitals and regions (see National Board of Health and Welfare, Nyckeltal och dimensionerande målbilder för hälso- och sjukvårdens planering för civilt försvar, 2023-12-8916, December 2023, p. 9).

requirements in order to support planning in their own areas of responsibility. In this regard, the work carried out by the National Board of Health and Welfare can serve as a good example of how such work can be done.

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